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INTRODUCTION 
Since the early 1930*s over capacity and low incomes in agriculture 
have been persistent problems within the United States. Technological 
advances and economic development in the form of substitution of capital 
inputs for labor inputs have increased output greatly and lowered the 
demand for physical labor. From 1940 to 1960, farm output increased 55 
percent, the output per unit of labor increased 210 percent, and the 
percentage of the population classified as rural decreased from 42 per­
cent to 28 percent (37). This rise in output has increased supply be­
yond demand. Prices have fallen and incomes of farmers have generally 
not risen as rapidly as the incomes of those employed in the other 
sectors of the economy. 
During this period government farm programs have played an ever 
increasing role in the farmer's life. On the Wiole these programs have 
been designed to deal with the price problem. Farm programs in the Mid­
west have gone from commodity credit programs to soil bank programs to 
the present feed grain program. The dependency of farmers upon govern­
ment farm programs has reached the point where it is estimated that 
wheat prices could drop as low as 74 cents per bushel and corn prices as 
low as 66 cents per bushél if government programs were discontinued (37). 
To date, these farm programs have failed to solve the major structural 
problems of agriculture. 
There is limited consensus within the farming sector concerning 
government farm policy. Not only do farmers have varied opinions about 
the goals of farm policy, but they also disagree over which programs 
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will most effectively bring about the desired results. Farmers differ 
widely in their perceptions of the role the government should play in 
agriculture. Although many farmers are relatively satisfied with the 
present government production-control and price support programs, some 
have expressed a desire for much stronger controls while others favor a 
large reduction in government controls. Many observers have asserted 
that this lack of consensus has impeded progress toward solving the 
major structural problems which are present in American agriculture. 
Various social scientists have suggested that conflicting values 
and beliefs are two very important variables \rfiich are responsible for 
the diversity of opinion. They have hypothesized that certain value 
and belief differences among farmers are associated with the variety 
of views concerning what kind of overall farm program is needed and how 
such a program should be implemented. This suggestion stems from the 
general proposition that values and beliefs influence the choices and 
actions of men. 
Sociologists have often examined values and beliefs within the 
context of conflict and competition. Social scientists have become in­
creasingly interested in the state of competition and overt conflict 
which is present in all societies. Many have considered the bases of 
competition and conflict to exist in the differences in modes of thought, 
values, and beliefs. A great deal of attention has been focused upon 
the role of values and beliefs in the determinations of ideas, ideologies 
and social action. An outcome of both the theoretical and empirical 
results of these studies has been the proposition that values are 
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influential variables in the determination of behavior. The theoretical 
arguments have been much more convincing than the empirical demonstra­
tions of these principles. 
Given this background, it is understandable that people working in 
the area of farm policy have suggested that values and beliefs are im­
portant variables in the determination of both the ends of policy and 
the means by which given policies are accomplished. If values and be­
liefs influence the selection of ends, then it is likely that certain 
farm operators who are more oriented toward such ends as security, 
familism, leisure and various other non-economic activities may have a 
different conception of policy than those who are oriented toward eco­
nomic and profit maximization activities. Farm operators \Aio are 
oriented toward the same ends may differ sharply over which means will 
best accomplish those ends. For example, individuals vho believe in 
independent action may have quite a different perception of how certain 
ends might be gained than individuals who are more group and collective­
ly oriented. 
Three decades ago, rural society was considered to be a homogeneous 
entity characterized by value and belief consensus rather than by value 
and belief conflicts. Descriptions of rural values and beliefs focused 
primarily upon the differences between rural and urban values and beliefs 
and not upon value and belief conflicts within rural society per se. 
More recently, portions of the rural population have been conceived to 
be moving closer to the central value orientations of society and there­
by breaking down the homogeneous state of rural society. Rural value 
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positions are now considered to be ambiguous and heterogeneous. Conse­
quently, value and belief conflicts within the rural sector are con­
sidered to be more important factors than they were in the past. 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to examine the impact of 
values and beliefs upon farm policy positions and actions. There are 
two major reasons for undertaking this research. First, there is very 
little empirical research extant concerning the hypothesized relation­
ship between certain value-orientations and farm policy positions and 
actions. Empirical research related to this hypothesis is needed to 
determine more precisely vAiat role values and beliefs play in the pre­
sent farm policy conflict. Second, research of this nature should 
articulate the various value and belief conflicts which are present 
in rural society. Knowledge of these conflicts may be useful in the 
development of more informed farm policy. 
The specific objectives of this dissertation are: 
1. To determine the nature and type of value and belief patterns 
of Iowa farmers. 
2. To determine the relationship between certain value and be­
lief dimensions and farm policy positions and actions. 
3. To determine the relationship between the various value and 
belief dimensions. 
4. To determine the degree of association between value and be­
lief configurations and farm policy positions and actions. 
5. To determine the degree to which value and belief dimensions 
will predict the positions and actions of individuals with 
respect to farm policy positions and actions. 
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The dissertation is divided into four major parts. The first part 
is concerned with the derivation of the general and sub-general hypothe­
ses and the theoretical basis from vhich these hypotheses are developed. 
The next part contains a discussion of the methods and procedures used 
to collect the data. The procedures involved in the gathering of the 
data, the measures of the major concepts, and the statistical tests used 
are described and discussed. The findings relevant to the hypotheses 
developed are presented in the third part. The last part of the disserta­
tion contains certain additional findings and an interpretation and 
evaluation of the findings. A brief summary of the dissertation is also 
included in this part. 
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REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
A review of literature is essential to any research endeavor. The 
main functions of the review of literature are to: determine xriiat work, 
both theoretical and empirical, has been done in the area of interest; 
assist in the delineation of the problem area; provide a basis for the 
theoretical framework; provide insights into methods and procedures and 
suggest operational definitions of major concepts; and, provide a basis 
for the interpretation of the findings. 
There is, to the author's knowledge, very little literature in 
existence concerning the relations between values, beliefs and farm 
policy. A majority of this literature is peripherally rather than 
directly related to the problem being examined in this dissertation. 
The general literature on values, beliefs, and farm policy is quite 
extensive but more relevant to the theoretical section of the disserta­
tion. Given the lack of literature directly relevant to the problem 
and the non-applicability of the bulk of the general literature, it is 
believed that a standard review of literature would not be very meaning­
ful. 
To overcome this difficulty, the review of literature has been in­
tegrated into the entire dissertation. This has also been done for 
another important reason. The various functions which the review of 
literature performs are related to each section. Relevant literature 
must be reviewed as the theoretical framework of the study is developed, 
as the methods and procedures are explained, and as the findings are 
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interpreted. If the review of literature is incorporated into the dis­
sertation rather than segmented as a separate section, it should con­
tribute to a more meaningful overall presentation. 
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THEORETICAL ORIENTATION MD DERIVATION OF HYPOTHESES 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss values, beliefs, and farm 
policy in some detail and to relate these concepts to a theoretical and 
conceptual framework for the purpose of deriving hypotheses concerning 
the expected relation between these three variables. The chapter be­
gins with some brief comments concerning the limitations of the theore­
tical scheme developed in this dissertation. This section will be 
followed by a definitive discussion of the major concepts. A general 
theoretical scheme,.will then be developed and a certain general hypoth­
eses derived. These general hypotheses will be defined more specifical­
ly by a series of sub-general hypotheses. 
Theoretical Limitations 
The role of theory in any scientific inquiry is to provide an 
explanatory and predictive framework from which testable hypotheses can 
be generated. Although the role of theory is relatively uniform from 
one science to another, the level of theoretical sophistication is not. 
The stage of development of any given scientific discipline and the 
nature of the phenomena studied may impose important restrictions upon 
the logical and explanatory completeness of many of its theoretical 
systems. The discipline of sociology is presently characterized by 
both immaturity and illusive phenomena so that most of its theories 
encounter serious limitations. Consequently, it is important that such 
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limitations be recognized and specified prior to the construction of any 
sociological theoretical scheme. 
Before stating precisely the limitations of the theoretical scheme 
developed in this dissertation, a brief discussion of the term theory 
will be presented. Many contemporary sociologists have been preoccupied 
with theory, but seldom have made explicit what they mean by the term 
theory. A cursory examination of present sociological theories finds 
elaborate taxonomies, social philosophies, "logically interdependent 
concepts", and "sets of working hypotheses" all being referred to as 
theory. This variety of definitions of theory have left the meaning of 
the term ambiguous,. 
To avoid this confusion and ambiguity, theory will be viewed in 
this dissertation in the context of the Classical definition (13). 
This definition identifies a theory of a phenomenon with an explanation 
of that phenomenon by means of a deductive system. In brief, the gen­
eral characteristics of theory in this context are the following: 
1. A set of concepts or a conceptual scheme. 
2. A set of propositions, some of which are contingent, i.e., 
experience is relevant to their truth or falsity. 
3. A deductive system, i.e., the propositions can be arranged into 
a deductive system. Concepts generally are defined on both a 
theoretical and operational level. The propositions of a de­
ductive system differ in terms of level of generality, so that 
lower order propositions are derived from higher order ones. 
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The most formal and powerful type of theory is the axiomatic theory. 
In this type of system, certain primitive concepts and propositions are 
stated and all corresponding theoretical concepts and propositions are 
deduced from these primitive concepts and propositions (110). All con­
cepts are interrelated in prepositional form and all propositions are 
derived from the combinations of higher order propositions. Costner and 
Leik have illustrated that an axiomatic theoretical system can only be 
meaningfully employed if 1) the propositions are stated in asymetrical 
causal form and 2) a closed system is assumed (21, p. 827). 
Given this definition of theory, the assumptions and the limita­
tions of the theoretical scheme developed in this dissertation can be 
stated; 
1. For reasons to be made more explicit later, no axiomatic 
theoretical system will be employed. Rather a less formal 
variation of the deductive system will be used. Lower order 
propositions will be logically derived from more general or 
higher order propositions, but these propositions will be 
stated in a rational rather than in a causal framework. 
2. The propositions will be stated in a direct relation basis, i.e., 
X varies directly as y. In other words, monotonically increas­
ing functions will be assumed. 
3. The theoretical scheme developed below is not complete. It 
should be viewed as a "middle range", theoretical scheme which 
only attempts to explain a portion of behavior. 
4. The theoretical scheme can not be viewed as a closed system. 
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The propositions must be treated as tendency statements, i.e., 
the possibility of the propositions not holding under certain 
conditions is recognized. Following Braithwaite (13), these 
tendency statements will be treated as quasi-general proposi­
tions. In this manner, the success and the failure of the 
empirical test will help provide information on the unknown 
limiting conditions that may prevail. 
Policy Positions and Policy Actions 
Having outlined the major theoretical limitations, attention will 
now be focused upon the central concepts. The first concepts which will 
be defined and discussed are policy positions and policy actions. 
Policy can be defined as an integrated program of actions which an 
actor (or group of actors) is accustomed to or intends to undertake in 
response to a given problem or situation with which he is confronted. 
A series of policies represent various behavior alternatives. Policy 
is generally considered to be a means, but under certain conditions can 
also become an end. 
As can be seen in the definition given above, there are two forms 
of behavior associated with policy: actual behavior (accustomed) and 
planned or hypothetical behavior (intended). Accustomed behavior refers 
to overt validated behavior or participation in past and present policy. 
Henceforth this type of behavior will be called policy actions. In­
tended behavior represents the actor's predispositions towards proposed 
policy alternatives. This type of policy behavior is defined as an 
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actor's verbal expression of how he would behave with respect to a given 
set of proposed policy alternatives. Intended policy behavior will be 
referred to as policy positions throughout the remainder of this dis­
sertation. 
The specific type of policy actions and policy positions which will 
be examined in this study are government farm programs. Since the mid 
1930's, the United States has had some kind of a government farm program. 
These programs have been designed to deal with three major problems in 
agriculture: over-production, low income, and adjustment. 
Programs designed to control supply and thereby stabilize prices 
have been implemented in an attempt to overcome the problems of over­
production and low income. Most of these programs have been voluntary, 
i.e., the farmer has the choice of participating or not participating in 
the program. Land retirement and production allotments have been the 
most important types of supply control programs. The surplus and income 
problems have also been approached from the demand side. Programs de­
signed to increase the demand for farm products both here and abroad 
such as school lunch programs, Food-For-Peace, and various tariff 
programs have been enacted. 
Programs to aid the rural people in the rapid adjustment process 
\rtiich is occurring in agriculture have begun to appear. Information 
concerning non-farm employment and a few retraining facilities have been 
made available to some rural people. More programs of this nature have 
been proposed. These programs would make the transition from farm to 
non-farm easier through such means as 1) establishing a number of 
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adequate retraining centers, and 2) providing financial aid to rural 
farmers VAÏO relocate in non-farm jobs. 
Direct payment programs have been implemented at various times dur­
ing the last 30 years. These programs attack the income problem direct­
ly, for the farmer receives a cash amount for the difference between the 
prevailing market price and some target price. 
Other types of programs have been proposed but not enacted. It has 
been suggested by some policy makers that compulsory programs similar to 
the present supply control programs be established. Under this type of 
program, all farmers would be required by law to conform to any govern­
ment regulations concerning their production. Others have contended that 
the problems of adjustment, over-capacity, and low income would be most 
rapidly solved if all government programs were eliminated. Prices, sup­
ply, and the fate of the farmer, therefore, would be determined by the 
mechanisms of the market. Another type of program which has been sug­
gested is the restraint program. The restraint type program is designed 
to preserve the American agricultural heritage by reversing the trends 
of adjustment through such means as taxing the use of large equipment 
and reducing government support for agricultural research. 
This brief review of farm policy illustrates that a number of sug­
gestions have been offered over the last 30 years concerning how the 
problems of over-capacity, low income, and adjustment can be solved. 
The diversity of these suggestions have important significaneeras will 
be seen in the latter part of this chapter. A relatively representative 
cross section of farm programs which have been enacted, which are 
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presently in effect, or which have been proposed will be examined in 
this study. For purposes of analysis, these government farm programs 
have been organized into six categories. The government farm program 
categories and their respective definitions are given below: 
1. Compulsory (mandatory) price - supply management and control 
programs — these include government programs which control 
supply and prices through the use of 1) market quotas to each 
producer, 2) acreage allotments to each farmer, and 3) compul­
sory purchasing of land. 
2. Voluntary price - supply management and control programs — 
these programs are designed to control supply and prices by 
restricting production primarily through acreage allotments and 
market quotas. These programs are binding only upon those vAio 
choose to enter them. 
3. Free market program — a program which would essentially abblish 
all governmental controls and leave the determination of supply 
- and price to the market mechanisms. 
4. Auxiliary adjustment programs — these include government pro­
grams which encourage the process of agricultural adjustment 
by providing education, information, retraining, and direct 
financial aid to farm people in order that they might find em­
ployment in non-farm jobs. 
5. Agricultural restraint programs — government programs designed 
to slow down the process of agricultural adjustment. These 
consist of programs designed to discourage large scale 
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production and agricultural research. 
6. Income transfer programs — these include programs which con­
sist of subsidies in the form of direct cash payments and/or 
special compensations to certain interest groups (e.g. small 
farmers). 
Values 
The concept value has an important history in many disciplines. 
The use of the concept value by these many disciplines in a variety of 
contexts, however, has left its meaning ambiguous. Clyde Kluckhohn once 
commented, "the only general agreement is that values somehow have to 
do witlj normative as opposed to existential propositions" (51, p. 390). 
A cursory examination of the literature reveals that, even on this point, 
there is much disagreement and ambiguity (46). Given this state of af­
fairs, it is essential that an attempt be made to carefully define the 
concept value so that it can be employed as a useful analytical tool in 
this study. 
A number of the more significant definitions of the concept value 
will be summarized below. Various criticisms of these definitions which 
have been raised will also be given. Once these definitions have been 
discussed, a summary and a synthesis of these definitions will be at­
tempted. From this synthesis, a definition of value as used in this 
study will be developed. It is believed that this approach will help 
clarify the term value and result in a more precise definition of the 
concept. 
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Values equated with ends and goals 
A number of definitions which appear in the literature equate values 
with goals, i.e., with the purpose or outcome of action. Philosopher 
Ralph Barton Perry (74) views values in terms of objects of.interest 
and perspective goals. Pepper (73) finds the sources of values in any-
purposeful behavior whether it be biological, social or otherwise. 
This approach to values is also evident in sociology. Lasswell and 
Kaplan view values, within a behavioral context, as: 
"...a desired event — a goal event. That x values y means 
that X acts so as to bring about the consummation of y. The 
act of valuing we call 'valuation', and we speak of the ob­
ject or situation desired as value" (58, p. 17). 
The major difficulty with the equation values equals goals, out­
comes of actions, etc., is that values are reduced to "things desired". 
Jacob and Flink (46) and Fallding (29) point out that this approach to 
values defines the term so broadly that it looses its meaning, not only 
theoretically but operationally as well. The term remains ambiguous 
for — 
"the broad equation of values with all goals seems to obliviate 
initial distinctions between these goals which, at one extreme, 
reflect primarily the impulsive demands of the biological or­
ganisms whose satisfactions are essential to the survival of 
the organism ('needs' in one of the more precise contemporary 
usages) and at the other, goals which have been shaped by 
layers upon layers of learned standards of social priority -
as well as those influenced by normative criteria more partic-
ularily to the individual" (46, p. 20). 
This view of values also implies that the locus of value lies in the 
object, rather than in the product of the interaction between the subject 
and the object. This implication is particularly evident in the Lass-
well-Kaplan (58) definition. 
17 
Kluckhohn (51) has suggested that the concept value cuts across 
goals relative to an action sequence. Values are not the concrete goals 
of behavior but are the aspects of these goals. Values, for Kluckhohn, 
are the criteria against which goals are chosen and appear as the im­
plications which these goals have in the situation (51, p. 429). 
Values as hierarchal attitude structures 
Values have also been conceived as attitudes organized into hier­
archal structures (48, 67, 83, 87, 109). This position is particularly 
widespread among those who have worked in the area of social psychology. 
Attitudes are usually defined as enduring systems of positive or negative 
evaluations, emotional feelings, and pro and con tendencies with respect 
to a specific social object (54, p. 139). It is suggested that these 
attitudes become integrated into broad patterns and form generalized 
attitudes or values. Within this framework, attitudes are oriented 
toward single objects whereas values are oriented towards an entire 
class of objects. Values take on all the characteristics of attitudes 
but are more general in orientation. 
On the surface, this appears to be a relatively logical and plausi­
ble approach. Upon closer examination, however, some important questions 
arise concerning this definition. If values are defined as an integrated 
system of attitudes, then one would at the very least expect a one-to-one 
relationship between the general content and direction of a value and a 
related attitude. Krech, et (54) suggests that this direct cor­
respondence does not necessarily exist, for the "...same value may lead 
different persons to develop different -- even opposing — attitudes. 
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...The functional relation between a single value and the attitude of 
the individual is influenced by all his other cognitions, values, and 
attitudes, by his wants, and by his group affiliations. Because of this 
we should not expect to find a simple, univocal relation" (54, p. 193). 
If one refutes the notion of a one-to-one correspondence between values 
and their related component attitudes, the definition given in the pre­
ceding paragraph is only useful in an idiosyncratic sense. To define 
values in this manner would not be very meaningful for social science 
research. 
Values equated with action 
A rather polemic view of values can be found in the work of Franz 
Adler (2). Ad1er has classified the concept of value into four basic 
types. He sees the concept applied variously to 1) absolute quantities 
inherent in events or in contemplated states of affair, 2) characteris­
tics of objects as apprehended by people, 3) characteristics of people 
who do the evaluating, and 4) the actual behavior of people toward ob­
jects. Adler places the first classification of values in the category 
of niaumena, thereby inaccessible to scientific inquiry. Adler believes 
the second meaning of value can never be discovered apart from the human 
behavior relating to the specific object. This circularity, according 
to Adler, makes them inaccessible to scientific measurement. According 
to the third classification, values are conceived as being within the 
biological organism. Adler believes values conceived in this manner 
cannot be measured by scientific means because such internal events are 
inaccessible to direct observation. Adler concludes, therefore, that 
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the fourth classification of values which equates values with human ac­
tion is the only meaningful definition for scientific inquiry. 
Adler's position has been strongly criticized by both Catton (18) 
and Scott (82). The major criticism raised by both of these observers 
is a basic one. Each point out that if value is equated with action, 
it would require a proliferation of terminology such that each different 
response to an object would require the designation of a different value. 
Approaching the study at this level, they contend, would imply confining 
the work of the researcher to simply discerning and recording various 
empirical phenomena. Consequently, there would be no means available 
whereby such empirical phenomena could be classified into various re­
curring categories. They have also pointed out that if one equates 
values with action, it would at least be necessary to delimit the clas­
ses of action. . Ad1er has not done this. 
Catton (18) does not consider Adler's third class of values inac­
cessible to the methods of science. Catton suggests that this class of 
values is equivalent to "conceived values" as defined by Charles Morris 
(63). Conceived values are those vAiich are based upon the anticipation 
of the outcome of alternative behaviors and may be operationally defined 
as factors to be found through an analysis of preferences. Catton con­
tends that Adler's third class of values are accessible to the methods 
of science..."if we are willing to adopt the general position that 
preferential behavior, both symbolic and non-symjaolic, can be observed, 
recorded, and studied" (18, p. 312). 
Scott (82) and Catton (18) suggest that defining value as a 
hypothetical construct rather than as human action is much more useful 
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both theoretically and empirically. The major gain from employing hy­
pothetical constructs in the scientific explanation of behavior is that 
they lend economy to the conceptualization of what is an exceedingly 
complex set of events, virtually incomprehensible to the most superior 
intellect (82). Such hypothetical constructs have been useful to science 
since the time of Newton. They lend parsimony to the study of a given 
phenomena, and allow one to subsume many empirical regularities into 
one theory. 
Values as influential standards 
Many sociologists and anthropologists have considered values to be 
influential standards. These scholars have defined values as normative 
standards or normative criteria by which human beings are influenced in 
their choices among perceived courses of action (5, 46, 50, 51, 72, 103, 
104). Values therefore, refer to normative (as opposed to existential) 
propositions concerning what people believe they ought to desire or rela­
tions they believe ought to exist between phenomena. Values are the 
standards upon lAich evaluations are made; the criteria by \rfiich both 
means and ends are selected. This definition generally implies that the 
individual is emotionally committed to these standards in such a manner 
that these standards influence, guide or direct his behavior in a logical 
manner. 
Some of those who have defined values in this manner have made an 
important distinction between what is desired and that which is desirable 
(46, 51, 103, 104). They point out that values in the sense of standards 
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are "conceptions of the desirable." These standards refer to "what I 
ought to desire" in contrast to "what I do desire". From this point of 
view, values define the limits of permissible cost of impulse satisfac­
tion in accord with the whole array of hierarchal enduring goals of the 
personality (51). This distinction, in effect, separates cathexis from 
values for cathexis is generally considered in a short term or narrow 
impulse response \Aiere value is viewed in a broader or long term sense. 
The question of value does not arise solely on the basis of some need, 
but only vAien the possibility of selection is in accord with certain 
abstract standards (50). Values, therefore,function as 1) imperatives 
in judging how one's social world ought to be structured and operated 
and 2) standards for evaluating and rationalizing the propriety of 
individual and social choices. 
There are several difficulties with this approach to values. One 
difficulty has been the failure on the part of those #L0 have used this 
type of definition to see the distinction between definition and proposi­
tion. As Catton (18) has pointed out, the notion that values "influence, 
guide, channel, direct, motivate, etc. human beings in their choices 
among alternative choices of actions" should not be included as part of 
the definition of values but designated as a proposition concerning the 
relationship between values and behavior. Since the relationship be­
tween behavior and values is far from being validated, it appears to be 
more useful to consider this section of the definition as a hypothesis 
to be tested rather than an integral part of the definition. 
It should also be recognized that the notion values influence, 
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direct, guide, etc., behavior may imply a causal relationship. This 
makes the definition even more unsatisfactory, for it is very difficult 
to establish a-priori a causal relationship between values and behavior. 
This point will be elaborated in more detail below. 
Another difficulty which arises lAen values are defined as norma­
tive standards or normative criteria is the problem of ambiguity (2, 23). 
It is not clear \^ at these standards refer to. This difficulty can be 
traced to the latent nature of these standards. Since latent variables 
are by definition unobservable, a precise definition of these standards 
or "inner mechanism" is not readily forthcoming. However, considering 
the usefulness of hypothetical constructs (in a scientific framework), 
concepts such as values must be defined in latent and non-observable terms 
to retain their utility. The precise meaning of latent concepts can 
only be established once sufficient empirical evidence is obtained lAiich 
show the phenomena behave precisely as predicted by the definition. 
Values as preferences 
Values have also been defined as preferences of an actor for a given 
object or situation. Robert C. Angell (3) defines values as "lasting 
preferences for the way in which one's social world is structured and 
operated" (3). Williams (103) states that, "...a belief is a convic­
tion about something real whereas a value is a preference..." (103, 
p. 379). Values, therefore, are equated with the relative worth of the 
perceived alternatives. This definition probably comes the closest to 
the ejery day usage of the term value. 
Jacob and Flink (46) have questioned the general applicability of 
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this definition. While admitting this definition may be quite adequate 
for certain types of problems, they point out that it may not be of much 
use for other types of problems. The concept preference does not neces­
sarily imply a normative context, for it may apply to things desired as 
well as things that ought to be desired. As Jacob and Flink have pointed 
out: 
"Another difficulty is that attention is focused rather ex­
clusively upon what ego prefers, and no conceptual distinction 
is formally made between either 1) ego's drives and/or cathexes 
and ego's evaluation of the propriety of these drives and/or 
cathexes, or 2) preferences which are supported by ego's in­
ternalized sanctions, preferences which are maintained by the 
perceived threat of direct physical coercion by alter, and 
preferences which are not associated with sanctions. We feel 
that these types of phenomena are in many cases distinguishable 
at an experiential level, and that, therefore, it would be 
useful to distinguish them conceptually. Conceptual clarity 
would seem to dictate on this ground that all of these types 
of preferences should not be called values" (46, pp. 20-21). 
Preferences also are not necessarily enduring and stable. The dura­
tion of preferences has not been established empirically so that they may 
not be an enduring and stable component of the personality system. Thus 
the equation of preferences with values introduces confusion about the 
stability and duration of values. 
Some conclusions concerning values 
This brief survey of how values have been defined by philosophers, 
sociologists, social psychologists, and anthropologists illustrates why 
the term is relatively ambiguous and elusive. None of the definitions 
given above is free of criticism and thus completely acceptable. Both 
the array of phenomena and the level of conceptualization vary widely 
from one definition to the next. Until the concept value has been given 
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a more precise empirical meaning, it is likely that its definition will 
remain unsatisfactory for scientific inquiry. 
Keeping in mind these definitional difficulties, certain generaliza­
tions and premises will be set forth concerning the concept value. Al­
though no attempt will be made to consolidate these conclusions into an 
intensive definition of values, this synthesis will represent the major 
points that will be included in the definition of values in this dis­
sertation. In view of the fact that values has referred to a large 
quantity of phenomena, the definition given below should not be con­
sidered to be the "correct" one or the only one, but rather an approach 
to the term value which appears feasible within the context of sociology 
and this dissertation. 
1. Within the context of sociology, value should not be identified 
with need or object, but rather must be understood as the rela­
tion between subject and object. It is a relational rather 
than an entity concept which rest in a nexus of relationship 
between subject and object. The locus of value is not to be 
found in the object but rather in the product of the interac­
tion between subject and object, 
2, Value should be conceptually distinguished from attitude and 
not considered as a system of attitudes. It is plausible to 
assume that attitudes are formed in a relation to values, but 
the nature of this formation is most likely a function of each 
individual's personality structure. The relation between value 
and attitude can most meaningfully be seen if one considers 
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the value-expressive function of attitudes as proposed by Katz 
(48). Value-expressive attitudes have the function of giving 
a positive expression of each person's central values and the 
type of person he conceives himself to be. This conceptualiza­
tion is useful, for it considers values and attitudes within 
the personality rather than in a societal or correspondence 
framework. 
The concept value can be most meaningfully employed if it is 
viewed as a hypothetical construct. Hypothetical constructs 
and concepts allow for the grouping of large quantities of re­
lated empirical phenomena into meaningful categories. This, in 
turn, allows for the discovery of important regularities that 
occur within these hypothetical construct categories. 
Value can be a useful concept if it is defined as a normative 
standard or normative criterion. Value, defined in this man­
ner, becomes a more generic conept than lAien it is equated to 
either means or ends, for it is defined as standards upon which 
alternative means and ends may be evaluated. Value should not 
be defined, however, as an influential or directive force which 
guides behavior. Defining value as an influential force which 
guides behavior not only interjects into the definition an un­
confirmed hypothesis but introduces a "hopeless and useless 
circularity" (2) as well. 
Value is a more useful concept %ben it is not confused or equa­
ted with impulses, preferences, and cathexis. By separating 
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these concepts from value, value can retain its normative con­
text and be viewed as broad and long range in nature. 
Value in this dissertation will be defined as an abstract latent 
normative, standard which is a product of the interaction between subject 
and object and represents an individual's concept of what men ought to 
desire and what relationships ought to exist between phenomena. 
Types and Properties of Values 
A brief discussion of certain of the properties of values and some 
of the types of values will now be presented. This examination of the 
nature of types of values is an attempt to elaborate the discussion and 
definition of values given in the previous section. 
Properties of values 
Jacob and Flink (46) have listed seven major properties of values. 
These properties make it possible to distinguish values from other like 
concepts. A property in its strict logical sense implies an attribute 
which is common to all members of its class, and implies complete knowl­
edge of the qualities of the phenomena being defined. It is doubtful 
that properties of values can be viewed in this manner. Thus it may be 
more correct to refer to these as propositions concerning values rather 
than as properties. Whether properties or propositions of values, these 
distinctions will be useful in later chapters of this dissertation. 
1. Values possess the property of selectivity, i.e., the quality 
of ordering the options available in terms which those v^ o have 
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had to make the choices will accept them as decisive. 
2. Values do not have the property of universality. All men are 
not bound by identical norms in making choices. Variability in 
values is evident from individual to individual, but this vari­
ability from a sociological viewpoint is more meaningful from ' 
social group to social group or from culture to culture. 
3. Values have the property of continuity from generation to gener­
ation. This continuity is derived primarily through the socializ­
ation process which generally employs symbols to represent the 
values communicated. 
4. Values can and do change, though they are a relatively stable 
component of the personality and have a strong influence upon 
most human beings. 
5. Values are associated with the roles which human beings fulfill 
in society, or which they aspire to fulfill. In this connec­
tion, values have the property of imposing obligations, or de­
fining what is socially expected of a person in a certain role. 
6. Values have the property of inducing self-evaluation — the 
capacity of a person to judge the propriety of his own conduct 
in reference to standards he has learned to apply to himself. 
A value conveys to the particular person holding it a sense of 
personal imperative which makes him feel personally subject to 
itis direction. 
7. Values have the property of self-inhibition, i.e., the restraint 
of action considered improper by the process of internalized 
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control, rather than by external coercive sanctions (46, pp. 15-
16). 
Types of values 
It is not difficult to find in the literature of sociology and 
anthropology relatively elaborate taxonomies of values (29, 32, 51, 72). 
The utility of such taxonomies is quite limited, for it is necessary to 
have large quantities of information concerning values before these tax­
onomies can be used. One cannot necessarily establish a-priori such 
things as the intent of values, the generality of values, or even the 
intensity of values. For this reason, these taxonomies will not be 
discussed in detail. Only a few of the key categories x^ ich will be 
used for classification purposes will be described. 
The values which will be discussed in this dissertation are con­
sidered to belong to the following categories: 
1. Group values - these refer to values vhich can be clearly 
distinguished among a plurality of individuals or within a 
given subculture. In the case of this study, the rural popula­
tion will be considered as a subculture. It is recognized that 
values are never shared exactly by the same two individuals, so 
that the category group values will be considered as an ab­
straction, i.e., statements of central tendencies rather than 
absolute distribution statements. 
2. Explicit values - these are values which are stated verbally 
by the actors rather than inferred from recurrent trends in 
behavior. 
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3. Integrated values - it is anticipated that the values examined 
in this dissertation will form an interlocking network or con­
figuration. 
4. Moral values - the content of the values which will be examined 
will generally fit into the moral mode of value-orientation as 
outlined by Parsons and Shilsx (72). This mode involved "the 
various commitments to standards by which certain consequences 
or particular actions and types of action may be assessed with 
respect to their effect upon the system of action. These 
standards define the actors choice with a view of how the con­
sequences of the choices will affect (a) the integration of his 
personality system and (b) the social system of which he is a 
participant." (72, p. 60). 
Beliefs 
The third concept of interest to this study is beliefs. This con­
cept will not be discussed in as much detail as the concept value. An 
elaborate discussion of this concept is not necessary for two reasons. 
First, there is very little literature available which is concerned with 
the concept belief. Sociologists have been much more concerned with 
values than beliefs in both theoretical and empirical studies. Often 
beliefs have been subsumed under values or have been combined with them 
to make up value-orientations. Second, there is little discourse in the 
literature concerning the definition of the concept belief. There ap­
pears to be much more agreement among social scientists concerning the 
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definition of beliefs than the definition of values. 
Beliefs refer to existential propositions held by human beings re­
garding the structure and operation of the physical and social universe 
and one's place in it (46, p. 23). A belief is a conviction that some­
thing is real or true. Beliefs are man's perception of reality, i.e., 
viiiat is perceived to exist. Beliefs are enduring cognitions and percep­
tions which are expected to serve as "vectors which bear upon an individ­
ual as he confronts a choice of conduct" (46, p. 23). 
There are several types of beliefs which may be distinguished. The 
types of beliefs which will be examined in this study include cognitive 
standards and appreciative standards (46, 72). Cognitive standards are 
existential propositions which serve as criteria to establish the validi­
ty and applicability of information, certain stimuli, etc. but are not 
themselves subject to ultimate verification. Appreciative standards are 
beliefs which serve as criteria to evaluate the potential result of an 
act, particularly in terms of its gratificatory significance. 
Beliefs are functionally related to values. Often beliefs and 
values become integrated in such a manner that value-orientations are 
formed. Value-orientations refer to a set of linked propositions v^ ich 
embrace both normative and existential elements. This interaction be­
tween beliefs and values occurs when 1) the normative judgments are 
based on the group notion of v^ at facts exist and 2) the group's con­
ception of the universe is based partly on prior normative orientation 
and interests (51, pp. 409-412). In deference to parsimony, values and 
beliefs will henceforth be called value-orientation when they are being 
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discussed simultaneously. An attempt will also be made to establish the 
existence of value-orientations as defined here. 
Although closely related, values and beliefs are not identical. 
Values are normative statements whereas beliefs are existential state­
ments. Beliefs (as defined here) define the possible courses of action, 
but unlike values provide no indication if such a course of action has a 
positive or negative effect (41, p. 38). Beliefs are concerned with cate­
gories such as "true" and "false", "correct" or "incorrect". Values re­
fer primarily to "should" and "should not"; "right" and "wrong" (51, 
p. 432). Since both values and beliefs have their basis in the percep­
tions and cognitions of the actor, they do not necessarily bear any re­
lationship to scientifically validated "facts", but indicate only what 
the actor believes to be true or what conditions ought to be. 
General Theoretical Scheme 
To determine the relationship between values, beliefs, and policy 
actions and position, several general theoretical schemes of actions 
will briefly be discussed in this section. Some propositions concern­
ing the relationship between these concepts will be derived from these 
general theoretical schemes. 
Values, beliefs, and human behavior 
As noted in the last section, some observers have defined value as 
a directive or influencing force that shapes and guides human behavior. 
The emphasis placed upon value as a directive force of behavior varies 
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considerably. Stein and Cloward, for example, maintain values "determine 
the choices men make, and the ends they live by" (90, p. 263), xdiereas 
Blake and Davis (10) prefer to "abandon the use of values as influential 
or directive agents and to recognize them frankly as sheer constructs by 
which we attempt to fill in subjective linkages in the analysis of social 
causation." 
Few social scientists take the extreme position of Stein and Cloward 
(90) who consider values as the sole determinate of behavior. A majority 
view values as only one of the important variables which influence be­
havior. Those who have attempted to develop general theories and models 
of behavior (at various levels of complexity) consider values and beliefs 
to be one of several important components. Jacob and Flink (46) specify 
three variables as being essential in the determinate of action. These 
include values, beliefs, and impulses. Although they do not consider 
these to be all of the determinates of action, they believe that these 
three factors and the interaction of these three factors exert a sig­
nificant influence upon a person which predisposes him to act in a 
specific manner vdien he responds to a different stimuli. The concepts 
value and belief also play a crucial role in the Parsons and Shils gen­
eral theory of social behavior (72). Parsons and Shils propose that the 
fundamental elements of action can be classified into two major cate­
gories — the motivational-orientations and the value-orientations of an 
individual. The distinction between the motivational-orientation and 
the value-orientation is an important one. Motivational-orientation 
refers to those aspects of the actors orientation which are related to 
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actual or potential gratification or deprivation of the actors need-
dispositions. The value-orientations, on the other hand, refer to those 
aspects of the actors orientation which commit him to the observance of 
certain norms, standards, criteria of selection, etc., whenever he is 
in a contingent situation which allows him to make a choice (72, p. 59), 
The motivational-orientation elements refers to such things as needs, 
desires, i.e., psychologically based phenomena which roughly parallel 
the impulse category of Jacob and Flink. It may be pointed out that 
although motivational-orientation elements are essential to the under­
standing of total behavior, they are outside the scope of interest in 
this dissertation. They are only important in so far as they are clearly 
distinguished from the value-orientation category of action. 
Another general model of behavior which considers values and beliefs 
as important determinates of action has been synthesized by Bohlen and 
Seal (12). This is the so-called SIR model. When man is confronted 
with a stimulus (S), he looks into his past experiences to determine if 
he has previously encountered similar stimuli. If he finds he has been 
confronted with the same stimulus before, he attempts to recall how he 
responded to this stimuli at that time. He also recalls his evaluation 
of that response in terms of his satisfaction with the outcome of his 
response. He then compares the former response with other alternatives 
in terms of which alternatives will maximize what he is attempting to 
accomplish. This phase is called the interpretation (I) phase. He 
then responds (R) to the stimuli (S) on the basis of his decision reached 
during the interpretation (I) phase of the action process. 
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Beliefs and values are two of the important elements in the inter­
pretation process. Beliefs determine the range of alternatives and 
values provide the actor with a basis upon which he can judge how desir­
able the alternatives are. In the model, values are considered as a 
pattern of judgments concerning the relative satisfactions gained from 
each experience. Values, therefore, serve as organizing agents in the 
interpretative phase of the SIR model, for they are conceived to or­
ganize both ends and means into hierarchies on the basis of favorable-
ness and acceptability to the actor. 
An important element in any theory of human action is the situa­
tion. This element is recognized by Parsons and Shils (72), Kluckhohn 
(51), Thomas and Znaniecki (93), and Newcomib (67), These writers sug­
gest that one cannot expect a perfect correspondence between values, 
beliefs and behavior because behavior is a function not only of value-
orientations but of the immediate situation as well. Newcomb (67), for 
example, suggests that human behavior is a function of the interaction 
of three variables: experience, current attitudes and values, and the 
current situation. He further suggests that although one cannot assign 
relative weights to these variables, one must view the relationship be­
tween one of these variables and behavior with respect to the other two 
elements. 
On the basis of these remarks, it would be expected that the rela­
tionship between values, beliefs, and behavior can be more completely 
understood if one has knowledge of certain situational variables. This 
hypothesis will be examined more completely in the last chapter of this 
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dissertation. 
This very superficial examination of some of the theories and models 
of behavior Suggests that values and beliefs are considered to be as im­
portant elements in the determination of action, but not the sole de­
terminates. There are many other variables such as the situation, needs, 
desires, impulses, and past experience which must also be considered. 
It should be pointed out that this review has not sought to discuss 
these theories in detail, but rather has sought only to determine the 
role of values and beliefs within these general theories. 
On the basis of the preceding discussion, it would be expected that 
values and beliefs would be related to policy behavior, i.e., policy 
positions and actions. This relationship should also be a predictable 
one, for certain types of values and beliefs would be expected to be 
related to certain types of policy alternatives. This latter point will 
be explored more in detail in the latter half of this chapter. 
The following general- hypothesis can now be stated ; 
General Hypothesis J.; There will be a predictable relationship be­
tween the policy positions and policy actions of individuals and their 
values or beliefs. 
Williams (103) and Newcomb (67) have suggested that even the most 
simple choice situations involves not single values, but complexes of 
values and value configurations. Thus a number of values may influence 
any response an actor may give to any given stimuli. Beliefs relevant 
to behavior are also often multiple and, as has been mentioned above, are 
often organized with values into interdependent systems known as value-
orientations. As Williams has stated, "...values are not simply 
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distributed at random, but are instead interdependent, arranged in a pat­
tern, and subject to reciprocal or mutual variation" (103, p. 382). 
The importance of considering value configurations and value-
orientations can be seen when one considers those situations involving 
value inconsistencies and/or value conflicts. For example, if it was 
known that a certain individual valued independence, one might expect 
that he would reject those government programs which would interfere 
with his freedom to make his own management decisions. If this individ­
ual, however, also valued commutative justice, i.e., a belief that the 
government should take the necessary steps to assure him a fair return 
for his labors, he may actively support government programs in an action 
situation. In this specific case, knowledge of only a single value di­
mension would have yielded opposing results. If one had knowledge of 
the value dimension commutative justice, the predicted result would have 
occurred (although the presence of independence might have resulted in 
a weaker relationship than expected). If one only had knowledge of the 
dimension independence, however, an unexpected result would have oc-
curredi Knowledge of both dimensions would provide the observer with 
the most meaningful basis upon which his prediction could be made, and 
should provide him with better results than if he had knowledge of only 
one of the two value dimensions. 
These considerations lead to the second and third general hypotheses: 
General Hypothesis 2: Certain values and beliefs will form value 
configurations or value-orientation configurations. 
General Hypothesis 3: There will be a relationship between policy 
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actions and policy positions and a weighted combination of certain value 
configurations and value-orientation configurations. 
This last general hypothesis is derived from General Hypothesis 1 
and General Hypothesis 2. Paraphrasing these three general hypotheses, 
it is postulated 1) that individual value and belief dimensions are re­
lated to policy behavior, 2) that certain of these value and belief di­
mensions form value or value-orientation configurations, and 3) that 
these value or value-orientâtion configurations are, in turn, related 
to policy behavior. It is also expected that knowledge of these value 
and value-orientation configurations will serve as useable predictors of 
policy behavior. 
Values. beliefs and behavior in an empirical setting 
To this point, values and beliefs have been examined only in a 
theoretical setting. The discussion will now briefly focus on the re­
search work which has been conducted using these concepts. Values have 
been studied very extensively by many sociologists. The results of 
these empirical investigations have been somewhat disappointing. Those 
who have worked in this area have used a variety of definitions of values 
which have referred to a great variety of phenomena. In addition, the 
methods which have been employed have differed widely both with res­
pect to validity and reliability. Consequently, it is difficult to 
draw very meaningful conclusions from many of these empirical studies. 
Findings from studies concerning values and behavior have been 
summarized by Dukes (27) and Berelson and Stiener (8). A review of 
these inventories of findings and a sample of the literature reveals 
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that, on a \^ ole, the empirical investigation of values has been some-
vritiat inconclusive. The studies generally have not demonstrated high cor­
respondence between values and behavior. DeFluer and Westie (23) have 
called this result the "fallacy of expected correspondence." Poor 
methodology, poor definitions of value, lack of consideration of other 
factors such as those mentioned above, and lack of conceptual clarity 
have all probably contributed to this lack of correspondence. In light 
of these relatively ambiguous conclusions, it is even more difficult to 
understand the reason for the inclusion of the hypothesis "which influ­
ence behavior" in many of the definitions of value. 
The findings concerning the relationship between beliefs and be­
havior are also inconclusive. Many of the studies which have been con­
cerned with the concept belief have aggregated beliefs with values and 
called them value-orientations (16, 26, 41j 42, 77, 80, 111). Some 
studies have found moderately strong relationships between beliefs and 
behavior, but other studies have found little or no relationship be­
tween these variables. As in the case of values, important differences 
in methods, definitions, and theoretical orientation are evident in 
these studies making evaluation and comparison of the results most dif­
ficult. 
A few studies have established the existence of value-complexes 
and value-orientation configurations. Hobbs (41), in a study of factors 
associated with fam management ability found that economic motivation, 
scientific orientation, mental activity, independence and risk aversion 
were all related and formed a meaningful configuration. Scott (82) found 
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that independence, intellectualisa and creativity formed an "inner-
directed" configuration of values while loyalty, kindness, status, self-
control, religiousness, and social skills formed an "other directed" set 
of values. Bales and Couch (4) have also isolated value configurations 
through the use of factor analysis. 
The author has been able to find only a few studies which have been 
concerned with either values, beliefs, or attitudes and farm policy be­
havior (34, 47, 62). None of these studies have examined empirically 
the relationship between values, beliefs and farm policy behavior. 
Value-orientations and cause 
Although only a few social scientists have explicitly stated that 
there is a causal relationship between values, beliefs and behavior, 
many have claimed that these variables "influence", "guide", "channel", 
"direct", etc. behavior. These latter terms, vAiile not being synonymous 
for the term cause, nevertheless, can be suggestive of causal relation­
ships between value-orientations and behavior. As Timasheff (94) has 
pointed out, it is fashionable today to avoid the term cause and replace 
it with terms which are not quite so objectionable but still imply quasi 
causal connotations. The appearance of this new "metalanguage" is prob­
ably due to the attractive features of the notion of cause and the scien­
tific prestige ^ ich îS associated with it. 
It is recognized that the notion of cause is indeed desirable and a 
necessary and sufficient condition to make the explanation of any pheno­
menon complete. However, the suggestion that the relationship between 
values, beliefs and behavior is a causal one is highly questionable. It 
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is extremely tempting to suggest"that behavior is caused (at least in 
part) by value-orientations because it gives one an unfailing explana­
tion of behavior. Yet, certain flaws are evident not only in the logic 
but also in the evidence at hand. A causal proposition, at the very 
least, must be asymmetrical, invariant, contained within a closed sys­
tem, tested in a dynamic situation, and be necessary and sufficient (11, 
94, 110). The relationship between value-orientations and behavior most 
likely conforms to none of these conditions. For example, this rela­
tionship is probably not asymmetrical, for it is likely that interaction 
occurs between these variables. Values and beliefs may direct behavior 
in one instance \Aereas behavior may form values and beliefs in another 
instance. Scott (82) has pointed out two functions of values which 
imply this symmetrical relationship: 
1. Values play a guiding role in the formation of behavior. 
2. Values also play a rationalization role of behavior, i.e., the 
execution of a given behavioral act is justified on the basis 
of some value. This second function clearly implies the re­
lationship between values and behavior is a symmetrical one. 
The empirical studies which have been conducted concerning the re­
lationships between value-orientations and behavior offer little evidence 
that values are causal agents. As noted above, these studies taken as a 
v^ ole have been inconclusive. In many cases, the relationships reported 
have been of such a low magnitude that one is lead to the conclusion 
that value-orientations and behavior may be relatively orthogonal. 
Consequently, the relationship between value-orientations and 
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behavior will be viewed in this dissertation only as a relationship. Un­
til more empirical evidence is obtained about the nature of the formation 
of value-orientations, such relationship statements are probably the most 
useful. Relational statements can provide one with a great deal of in­
formation concerning why behavior takes a given pattern. They also can 
result in very useful constructs from which succinct taxonomies of be­
havior can be built. In other words, knowledge of a person's value sys­
tem provides one with a great deal of knowledge about his potential be­
havior pattern. 
The following statement by Blake and Davis (10) summarizes the major 
points in this discussion: 
"A more satisfactory use of 'values' in sociological analysis 
is to abandon them as causal agents and to recognize them 
frankly as sheer constructs by vAiich we attempt to fill in 
subjective linkages in the analysis of social causation. For 
ex^ ple, the movement of peasants to cities during the process 
of industrialization is not 'explained' by saying that they 
prefer the bright lights to the city to the drab monotony of 
the village. Only ^ en the evolving economic and social situa­
tion in both village and the city are taken into account can we 
begin to explain this recurrent social phenomena. It helps us 
to understand the process, however, if we can get some inkling 
of how the peasants' feelings and thoughts take shape in view 
of these conditions; and so we try to put together a model of 
his memory actions and test it against the various kinds of 
empirical evidence including his verbal statements." (10, p. 461) 
Rural Value-Orientations^ and Farm Policy Positions 
The focus of the discussion will now concentrate on the specific 
values and beliefs which will be examined in this dissertation. In the 
following sections each of these values and beliefs will be derived, a 
justification for their selection will be given, and a definition of 
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each will be stated. The various sub-general hypotheses associated with 
the general hypotheses discussed above will be derived. Not all of the 
values and beliefs are logically related to every policy choice and ac­
tion. In other words, the theoretical system developed here is not in­
tended to be exhaustive, but is concerned only with those relationships 
between value-orientations and policy behavior lAich appear to have a 
logical basis. 
Traditional and contemporary rural value-orientations 
Many observers of American rural life have enumerated and elaborated 
the values and beliefs which they consider to be predominant in rural 
America. During the early part of this century, most of these observers 
contended that the value-orientations of rural people were quite homog­
eneous and distinct from the value-orientations of their urban counter­
parts . Sorokin (89), Taylor (92), Bernard (9), and Loomis (61) accepted 
this premise and constructed elaborate taxonomies which carefully clas­
sified the rural population on a multitude of dimensions. One of these 
devices, called the "rural-urban" continuum, portrayed rural inhabitants 
as highly independent, conservative, and traditional in contrast to 
urban people who were more dependent, liberal, and innovative. The 
"rural" end of this continuum has been identified with the familistic 
Gemeinschaft society (61) which characterizes rural people as sacred, 
functionally diffused with a high interaction of roles, and isolated. 
These observers also suggested that the rural people of this time ad­
hered to many of the precepts of the Protestant ethic. The rural popu^  
lation, therefore, was considered to be a distinct homogeneous subculture 
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holding value-orientations unlike those of other subcultures. 
Many of the early rural sociologists proposed that fatalism, tradi­
tionalism, debt avoidance, risk aversion, farming as a way of life and 
individualism were values and beliefs widely held by rural people. 
These values and beliefs were considered to constitute a value-orienta­
tion which was unique to rural people. To determine why these writers 
considered these values and beliefs to be adhered to by a majority of 
the rural people, each will be examined individually. 
Fatalism may be defined as a personal philosophy lAiich maintains 
that events and man's destiny are determined by external forces in ad­
vance so that man has no control over what happens to him. Schuler and 
Taylor (80), tandis (55), and Sorokin (89) all considered fatalism to be 
an important belief of American rural people. These writers suggested 
that the basis for this association was the high dependency of the 
farmer upon the elements. They proposed that rural people believed 
they had little power to manipulate nature, for they had often seen 
nature bring unexpected disaster to themselves and/or to their neighbors 
and friends. They perceived themselves as subjugated to nature rather 
than being master over it. This belief has also been found to be 
present in many other societies (52). 
Traditionalism has been defined as the conviction that "past tested" 
methods rather than relatively new untried methods should serve as guides 
for decision-making. The roots of traditionalism were generally thought 
to reside in rural pragmatism — a philosophy which emphasizes the value 
of those things which are practical and necessary, not ornamental (55). 
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The conservative nature of the farmer was also believed to be a factor 
in his adherence to traditionalism (9, 55, 80, 105). The uncertainty 
of farm life coupled with geographical and social isolation lead to a 
fixity of habits which produced a value-orientation that stressed-the 
use of known methods and a suspicion of innovations. 
A value closely associated with traditionalism is debt avoidance. 
Landis (55) and Taylor (92) suggested that farmers have always strongly 
desired to own the land they work, for they believe that ownership of 
land results in higher profits and serves as a means of security. For 
these reasons land has been considered a tangible property, one which 
has deep meaning for the farmer as an ultimate material value. Landis 
and Taylor reasoned that farmers were willing to forego many of the 
material things in life in order to accumulate enough money to eventual­
ly purchase the land (and related equipment) they desire. This situa­
tion has been highly instrumental in the formation of the value debt 
avoidance -- the belief that capital should be accumulated rather than 
borrowed before one purchases any goods, services and property for either 
maintenance or expansion purposes (55, 92), 
Debt avoidance was also associated with the Protestant ethic notion 
of thrift. The rural population was characterized as placing a high 
value on the notion of using money wisely and not wasting money on 
frivolous or non-essential goods (31). There have been historically 
many patterns of thrift in the agricultural community including the 
laying up of home produced foodstuffs, the saving of seed, etc. Many 
of these patterns of thrift were developed as insurance against any 
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unexpected situation which might be harmful to the farm family. These 
two factors, the habit of thrift and the uncertainty associated with 
farming, have reinforced the value debt avoidance, for they have dis­
couraged the farmer from purchasing unnecessary goods and encouraged the 
buying of necessary goods on a cash basis (31, 55). 
The value risk aversion was associated with rural society by these 
writers for essentially the same reasons as debt avoidance. Risk aver­
sion refers to the belief that a farmer should use assured and predict­
able practices in his farming operation to reduce risk as much as pos­
sible. Landis (55) pointed out that the farmer generally had to wait a 
long time for his returns so that he had to always plan his spending 
wisely. In addition, the magnitude of the returns in farming were, to 
some degree, uncertain so that the farmer never was assured of a certain 
level of income. These factors together with those mentioned above con­
cerning debt avoidance were the basis on vAiich these early writers identi­
fied risk aversion as one of the values which was common among rural in­
habitants. 
Another belief which was identified by various writers with the 
rural subculture is farming as a way of life (9, 55, 66, 71, 77), This 
belief advocates that farming is the most "natural" and desirable way to 
live and is an end in itself. It emphasizes the non-economic returns of 
farming. It was contended that this belief had its basis in the history 
of the family farm (55, 66, 71). During the frontier period and during 
a part of the present century, the family unit on the farm was forced by 
necessity to work together on both inside and outside activities in order 
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to survive. Out of this cooperative framework emerged the belief that 
the farm was an ideal place to raise a family, enjoy family living, and 
develop high moral standards and other desirable characteristics. Studies 
during the late 1930's and early 1940's indicated that the majority of 
the rural population considered farming to be an ideal occupation not 
only because of the financial rewards, but more importantly because 
they believed it was an ideal place to raise a family and live cleanly 
(80, pp. 502-503). This belief also has some basis in the notions of 
Jefferson. Jefferson considered farming to be an occupation which de­
veloped social virtues basic to the life and backbone of any great na­
tion (96). 
Probably the value which was most often identified with the rural 
population is individualism (9, 31, 41, 55, 71, 77). Individualism may 
be defined as the belief that an individual should be self-sufficient 
and responsible for solving his own problems and making his own deci­
sions. Goldstein and Eichhorn (31) have suggested that individualism is 
one of the major dimensions of the Protestant ethic and also of early 
frontier life. The rural family, because of social and physical isola­
tion, were compelled to make their own decisions. The Protestant ethic 
complemented this situation, for it became common for the rural inhabi­
tants to consider the responsibility for their action a moral obligation. 
In some areas (particularly at the time of frontier society) individualism 
became more a norm than a value, for it became expected behavior for an 
individual to become self-sufficient and work out his own problems. 
All of these values and beliefs are associated with the traditional 
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concept of fanning, i.e., the belief in the family farm system, the work 
ethic, close contact with nature, visibility of accomplishment, thrift, 
vocational prestige, and a high appreciation for the non-monetary rewards 
of farming (66). Those writers who described American rural society of 
the 1880-1940 period considered these values and beliefs to be inter­
related and form the core of the traditional rural value-orientation 
configuration (9, 55, 51, 80, 89, 92), As can be seen above, the common 
background from vAiich these values and beliefs emerged, the overlap in 
content, and the complementary interrelation of all of these values and 
beliefs would lead one to expect that they would form a meaningful con­
figuration. More formally; 
Sub-Hypothesis 2A; Fatalism, traditionalism, farming as a way of 
life, debt avoidance, risk aversion, and individualism will form an 
interrelated value-orientation configuration. 
Observers of present day rural society believe the value and belief 
patterns are changing in emphasis and becoming more heterogeneous (56, 
57, 62, 84, 86, 91), The important technological and social changes in 
the last two or three decades have resulted in significant changes in 
the rural value-orientation structure. Many farmers appear to be moving 
closer to the value-orientations of the majority of society (1, 56, 57). 
Since this change is not universal among farmers, rural value-orienta­
tions are now in a state of transition. Consequently, the values and 
beliefs found in American rural society are believed to be a mixture of 
traditional value-orientations and non-rural societal value-orientations. 
Sjoberg (86) has proposed that these recent changes in rural society 
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make such notions as the rural-urban continuum and Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft no longer very meaningful distinctions in American society. 
Rural society is no longer a closed and isolated system, but is interact­
ing directly and indirectly with all of society. This contention has 
been corroborated by several empirical studies (7, 34, 105). It has 
been found that rural people do hot differ significantly from the rest 
of society on such things as opinions on public affairs, conservatism, 
radicalism, and fundamentalism. Thus the past conceptions of the term 
rural are no longer very meaningful (6). 
The nature of the shift and changes of rural value-orientations 
closely parallels the changes in the rest of society. The rapidly 
developing industrial sector of our society and the accompanying 
technological advances have resulted in significant changes in Ameri­
can beliefs and values. There has been a steady decline in the Protes­
tant ethic and a counterpart to this value system is now emerging. 
There is presently an emphasis upon ways of maintaining and enhancing 
personal development under the conditions of modern life. Even though 
individualism is still strong, a new belief in the group is emerging. 
Now there is a strong emphasis upon 1) the group as a source of creativi­
ty, 2) the notion that belongingness is the ultimate need of the individ­
ual, and 3) a faith in the application of science to achieve this be­
longingness (101). These new value-orientations are based on the premise 
that modern man is an active participant in the manipulation of his des­
tiny and finds meaning and strength through constant association with 
others. 
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Although farmers as an occupational group appear to be moving closer 
to the central value-orientations of society, this does not imply that 
all rural people are abandoning or have abandoned more traditional value-
orientations. Within the rural population there "...is a wide diversity 
in the extent of adherence and intensity of adherence to some of the 
most dominant value orientations, and probably even more diversity with 
respect to lesser values" (56, p. 147). The more societal value-
orientations are relatively inconsistent with most of the traditional 
value-orientations. This inconsistency has been a major factor in cer­
tain conflicts over policy within the rural community. This conflict 
will be discussed more in detail below. 
Some of the contemporary values lAiich various writers have con­
tended are replacing the traditional value-orientations in the rural 
area include scientific orientation, risk orientation, and income max­
imization (31, 42, 101, 103). These do not constitute the entire array 
of contemporary values and beliefs, but represent mainly the counter­
parts to the traditional value-orientation complex. As in the case of 
the traditional values and beliefs, each of these contemporary values 
will be defined and the relevant commentary related to each summarized. 
Scientific orientation is a value \diich is widely held in American 
society (103). The high value placed upon science and the extensive 
application of science to all types of problems has become commonplace. 
Scientific orientation may be defined as a value which advocates that 
1) scientific findings should be applied to all aspects of our everyday 
life and 2) scientific findings and the scientific method should serve 
50 
as the criteria for the selection among alternative courses of action. 
Scientific orientation is the counterpart to traditionalism, for it 
places emphasis upon new innovations and new ideas lAich offer an entire 
array of alternative means to obtain given ends. In another respect, 
scientific orientation also is the converse of fatalism. The notions of 
manipulation of nature and mastery over nature, which are directly con­
trary to the premises of fatalism, are explicit in scientific orientation. 
Numerous studies have linked scientific orientation to such things 
as innovativeness, adoption of practices, economic rationality, and 
management ability (42, 60, 78). These findings suggest that scientific 
orientation is an important value to a number of people within rural 
society. 
The interest in science on the part of farmers is not entirely new. 
The land-grant system and the resultant research and dissemination of 
information to the farming population have a long history. The vast 
technological changes in farming in the last three decades, however, 
have quickened the pace of farmer interest in science. The large amount 
of research carried out by both public and private agencies, the convinc­
ing demonstrations of the effectiveness of new and revolutionary prac­
tices, the general increase in educational experience, and the avail­
ability of technical information concerning these new methods have all 
influenced certain farmers to change from a traditional orientation to 
a scientific orientation. 
In summary, it can be said that those individuals who adhere to 
scientific orientation consider new as well as proven alternatives. 
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evaluate means in relation to ends, and employ science as the criteria 
for choices among alternatives. 
Risk orientation places emphasis upon using methods which are per­
ceived as involving elements beyond the individual's control for purposes 
of gaining certain predetermined ends. Risk orientation is not only as­
sociated with the modern business world, but has also been associated 
with the business type farming operation (42, pp. 59-63). Risk orienta­
tion is also closely associated with scientific orientation. They both 
represent orientations toward mastery rather than passive acceptance and 
a faith in rationalism as opposed to traditionalism (104). Risk orienta­
tion is an alternative to both traditionalism and debt avoidance. 
This association between scientific orientation and risk preference 
is an historical one. As man discovered more and more about nature and 
how to manipulate it, a corresponding reduction in risk occurred. Man 
became more confident that he could control nature and determine his own 
fate. He acquired a new faith in science and at the same time began to 
see that risk could be predicted within certain parameters (17). 
The change from risk aversion to risk orientation on the part of 
certain farmers has been associated with the interest of these farmers 
in higher profits (17, 41, 42, 77). Risk orientation has been found to 
be positively associated with adoption of new practices, full use of 
capital available, and gross and net income (38, 39, 41, 42, 77). It 
would appear that many of those farmers who are interested in higher 
returns are not only willing to take chances on new practices or methods, 
but are also willing to make the necessary investment to employ these 
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practices. Thus the increasing interest in materialism and science by 
the society as a whole has resulted in a significant change in the risk 
patterns of many farmers. 
Another recent change in the value-orientation of the American 
farmer has been a stronger emphasis on viewing farming as a business 
rather than as a way of life. This value will be called maximization 
of income. It refers to the belief that farming should be considered 
primarily as a business operation and a means to economic ends such as 
yield and profit. Maximization of income is related to risk orientation 
and scientific orientation, for all three values are considered to be 
related to the attainment of economic ends (41, 60, 77, 78). Maximiza­
tion of income has been identified as a dominant value in current 
American society (104), and has been found to be a very important value 
in many parts of rural society (42). 
This value represents a significant change in the traditional con­
cept of farming. Farming is considered to be a means by which profit 
can be gained for the attainment of other ends, not an end in itself. 
In addition, this value de-emphasizes the notion that farming should be 
concisely and purposely distinguished from other vocations (71). It 
might be said that this change from emphasizing farming as a way of life 
to farming as a business represents one of the more significant changes 
in contemporary rural American society. 
The nature of the relationship between these contemporary values as 
outlined above suggests the following hypothesis: 
Sub-Hvpothesié 2B; Scientific orientation, maximization of income. 
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and risk orientation will form a value configuration. 
Thus two different value-orientations within rural society can be 
identified: the traditional configuration and the contemporary config­
uration. Certain relationships between these value-orientations and 
policy positions and actions can be predicted. As has been shown above, 
recent trends in American agriculture have challenged the traditional 
concept of farming. The farming community is becoming less isolated, 
farm sizes are increasing beyond the limits of the traditional "family 
farms", and the rural subculture is becoming more integrated into the 
whole of American culture through direct and indirect interaction. 
Farmers are becoming more risk oriented, credit has become an essential 
part of farming, and advancements in technology have given farmers a new 
faith in science and thus a confidence in their ability to control their 
own destiny. It would be expected that farmers who a&ere to the tradi­
tional value-orientation would desire to preserve farming in its most 
basic form and resist these changes which are occurring. They would be 
expected to support government programs which would restrain the de­
velopment of this new type of agriculture. 
Alternatively, agricultural restraint programs would be highly in­
consistent with the content of the contemporary value-configuration. 
Restraint programs are designed to perpetuate certain types of inefficien­
cies and retard technological progress in agriculture. Since those 
holding the contemporary value-configuration have, almost by definition, 
a high regard for efficiency and technological advancement it is ex­
pected that they would strongly reject restraint programs. These con­
siderations lead to the following two sub-hypotheses: 
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Sub-general Hypothesis lA; There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning agricultural restraint 
programs and their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the 
traditional value-orientation configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IB; There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning agricultural restraint 
programs and their adherence to each of the values of the contemporary 
value configuration. 
The contemporary value configuration is explicitly associated with 
a higher regard for the scientific method, technological advancement, 
and efficiency. The auxiliary adjustment programs have been considered 
by many to be the most rational and objective means to develop and en­
courage efficient farming. These programs are designed to move people 
out of agriculture, give them the necessary skills to find work in non-
farm occupations, and thereby eliminate the small inefficient farm units 
lAich often provide their occupants with a very meager livelihood. 
Therefore it would be expected that those people who adhere to the con­
temporary value configuration would be attracted to the auxiliary ad­
justment programs. 
On the other hand, those holding to the traditional value-orientation 
configuration would be expected to reject programs which hasten adjust­
ments in agriculture. These programs are designed to bring about changes 
in agriculture more quickly, changes vrtiich threaten the traditional con­
cept of rural life. For purposes of this analysis the following sub-
general hypotheses are stated: 
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Sub-general Hypothesis IC; There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning auxiliary adjustment 
programs and their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the 
traditional value-orientation configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis ID; There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning auxiliary adjustment 
programs and their adherence to each of the values of the contemporary 
value configuration. 
A third category of farm programs which is likely to be related to 
the traditional value-orientation is income transfer programs. A recent 
study by Quinney (76) provides information which is germaine to this 
discussion. Quinney found that traditionalism and fatalism were as­
sociated with low status people. He also found that these people were 
politically alienated from the rest of society and appeared to be more 
responsive to liberal political measures. Quinney reasoned that these 
people occupy marginal positions in the social structure, have the 
weakest ties with the social order, receive the smallest benefits from 
it, and have the fewest opportunities to participate in it. He con­
cluded that these people are most responsive to those political measures 
\rtiich could immediately improve their existence. 
The income transfer programs are the most direct form of aiding 
low socio-economic groups. On the basis of these findings, it would 
be expected that those ^ o adhere to the traditional value-orientation 
configuration would favor income transfer programs. 
These considerations suggest the following hypothesis: 
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Sub-general Hypothesis IE ; There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning income transfer pro­
grams and their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the tradi­
tional value-orientation configuration. 
It may be recalled that a third general hypothesis concerning the 
relationship between value-orientation configurations and farm policy 
behavior was derived in the preceding section. Since this hypothesis 
(General Hypothesis 3) is concerned with the multiple relationship be­
tween values, beliefs, and farm policy, the sub-general hypotheses re­
lated to General Hypothesis 3 are justified on the basis of the theoreti­
cal discussion presented directly above. Therefore, these sub-general 
hypotheses can be stated without further discussion. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3A; There will be a relationship between the 
policy positions of farmers concerning agricultural restraint programs 
and auxiliary adjustment programs and the weighted combination of their 
adherence to the traditional value-orientation configuration and the 
contemporary value configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3B: There will be a relationship between the 
policy positions of farmers concerning income transfer programs and a 
weighted combination of their adherence to the values and beliefs of the 
traditional value-orientation configuration. 
Values and beliefs specifically associated with farm policy 
There are certain values and beliefs which have been explicitly as­
sociated with farm policy positions and actions. These values and beliefs 
are primarily a product of recent changes in the role of government in 
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agriculture. As will be seen, certain of these values and beliefs con­
flict with one another in principle and implication. This conflict is 
considered to be related to the variety of views concerning the overall 
farm program (15, 20, 35). 
Three of these values and beliefs are independent action, individ­
ualism, and government dominance. These values and beliefs will be re­
ferred to as the independent action value-orientation configuration. 
Each will be discussed individually. 
Independence is a value which has long been associated with rural 
living. Observers of rural America (55, 80, 92) have suggested the farmer 
acquired his desire for independence in the following manner. The farmer 
has generally been alone during much of his work and has been forced to 
make his own decisions. Thus he has developed a strong image of self-
sufficiency and self-reliance. He has become accustomed to being his 
own boss. He views himself not as a wage earner, but as a manager of 
his own business and his own affairs. This desire for independence has 
been so common among the farming population that it is considered to be 
one of the precepts of the "agricultural creed" (71). 
The changes in the American society during the last forty years 
have had an impact on the importance attached to independence (20), 
Prior to the 1930's, American farmers were able to live and work in re­
lative isolation, accountable to no one and free to run their business as 
they pleased. The impact of the Great Depression and World War II al­
tered this situation. The Depression forced the farmer to turn to the 
government for assistance in areas where previously assistance had been 
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neither needed nor desired. The war years and those which immediately 
followed resulted in an unparalleled acceleration of farm production and 
an accumulation of surpluses. Many farmers began to believe that the 
market place no longer renumerated them a just reward for their labors 
so that independence came into sharp conflict with other values. The 
farmers were forced to give up some of their independence if they de­
sired what they considered to be a fair return. Thus the general ad­
herence to independence diminished to some degree, for other values 
r 
which conflicted with independence were seen as being equally as impor­
tant (71). 
For purposes of this dissertation, independence will be referred to 
as independent action. Independent action will be defined as a value 
v^ ich stresses that everyone should make his own decisions and run his 
business unimpaired by any external force. 
Independent action is highly related to individualism, but should 
be differentiated from it. Individualism implies that decision-making 
is a personal responsibility. Thus, this value has certain ethical and 
moral overtones. Independent action, although based upon this ethic of 
self-integrity, carries no ethical connotations. Independent action only 
emphasizes that a man should be able to make his own decision and solve 
his own problems without any outside interference. 
Individualism has been defined and discussed above in the section 
concerning the traditional value-orientation complex. It is relevant 
here because of its high association to independent action. Individu­
alism, like independent action, emphasizes that problem solving and 
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decision-making should be done by the individual and no one else should 
do it for him. 
Government dominance refers to the belief that government is placing 
too many restrictions and controls on the farmers* efficiency, earning 
possibilities, and freedom to manage their farming operations. This be­
lief is at a different conceptual level than the beliefs discussed above. 
Whereas the beliefs discussed before can be included in the category of 
cognitive standards, government dominance is an appreciative standard. 
It is basically a perceptual concept which is focused on the result of 
a given action. 
The basis of this belief can be traced to the emergence of govern­
ment programs. Most government programs require the farmer to control 
his production in a certain way if he wishes to receive the benefits of 
the program. The belief government dominance can be considered as a 
reaction to these programs, for it represents the farmer's perception 
of the relative constraints these programs place on his freedom and 
economic returns. 
It would be expected that government dominance would be positively 
related to independent action and indivualism. An individual who per­
ceives some external agent to be restraining his freedom in some manner 
would also be expected to strongly desire that freedom. 
The other set of values which is specially related to farm programs 
can be called the collective action set of values. This complex includes 
collective action, commutative justice and distributive justice. Collec­
tive action may be defined as the belief that problems should be solved 
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and business decisions should be made through cooperation with others. 
Collective action has an historical bases in the rural society. In the 
early 1900's, this value was reflected in the cooperative movement. At 
that time, the emphasis of collective action was basically concerned 
with the collective purchasing of inputs for production and therefore 
had little impact upon the decision-making freedom of the farmer. The 
Depression and the impact of technological advancement, however, broadened 
the emphasis of collective action. Faced with many new problems, a num­
ber of farmers decided that solutions to these problems could best be ob­
tained through a cooperative effort. Thus they were willing to shift 
some of the responsibility of decision-making from the individual to the 
group. Such concepts as collective marketing, quota systems, and collec­
tive withholding of crops and livestock bectoe popular with certain 
farmers. Many farmers also began to consider the government as an ap­
propriate agency through which collective action could best be achieved. 
The terms commutative justice and distributive justice have been 
borrowed from Brewster (15). However, he has used these terms in a 
broader sense than they will be used in this study. In this disserta­
tion, distributive justice will refer to the belief that the government 
should equalize opportunity and income so everyone has the necessary 
means to develop to their full potential. Commutative justice will re­
fer to the belief that the government should guarantee everyone a fair 
return for their contribution to society. 
It has been hypothesized that commutative justice and distributive 
justice are closely associated with collective action (15, 20, 35). 
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Collective action does not directly conflict with distributive justice 
and commutative justice, and in many instances complements them. It is 
probable that many of those who adhered to collective action define the 
government as a means by which group decisions can be expressed and im­
plemented. It would be expected that they consider the programs of the 
government to be important means to solve such problems in agriculture 
as low incomes, unequal opportunity, and poor returns for their contribu­
tion to society. 
It should be pointed out that prior to the 1930's, farm people at­
tempted to obtain equality of opportunity and a fair return through such 
governmental programs as the Homestead Act, the Morrell Act, the Hatch 
Act, the Federal Land Bank, and the Farm Credit Administration. This 
approach to obtain distributive and commutative justice did not sig­
nificantly conflict with independent action. Technological changes and 
the accumulation of surpluses, however, placed these two values in sharp 
conflict with independent action. It became difficult under the new 
system to obtain what was judged to be a fair return and income equality 
and still retain complete freedom in decision-making. One had to be 
sacrificed for the other. 
On the basis of the foregoing discussion it would be expected that 
the collective action set of values and the independent action set of 
values and beliefs form value-orientation configurations. More formally: 
Sub-general Hypothesis 2C; Collective action, commutative justice, 
and distributive justice will form a value configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 2D; Independent action, individualism, and 
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government dominance will form a value-orientation configuration. 
These two configurations are clearly in conflict with one another. 
This conflict has important implications for farm policy actions and 
positions. Independent action and individualism emphasize the role of 
the individual in decision-making and the freedom to act as one chooses. 
It would be expected that those who strongly adhere to independent action 
and individualism would reject the constraints and controls of govern­
ment programs. The same pattern of rejection would be expected for those 
vdio perceive government programs as being more restrictive than they de­
sire. 
It is expected that those who adhere to these three values and be­
liefs would reject both voluntary and compulsory price-supply management 
and control farm programs. Both of these program types require those 
o^ participate to conform to certain production regulations and give 
up some entrepreneural freedom. Because of the explicit restrictive 
nature of the compulsory programs, it is expected that these programs 
would be more strongly rejected by those who adhere to the values and 
beliefs of the independent action configuration than the voluntary 
government programs. 
It also appears logical that the individual who adheres to the 
independent action, individualism, and government dominance will favor 
some alternative policy to government farm programs. The approach which 
would probably maximize these values and beliefs would be a free market 
system, for this sjstem places no restraints on the individual. It has 
been proposed that those individuals vAio adhere to the independent 
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action configuration will view the market system as the best determinate 
of a person's contribution to society and the place v&iere he will ulti­
mately receive a fair return and equality of income and opportunity re­
gardless of present conditions (35). 
On the other hand, those who adhere to collective action, distribu­
tive justice, and commutative justice would be expected, on the basis of 
the preceding discussion, to view government intervention as an accept­
able approach to solving the problems facing farmers. It is expected 
that those who adhere to these three values would support and participate 
in voluntary programs, compulsory programs, and auxiliary adjustment 
programs. The voluntary and compulsory programs (as defined here) are 
designed to control production so that prices will remain relatively 
stable at some reasonable level. These programs are designed to deal 
with problems such as low income and poor returns. The auxiliary ad­
justment programs are very direct means to equalize opportunity in both 
the farming and non-farming sector. Thus those xdio believe that an ac­
ceptable way to solve such problems as low income, unequal opportunity 
and poor returns is by collective action through government intervention 
could achieve their objectives by supporting these three types of pro­
grams. 
It seems logical to assert that those •v^ o adhere to collective 
action, commutative justice, and distributive justice would reject the 
free market system. It has been proposed that farmers lAio hold these 
three values do not believe that a fair return can be obtained in such 
a system (35). It has been suggested that they believe they have little 
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power to control the market system and, therefore, consider the market a 
poor alternative to obtain a fair return or equality with other sectors 
of the economy (35). 
The hypothesized relationship between past, present, and proposed 
programs and these two value-orientations are summarized below: 
Sub-general Hypothesis IF; There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning compulsory price-
supply management and control programs and their adherence to each of 
the values of the collective action value configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IG; There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning voluntary price-
supply management and control programs and their adherence to each of 
the values of the collective action value configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IH; There will be a positive relationship 
between the participation by farmers in past and present farm programs 
and their adherence to each of the values of the collective action value 
configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis II; There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning compulsory price-
supply management and control programs and their adherence to each of 
the values and beliefs of the independent action value-orientation con­
figuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IJ; There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning voluntary price-
supply management and control programs and their adherence to each of 
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the values and beliefs of the independent action value-orientation con­
figuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IK; There will be a negative relationship 
between participation by farmers in past and present farm programs and 
their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the independent 
action value-orientation configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IL; There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning the auxiliary adjust­
ment programs and their adherence to each of the values of the collec­
tive action valuè configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IM; There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning the free market pro­
gram and their adherence to each of the values of the collective action 
value configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IN; There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning the free market pro­
gram and their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the inde­
pendent action value-orientation configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3C; There will be a relationship between 
the policy positions of farmers concerning compulsory price-supply manage­
ment and control programs, voluntary price-supply management and control 
programs, and the free market program and a weighted combination of 
their adherence to the collective action value configuration and the 
independent action value-orientation configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3D; There will be a relationship between the 
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policy positions of farmers concerning auxiliary adjustment programs and 
a weighted combination of their adherence to the values of the collective 
action value configuration. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3E: There will be a relationship between 
the participation of farmers in past and present farm programs and a 
weighted combination of their adherence to the collective action value 
configuration and the independent action value-orientation configuration. 
These constitute the major values and beliefs which have been pro­
posed to be related to farm policy both directly and inferentially. As 
was pointed out in the introduction of this section, all of the values 
and beliefs discussed to not relate logically to every type of farm 
program category. It is also recognized that the intensity of the re­
lationships between the various value-orientation configurations and 
farm programs categories will vary from category to category. Some of 
these intensity variations have been mentioned above. However, it is 
important to note that whereas the direction of the relationship between 
the variables of interest can often be predicted, the degree of intensity 
of those relations cannot. 
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METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
Having derived the hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation, 
the discussion will now focus upon the methods and procedures employed 
to collect the data and to test these hypotheses. The first section of 
this chapter will be concerned with the methods and procedures involved 
in the collection of the data. The second portion will be devoted to 
the development of the empirical measures designed to operationalize 
the theoretical concepts. The final section will discuss the procedures 
followed in the analysis of the data. 
The data used to test the hypotheses in this research are part of 
those collected in conjunction with Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station 
Project 1493: "The Relationship Between Values and Attitudes and Posi­
tion Taken by Farm People Regarding Agricultural Adjustment and Policy." 
The leaders of the projects were Drs. George Seal and Joe Bohlen of the» 
Department of Economics and Sociology of Iowa State University, The 
general objective of the project was to "...determine the value and at­
titude complexes, and their interrelationship, that will predict the 
positions or actions of individuals in relation to agricultural adjust­
ment and policy."^  
Collection of Data 
Interview schedule and questionnaire 
The data gathered for this study were obtained from a schedule and 
a questionnaire. The questionnaire used in this study was developed 
T^his statement is from the project proposal submitted to the Agri­
cultural Experiment Station at Iowa State University for the grant of 
funds to enable this research to be conducted. 
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primarily by the project leaders. Dr. George M. Seal and Dr. Joe M. Boh-
len, and the former project co-ordinator, Charles Elder. The author be­
came actively involved in the project after a majority of the scale con­
struction was completed. The questionnaire was pre-tested relatively 
extensively. A description of the questionnaire and its development will 
be given in the section on Construction of Indices. 
The final interview schedule was developed primarily by the author 
and the project leaders, Drs. Beal and Bohlen, with the assistance of 
Charles Elder. Prior to its use in the field, the interview schedule 
was pre-tested by the author and Charles Elder on ten randomly selected 
Story County farm operators. The specific information obtained from the 
interview schedule will also be discussed in the Construction of Indices 
section of this chapter. 
The field interviewing conducted in conjunction with the project 
was supervised and co-ordinated by the author. 
Sample and field procedure 
The subjects of this study were Iowa farm operators who farmed 100 
or more acres of land and make the major management decisions for the 
farm firm. These criteria were used to insure that a high majority of 
the farmers interviewed were full-time farmers. This selection procedure 
was relatively effective, for approximately 90 percent of the sample can 
be considered full-time farmers. 
The respondents included in the sample were selected from the six 
economic areas of Iowa using a stratified sampling technique. This 
sample was drawn by the Iowa State University Statistical Laboratory. 
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Within each of these economic areas, three counties and three segments 
within each of the selected counties were selected at random. Figure 1 
indicates the location of the six economic areas of Iowa and the 18 
counties included in the sample. The number of farmers interviewed in 
each county can also be found in Figure 1. 
It was expected that the sample selected would yield approximately 
225 qualified respondents. The interviewers contacted 207 respondents 
\dio met the criteria stated above. Nearly 8 percent (16 farmers) of 
these 207 respondents refused or were unable to be interviewed. Of the 
remaining 191 respondents, 5 failed to complete the schedule and/or the 
questionnaire. Thus 186 respondents were included in the analysis. The 
discrepancy between the actual and expected number of respondents con­
tacted (225 and 207) was due mainly to the rural population changes 
which had occurred since the census information upon \Aiich the sample 
was based had been gathered. 
The study was conducted during March and April of 1964, As men­
tioned above, the means for data collection consisted of a questionnaire 
and a schedule. The questionnaire contained 127 value and belief state­
ments. These statements were left with the respondent to complete at 
his convenience. The interviewer was instructed to explain the proce­
dure for responding to the statements, leave the questionnaire with the 
respondent, and return and pick up the completed copy at an appointed 
time. When the interviewer returned, the schedule was administered. 
The schedule contained questions relating to farm program preferences 
and participation, farm policy, and certain situational and personal 
characteristics, 
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Figure 1. Location of farms included in sample 
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Characteristics of the sample 
Table 1 presents a summary of some selected characteristics of the 
186 farmers. Unless otherwise noted, all characteristics of the sample 
members are for the year 1963. A comparison of the characteristics of 
these farmers and the characteristics of all farmers in the counties in­
cluded in the study is also given.. 
The farms surveyed are above the average on the amount of land 
farmed and the number of acres of corn planted. This is to be expected, 
for the criteria for inclusion in the study eliminated farmers who farmed 
less than 100 acres. The farmers surveyed, however, were below the 
average on number of acres planted in soybeans. The 186 farmers rent 
more land and consequently own less land than the average farm resident 
in their respective areas. They feed more hogs but less cattle, and are 
younger than the average farm operator. 
The range of most of the characteristics is quite wide. The stan­
dard deviations of many of the characteristics is also relatively large. 
These parameters suggest that the members in the sample are relatively 
heterogeneous and thus represent a cross section of full-time Iowa 
farmers. An examination of the distributions of these characteristics 
substantiates this contention. 
Construction of Indices 
In this section a description of the methods used to construct the 
various indices will be presented. In each case, the logic and rationale 
will be given for the way in which each concept is operationalized as an 
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Table 1. Characteristics of the sample 
Sample 
Characteristics Range Average s** 
Census 
average 
Farm size (no. of acres) 110- 926 270.6 135.5 220.6* 
Percent of acres owned 42.8 52.4^ * 
Percent of acres rented 57.2 47.6^ * 
Corn acres 0- 345 91.5 56.6 77.0* 
Soybean acres 0- 250 36.6 49.6 44.8* 
Number of cattle fed 0- 500 37.6 60.8 42.2* 
Number of hogs fed 0-1,600 162.1 154.9 134.0* 
Operator age 1964 to
 1 44.4 11.3 48.3* 
Operator education 6- 19 10.5 2.2 
Net income -
3 year average 500-13,500 $4,300 $2,272 
Gross income -
3 year average 2,500-67,000 $12,100 $3,375 
S^ource: (97), 
S^ource : (45). 
* 




index. Previous research work which is relevant to the discussion will 
be reported. Where applicable, estimation of the reliability of the 
constructed measures will be included. 
Due to the multidimensional nature of the theoretical concepts, each 
concept will be operationalized by a group of measures vhich are logical­
ly related to the theoretical concept. This procedure has been employed 
to allow for a higher degree of construct validity, i.e., the degree to 
which the indicator corresponds to the theoretical definition (110). 
This degree of correspondence between the theoretical concept and the 
empirical measure(s) of that concept has also been called an epistimic 
correlation (68). 
Rural value-orientations 
The rural values and beliefs discussed in the theoretical chapter 
are operationally defined by 14 separate scales. The major reasons for 
the choice of scales are similar to those of Hobbs (42). He states: 
"The choice of scales as measures of the hypothesized value 
dimensions was predicated on the increased reliability as­
sociated with multi-item scales as opposed to single item 
measures of values or attitudes. In the development of the 
scales a relatively large number of items judged to be re­
lated to.the hypothesized dimension were developed in order 
to partially overcome the problems associated with the func­
tioning of value complexes and thereby increase reliability." 
(42, p. 82) 
In order to employ scaling techniques to measure values and beliefs, 
it is necessary to make the following assumptions: 
1. It is assumed that values and beliefs can be known and such 
knowledge exists. 
2. It is assumed that knowledge of values and beliefs is not 
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essentially different from other scientific or empirical knowl­
edge. 
3. It is assumed that values and beliefs can be meaningfully 
measured and that verbal statements within a given context 
can reflect individual values and belief patterns (as defined 
here). 
With respect to Assumption 3, it should be pointed out that some 
criticism has been leveled against using verbal statements as indicators 
of a person's values and beliefs (2, 10, 19, 81). These critics have 
claimed that people will generally do much less than they say they will 
do. Since values and beliefs have not been defined here as standards 
lAiich influence or direct behavior, this criticism is not particularly 
relevant. In other words, the correspondence between what people say 
and what people do is not an important consideration \Aien forming opera­
tional definitions of values and beliefs, for this correspondence is 
considered only as a proposition and not as an integral part of the 
definitions of values and beliefs. This question of whether verbal 
statements can be meaningful measures of values and beliefs will be dis­
cussed in more detail in the discussion chapter of this thesis. 
Since values and beliefs can only be measured indirectly, i.e., 
inferred from an individual's behavior, it has been assumed that an in­
dividual's response or reaction to a group of scaled statements provide 
insight concerning the values and beliefs the individual holds (Assump­
tion 3). However, measurement of values and beliefs in this manner is 
in no way absolute. Rather this form of measurement only determines the 
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relative ranking of the individuals measured in relation to a specific 
value or belief dimension. As Hobbs has pointed out, "...even an indi­
vidual scoring highest on a particular scale may have values and surrogate 
goals which have a higher ranking in his own preference scale than the 
value inferred from his responses to the scale items" (41, p. 103). The 
scores on each scale, therefore, can only be meaningfully examined in 
relation to one another. 
Values and beliefs have previously been discussed and defined in a 
general and multi-dimensional manner. In a research setting, values and 
beliefs viewed in this way cannot be meaningfully examined. To overcome 
this problem, various dimensions of the values and beliefs of interest 
were defined. These dimensions conceptually refer to the various ele­
ments or parts of a given multidimensional value or belief which 1) re­
tain all of the properties of the general value or belief, 2) can clearly 
be distinguished from other dimensions of the general values or belief, 
3) have a relatively homogeneous content, and 4) can clearly be identi­
fied. The possibility that the value dimensions are closely associated 
with the concept attitudes is recognized. The degree of specificity of 
these value dimensions, however, will not approach the degree of specific­
ity of attitudes with respect to a given object. 
The scales constructed to measure the various value-orientations 
were designed to measure the specific dimensions of the general values 
and beliefs. The procedure used to develop each of these scales was 
essentially the same. To minimize redundancy, the procedure will be out­
lined for the general case. The general procedure followed is based 
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upon Edwards (28), Hobbs (41), Wolins (107) and certain important sug­
gestions concerning modification and elaboration of these techniques of­
fered by Dr. LeRoy Wolins of the Department of Statistics of Iowa State 
University. 
The initial step of scale construction consisted of the preparation 
of a number of statements which were considered to reflect the various 
values and beliefs under consideration. Most of these statements were 
constructed following the criteria suggested by Edwards (28, p. 14). 
The source of the initial set of items included conceptual derivations 
from previous research, inferences from the literature, personality pro­
files, and suggestions of the project leaders. The number of items de­
veloped for each scale depended primarily upon the scope of the general 
value or belief involved. The range of statements included in each 
scale was from 19 to 131. In all, 461 statements were prepared at this 
stage of development. A complete listing of these items is given in 
Appendix A. 
The next steps were to determine the position of each of the state­
ments on a psychological continuum and eliminate the irrelevant state­
ments. This was accomplished by submitting the statements to a panel of 
judges for their evaluations following the basic procedure of Thurston's 
equal appearing interval technique (28, pp. 83-86). Each judge was 
asked to evaluate each statement in relation to a defined value or be­
lief, and decide where he believed the individual who would agree with 
the statement would be categorized on the given psychological continuum. 
The instructions and definitions provided for the judges are included 
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below with the discussion of the specific value and belief dimension. 
The judges were provided with 11 categories to evaluate the state­
ments. The category 1 was defined as the extreme negative position and 
category 11 was defined as the extreme positive position. Category 6 was 
defined as the neutral point. 
The people who served as judges were either faculty members or 
graduate students in the Sociology Department at Iowa State University 
and were familiar with the theoretical implications of the values and 
beliefs of interest. Although it is desirable to have a relatively 
large number of judges, only 15 were utilized to evaluate these state­
ments. The choice of this small number of judges is justified on the 
basis of past research (28, pp. 94-95) and the professional qualifica­
tions of the judges. 
At this early phase of the research project, the final 14 value and 
belief dimensions were included in 7 general categories for the judges' 
evaluation. Most of the dimensions were paired and polarized in these 
categories. Later analysis of the dimensions suggested that the di­
mensions should be treated individually and not as conceptual polar 
types. This point will be elaborated below. 
A measure of the location and the dispersion of each item (state­
ment) was obtained from the judges' evaluations. Medians were used as 
a measure of location. They indicated the direction of scoring for the 
item in the subsequent stages of scale analysis and the relative distribu­
tion of the items on a given continuum. The standard deviation deter­
mined for each item was used as a measure of dispersion. The degree of 
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dispersion was considered to be an indication of the degree of agreement 
among the judges concerning the location of the item. Those items with 
large standard deviations were deemed to be ambiguous or irrelevant. 
Arbitrary cutting points were established for each scale. Items which 
had standard deviation values equal to or greater than the selected cut­
ting point were discarded. The cutting points for items along the 11 
point continuum often resembled a bell-shaped curve, since judgments of 
the extreme items did not vary as much as those close to the neutral 
category. Items vAiich were judged to fall in the neutral category were 
discarded because it was expected that such statements would not dis­
criminate between individuals holding opposing values and beliefs. This 
judgment process reduced the original 461 items to 204 items (44.3 per­
cent) . 
The remaining items were administered to a sample of 102 Iowa 
farmers who attended four separate vocational agriculture night classes. 
Of the 102 farmers who were interviewed, 10 were discarded because of 
incomplete infoimation. Thus, 92 farmers were included in the final 
pre-test analysis. Ideally, a random sample of the population of inter­
est should have been pre-tested at this stage of the scale building pro­
cedure, but for reasons of economy of time and money, the farmers attend­
ing the vocational agricultural night classes were used. These farmers, 
however, were a representative sample of the population of interest, i.e., 
full-time Iowa farmers. These classes were located in the central Iowa 
communities of Ankeny, Clarion, Jefferson, and Jewell. 
The objectives of this pre-test were to eliminate all items which 
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had low discriminating power and obtain basic data from which the final 
dimensions could be formed. To accomplish these objectives the farmers 
were asked to respond to each of the 204 statements by indicating if 
they agreed or disagreed with each one, i.e., they were asked to express 
their own feelings about each statement. The following instructions were 
given to the respondents: 
Attached is a relatively large number of statements that 
are designed to determine the opinions of farm people about 
certain aspects of farming. Many of the statements apply only 
to farming but there are also many statements that could ap­
ply to other occupations and other people as well. 
These statements are to be answered by circling either "A" 
if you agree with the statement or "D" if you disagree with the 
statement. 
After you have reached this decision, please indicate how 
strongly you agree or disagree with this statement. Please 
circle one of the numbers from 1 to 5 based on how strongly 
you agree or disagree with the statement. Circle number 1'if 
it really didn't make much difference to you whether you 
agreed or disagreed with the statement. Circle number 5 if 
you feel very strongly about the statement. That is, it is 
very important to you. For some of the statements the num­
bers 2, 3 J or 4 may better" describe how strongly you agree 
or disagree with the statement. 
Please be sure to include both parts of your response, 
i.e., lAether you agree or disagree and how strongly you do. 
If you are completely undecided, circle both "A" and "D" 
indicating you neither agree nor disagree with the state­
ment. There is no need to indicate how strongly you feel 
in this case. 
This is not a test. There are no right or wrong answers 
to the statements. Just indicate your honest feelings about 
each statement. 
Each item was presented to the respondent in the following form: 
1. I admire the person who stands alone. 12 3 4 5 
D 
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It can be seen that the farmers were given five categories (1, 2, 
3, 4, 5) to indicate the intensity of their agreement or disagreement 
with each item. Categories 1, 2, and 3 were assigned their face numeri­
cal value while category 4 was assigned the score of 5 and category 5 
was assigned a score of 8. This scoring method is patterned after 
Wolins (107), The scoring was done in such a manner that agreement 
with positive items (those regarded by the judges as indicating a posi­
tive position with respect to the defined dimension) was scored positive­
ly and disagreement with a positive item was scored negatively. The 
scoring procedure was reversed for negative items. Thus the range of 
responses was from +8 to -8. This scoring procedure for a positive item 
is shown below: 
Responses D-5 D-4 D-3 D-2 D-1 A/D A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5 
Numerical values -8 -5 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 5 8 
Transformed values 0 3 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 13 16 
As can be seen, each respondent could make 11 different responses. 
The scores were transformed to a positive scale by adding 8 to each value 
so that the possible range of the responses on any given item was from 
0 to 16. 
At the conclusion of this pre-test, the items were arranged into 
hypothesized sub-dimensions of the original general dimensions. This 
step was initiated by the desire to develop unidimensional scales which 
measured only one specific factor. The 7 original general dimensions 
were divided into 25 factors for statistical analysis. These factors 
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were formed by grouping the 204 items into logical clusters. Some items 
were included in more than one dimension whereas other items were not in­
cluded in any subdimension, but rather were left to "find a home" through 
later correlation analysis. 
Item - total correlations were run on each of the 25 hypothesized 
clusters. In addition, each item was correlated with the total of every 
other cluster. This procedure resulted in a 204 by 25 correlation ma­
trix. 
It was expected that an item would correlate highest with the cluster 
total of which it was a part. This expectation was based on the assump­
tion that the item was in fact measuring the same value or belief as the 
other items in that cluster. It was recognized that this expected cor­
relation was, to some degree, a spurious one because of the built-in 
correlation of an item with its own cluster. This built-in correlation 
is a result of the unity in the cell of the matrix and the dependency 
between an item and the total score. 
A modification suggested by Wolins (106) of the Wherry-Winer method 
for factoring a large number of items was used to eliminate this built-in 
correlation. This procedure put all items on a common base and deter­
mined the factor loading of each item. Thus the correlation of each 
item with its own cluster was adjusted so that all item-total correla­
tions could be interpreted in the same manner. This procedure resulted 
in the reduction of the number of clusters involved in the analysis from 
25 to 19. It may be pointed out that it might have been possible to 
save some of these clusters or factors through a more exact test, but 
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enough dimensions were established without resorting to more refined 
analysis. 
Only 107 of the 204 items pre-tested were included in the final 19 
dimensions. These 107 items were 23,2 percent of the original 461 items. 
All of the items included in the final scales were considered to be re­
lated both statistically and logically to one of the clusters. These 
clusters were therefore considered to be relatively unidimensional 
groupings or scales. In some cases a group of items were found to 
correlate not only with one cluster, but to other clusters as well. 
This commonality factor suggested that certain of the 19 clusters could 
be grouped together without affecting the unidimensional nature of the 
specific scales. This grouping reduced the number of scales or dimen­
sions to 14.^  
In passing it may be pointed out that the final 14 dimensions were 
not determined purely on a statistical basis, but rather from the theore­
tical framework discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation. 
The 7 original dimensions v^ ich were submitted to the 15 judges contained 
these 14 dimensions. In most cases, the various dimensions were polarized, 
e.g., independent action and collective action, so that the judges could 
evaluate each item on the basis of a relatively clearly defined dichotomy. 
Subsequent analysis of these general dimensions suggested that the 14 
dimensions would be more unidimensional if they were split from the 
A much more detailed account of the development of these 14 dimen­
sions is the subject matter of a forthcoming M.S. thesis by Charles 
Elder. For this reason, the discussion of the scale development process 
has been limited here to only the essential steps involved and has pur­
posely avoided detailed descriptions of this process. 
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general dimensions and each treated as an individual scale. The formation 
of the 25 clusters was an attempt to break down the 14 dimensions of in­
terest into even more homogeneous units to achieve greater unidimension-
ality. However, the analysis of these 25 clusters, as in the case of the 
analysis of the 7 general dimensions, suggested that the most meaningful 
scales were these 14 dimensions. 
The final stage of the scale development consisted of presenting 
these selected items to the 186 Iowa farmers. The items were presented 
to this sample in the form as they were presented to the pre-test farmers 
as described above. When the study was completed, the 14 dimensions 
were rechecked for unidimensionality, reliability and additivity. All 
of the items met the minimum criteria and therefore all 107 items were 
included in the final analysis. 
Wolins (108) and Cranny (22) have suggested three conditions which 
are necessary and operationally definable to add items legitimately. 
These criteria were used to evaluate the final scale items in terms of 
additivity unidimensionality, and reliability. The criteria used include 
the following: 
1. The relationships among the responses to the different stimuli 
(items) must be linear. 
2. The variance of the responses to different stimuli must be 
homogeneous and independent of the means. 
3. The intercorrelations among the stimuli must be positive and 
homogeneous, 
Many studies in the past have evaluated items on the basis of 
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item-total correlations, split-plot reliability, Guttman coefficients of 
reproducibility, etc. However, these means of evaluation only consider 
the first of the three conditions for additivity. An examination of the 
items with respect to the other two conditions should provide much more 
information concerning the relative additivity of the dimensions. 
One cannot prove additivity in the same sense that a null hypothe­
sis cannot be proven (108). The degree to lAiich data conform to the 
condition for additivity can only be determined in a relative sense. 
The means which will be used to evaluate the scales relative to the 
three conditions stated above are primarily descriptive. The scales 
will be evaluated in terms of additivity with respect to one another, 
and not with respect to some predetermined standard. 
To evaluate the items with respect to the three conditions of ad­
ditivity, it is necessary to establish some criteria. These criteria 
will establish a basis upon which the scales can be compared to one 
another. The first condition for additivity will be evaluated on the 
basis of 1) a comparison between the minimum acceptable item-total cor­
relation coefficient (r. ) and the field sample r 's of each scale. 
It it 
2) the magnitude of the coefficient of reliability (r^ )^, 3) the mag­
nitude of the average intercorrelation coefficient (r..), and 4) the 
ij 
magnitude of a majority of the intercorrelations among the items of each 
scale. The minimum item total correlation is defined as r. = where 
It -/ n 
n is the number of items in the given dimension. The minimum item-total 
correlation coefficient (r^ )^ may serve as a quasi significance test of 
linearity. This coefficient defines the amount of independent variance 
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of the total score contributed by each item if there were no experimental 
relationship, i.e., the amount of variance which is contributed only by 
chance. The coefficient of reliability if defined as r = ——^  
"  l+Cn-DC Î )  
where n = the number of items and r is the average intercorrelation 
among the items (75). 
The magnitude of the intercorrelation coefficients (criterion 4) 
will be evaluated on the basis of the following arbitrary categories: 
1. If approximately 60 percent of the intercorrelation coefficients 
have values of .19 and below, they will be declared as having a 
"very low magnitude". 
2. If approximately 60 percent of the intercorrelation coefficients 
have values of .29 and below, they will be declared as having a 
"low magnitude". 
3. If approximately 60 percent of the intercorrelation coefficients 
have values of .30 and above, they will be declared as having 
a "moderate magnitude". 
4. If approximately 60 percent of the intercorrelation coefficients 
have values of .50 and above, they will be declared as having a 
"moderately high magnitude". 
The second condition will be evaluated on the basis of an inspection 
of 1) the pattern of relationships between the item means and item stan­
dard deviations and 2) the range of the item standard deviations. If 
the means and the standard deviations appear to be unrelated, the means 
and standard deviations will be declared as "relatively independent". If 
there appears to be some pattern to the relationship between the means 
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and standard deviations, it will be noted. If only certain items appear 
to be responsible for a positive or negative relationship between the 
item means and item standard deviations, they will be singled out and 
discussed. The distribution of the item standard deviations will be 
presented and their ranges noted. These ranges will be compared to each 
other at the end of the discussion of the 14 dimensions. 
It should be pointed out that the data concerning the relationship 
between the item means and item standard deviations can not be very 
meaningfully evaluated when the number of items of the scale is small. 
With only a few items, there is not enough data to determine accurately 
the nature of the relationship between the item means and item standard 
deviations. Since most of the scales discussed here have less than ten 
items, the evaluation of the relationship between the item means and 
item standard deviation should be considered to be rather tenuous. In 
light of this fact, the major purposes of this analysis will be to il­
lustrate a general procedure vAiich can be used to evaluate additivity 
and determine the general pattern of relationships between these item 
means and standard deviations. 
The third condition will be evaluated on the basis of an examina­
tion of the intercorrelations among the items. This criterion will be 
evaluated on the basis of the following arbitrary categories: 
1. If approximately 60 percent of the intercorrelation coefficients 
are contracted within a range of two adjacent categories (e.g., 
.10 to .19 and .20 to .29), these coefficients will be declared 
as being concentrated in a "relatively narrow range". 
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2. If approximately 60 percent of the intercorrelation coefficients 
are concentrated within a range of three adjacent categories, 
these coefficients will be declared as being concentrated in a 
"moderately narrow range". 
3. If approximately 60 percent of the intercorrelation coefficients 
are concentrated within a range of four adjacent categories, 
these coefficients will be declared as being concentrated in a 
"moderate range". 
Once each of the 14 dimensions have been discussed with respect to 
these various criteria, the scales will be compared to one another on the 
basis of the degree to which they approach the conditions for additivity. 
The scales will be evaluated primarily on the basis of how they meet the 
criteria relative to one another and not relative to any predetermined 
or absolute standard. 
The discussion of the 14 scales which will be presented directly 
below is somevAat redundant. This redundancy is unavoidable because 
each of the scales is evaluated with respect to the same criteria. The 
scales have been examined on the basis of the same criteria so compari­
sons can be made at the end of the discussion of these 14 dimensions. 
Independent action scale The independent action scale was con­
structed as a relative measure of the degree to which farmers believe 
they should make their own personal and farming decisions without any 
outside interference. This scale is intended to operationalize the 
concept independent action developed in relation to and included in 
Sub-general Hypothesis II, IJ, IK, IN, 2D, 3C, and 3E, This scale was 
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constructed by the methods and procedures outlined in the preceding sec­
tion of this dissertation. 
The independent action scale was originally part of the general di­
mension called freedom-independence. This general dimension was developed 
to measure the degree to which farmers believe that a man should make his 
own decisions and be free to do so. It was designed to discriminate 
those individuals who considered it right and desirable to act independent­
ly from those who relied chiefly upon other persons and/or groups to make 
their decisions for them. Collective action and individualism were also 
a part of the freedom-independence dimension. Therefore the general dis­
cussion of this dimension given below is relevant to independent action, 
collective action, and individualism. 
The general dimension freedom-independence originally contained 131 
statements. A complete listing of these statements appear in Appendix A, 
The judges were asked to respond to each of the 131 items on the basis 
of the following set of instructions: 
FREEDOM - INDEPENDENCE 
The following items are intended to measure the degree to 
which an individual is oriented towards freedom or independence 
in the business of running his farm. At the freedom end of the 
continuum, the individual is characterized by a desire to be 
free and to make his own decisions unimpaired by any external 
force. At the dependence end of the continuum, the individual 
is characterized as one vAo places a relatively high degree of 
importance to the decisions of others including the groups to 
\rtiich he belongs. This person prefers to base his decisions 
on the desires and opinions of these sources rather than to 
make his own independent decisions. 
For each of the following items assume that an individual 
agrees with the item. In vAiich of the eleven categories on 
the freedom or independence-dependence continuum would you 
place him? You are not to indicate your own feelings about the 
89 
statement but are to indicate your judgment about an individual 
who would agree with the item. 
Please respond on a 1 to 11 continuum as follows: 
Freedom or 
Independence Neutral Dependence 
1 1  1 0  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  
Not all of the following statements are "polar" in that 
they all do not indicate an extreme orientation at one end or 
the other. Most statements will probably fall between the ex­
treme positions and the neutral point (6). Some may even be 
judged to be completely neutral. In each case, read over the 
item, think about the individual who would agree with the 
statement and place your interpretation in the form of a 
number to the left of the statement. 
The medians (scale values) and standard deviations were computed 
for each item on the basis of the judges' evaluation of the item. The 
cutting points for the items varied so that the cutting point for the 
more extreme items were lower than for the less extreme items. The 
highest cutting point was at the level of 1.14 standard deviations while 
the lowest cutting point was at .85 standard deviations. This procedure 
resulted in the elimination of 78 of the 131 items. The pre-test re­
sulted in the elimination of an additional 20 items leaving 33 items 
for the freedom-independence general dimensions. 
Seven items were included in the final independent action scale. 
Data relevant to these 7 items are presented in Table 2. The scale 
values were computed with respect to the general dimension freedom-
independence, and not with respect to the dimension independent action. 
90 
Table 2. Data pertaining to the items of the independent action scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample sample standard 
number deviation value fit X deviation 
1 .77 10 .625 7.85 5.09 
2 .77 9 .469 9.55 4.72 
3 1.09 3 .478 9.65 4.73 
4 1.03 9 .601 10.11 4.95 
5 .91 9 .641 10.82 4.15 
6 .88 8 .539 11.75 4.18 
7 .98 9 .626 12.54 3.82 
An examination of Table 2 and the content of the items (Appendix A) indi­
cate that a majority of items have scale values at the positive end of 
the scale. All of the item r^ '^s exceed the minimum acceptable r^  ^of 
.376. The means and standard deviations of items 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 ap­
pear to be relatively independent, but Wien items 1 and 7 are added, the 
means and variances become somewhat negatively related. The range of 
the standard deviations of the items is from 3.82 to 5.09. The coeffi­
cient of reliability (r^ )^ of the scale is ,653. 
The range of the intercorrelation among the 7 items of the scale is 
from -.010 to +.367. A majority of the intercorrelations are in the .20 
to .39 range, but a significant proportion of the intercorrelations 
(42.9 percent) are below .20. The average intercorrelation coefficient 
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r,. is .212. Thus most of the intercorrelation coefficients are concen-
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trated in a relatively narrow range, but the magnitude of these coeffi­
cients is low. The distribution of the intercorrelations among the seven 
items of the independent scale can be found in Appendix B. 
The possible range on this scale is from 0 to 112. The actual 
scores ranged from 14 to 112 with a mean of 72.28 and a standard devia­
tion of 17.945. The distribution of the total scores by categories estab­
lished on the basis of standard deviations appears in Table 3. Both the 
distribution of the scores and the mean of the total scores reveal that 
a majority of the farmers scored on the positive end of the scale. 
Table 3. Distribution of sample scores on the independent action scale 
Score category Number Percent 
53 and below 21 11.3 
54 - 72 77 41.4 
73 - 91 58 31.2 
92 and above 30 16.1 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 72.28 
S » 17.945 
Collective action scale The collective action scale was de­
veloped to measure the degree to which farm operators are oriented toward 
cooperation with other farmers #ien solving farm problems and making 
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management decisions even if it involves the loss of some individual 
freedom. This scale is intended to operationalize the concept collec­
tive action developed in relation to and included in Sub-general Hypothe­
ses IF, IG, IE, IL, IM, 2C, 3C, 3D and 3E. 
The collective action scale was also originally part of the general 
dimension freedom-independence. The items included on the collective 
action scale, therefore, were developed in the same manner as those of 
the independent action scale. In the original freedom-independence 
general dimension, the collective action scale constituted the dependence 
end of the continuum. 
The final collective action scale contained 9 items. Data relevant 
to these items appear in Table 4. An examination of the scale values 
and the content of the items (Appendix A) reveal most of the items are 
on the dependence side of the freedom-independence continuum. Only one 
item (item 2) was on the independence side of the general dimension. All 
of the item r^ '^s exceed the minimum acceptable r^  ^of .332 (although 
item 3 and item 6 do not exceed the minimum by much). The means and the 
standard deviations of all items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 appear to be 
relatively independent. When item 9 is added, the means and the vari­
ances erfiibit someiAiat of a positive relationship. (The comments given 
above concerning the limitations of this evaluation should be recalled.) 
The item standard deviations range from 3.30 to 7.67. The coefficient of 
reliability of the collective action scale is .700. 
The distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of the col­
lective action scale (Appendix B) indicates that the coefficients are 
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Table 4. Data pertaining to the items of the collective action scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample sample standard 
number deviation value fit X deviation 
1 .99 8 .478 7.04 4.16 
2 1.11 3 .582 7.87 5.14 
3 1.07 3 .348 9.10 5.08 
4 .93 3 .631 9.36 4.64 
5 .86 3 .671 9.49 5.23 
6 .95 3 .365 9.68 3.67 
7 .95 4 .503 10.29 3.30 
8 1.06 3 .652 10.98 4.52 
9 .95 3 .599 12.40 7.67 
concentrated in a moderately narrow range and are of a low magnitude. 
A majority of the correlation coefficients are contained in the .00 to 
.29 range. The range of all the intercorrelation coefficients is from 
.027 to .482 and the average intercorrelation coefficient is .201. 
The possible range of total scores on the collective action scale 
is from 0 to 144 vAiile the actual range was from 3 to 144. The mean 
total score is 85.75 and the standard deviation is 22.885. The distri­
bution of the total scores by categories established on the basis of 
standard deviations is presented in Table 5. The distribution of the 
scores and the mean of total scores indicate that a majority of the 
farmers scored on the positive end of the scale. 
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Table 5. Distribution of sample scores on the collective action scale 
Score category Number Percent 
62 and below 28 15.1 
63 - 86 65 34.9 
87 - 110 72 38.7 
111 and above 21 11.3 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 85.75 
S = 22.885 
Individualism scale The individualism scale was constructed to 
measure the degree to lAiich farmers believe a farmer should be self-
sufficient and individually responsible for his actions, and the degree 
to which these traits are believed to be associated with professional 
and financial success. This scale is intended to operationalize the 
concept individualism developed in relation to and included in Sub-
general Hypotheses lA, IC, IE, II, IJ, IK, IN, 2A, 2D, 3A, SB, 3C and 3E. 
The individualism scale was originally part of the freedom-indepen­
dence general dimension. At the beginning of the project, individualism 
and independence were conceptually "pooled" at the freedom or indepen­
dence end of the freedom-independence dimension. Subsequent conceptual 
and related statistical analysis suggested that individualism should be 
separated from independent action and treated as a single dimension. The 
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conceptual reasons for the differentiation of individualism and indepen­
dent action have been discussed in the theory chapter. 
The final individualism scale contained 17 items. Data relevant to 
these items can be found in Table 6. An examination of Table 6 and the 
content of the items (Appendix A) reveal that all items have scale values 
which lie on the freedom or independence end of the continuum. The mini­
mum acceptable r^  ^was computed as .243 and all 17 item-total correlations 
exceed this value. It may be observed that the item means and standard 
deviations appear to be relatively independent. The item standard 
deviations range from 3.54 to 5.20. The reliability of the individualism 
scale is .817. 
The intercorrelations among the items of the individualism scale 
are concentrated in the .10 - .29 range (Appendix B). The range of all 
item intercorrelation coefficients is from .005 to .509 and the average 
intercorrelation coefficient is .207. Thus the intercorrelation coef­
ficients among the items of the individualism scale are concentrated in 
a relatively narrow range. The magnitude of these coefficients is low. 
The actual range of total scores on this scale ranged from 24 to 
272 while the possible range of responses is from 0 to 272. The mean 
total score is 146.08 with a standard deviation of 38.115. The distribu­
tion of the total scores (Table 7) and the mean indicate that most of 


















Data pertaining to the items of the individualism scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
standard scale sample s^ ple standard 
deviation value r., X deviation 
00 00 
10 .548 6.02 4.48 
1.02 9 .548 6.62 4.21 
1.14 8 .342 6.74 5.20 
.72 9 .530 6.87 3.54 
.85 10 .619 7.02 4.85 
.95 8 .513 7.22 4.39 
.80 10 .348 7.91 5.02 
.85 11 .580 8.14 4.83 
.99 9 .496 8.34 4.96 
.65 10 .435 8.54 5.17 
1.03 9 .620 8.82 4.56 
.85 9 .431 9.17 4.47 
.77 10 .531 9.98 4.19 
.87 9 .517 10.75 3.94 
1.01 9 .502 10.81 3.96 
1.08 8 .488 11.46 4.32 
.71 9 .517 11.67 4.02 
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Table 7. Distribution of sample scores on the individuals scale 
Score category Number Percent 
107 and below 18 9.7 
108 - 146 84 45.2 
147 - 185 60 32.3 
186 and above 24 12.8 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 146.08 
S = 38.115 
Fatalism scale The fatalism scale was developed as a relative 
measure of the degree to which individuals believe man's successes, 
failures, and all events \diich happen to him are controlled by forces 
over which he has no control. This scale is intended to operationalize 
the concept fatalism developed in relation to and included in Sub-general 
Hypotheses lA, IC, IE, 2A, 3A and 3B. 
The fatalism scale was originally part of the general dimension 
called mastery. This general dimension was constructed to measure the 
degree to which individuals believe that a person is able to control the 
major forces at play which affect his life. It was designed to discrim­
inate those individuals who believe they can control v^ at happens to 
them and their environment from those vAio accept the notion that they 
have little control over their lives and are subject to events -vAiich are 
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predetermined by circumstances beyond their control. 
The general dimension mastery originally contained 19 items. A 
complete listing of these statements appear in Appendix A. This general 
dimension had considerably fewer statements in the original list than 
other dimensions. This was due to the specific nature of the dimension 
and the lack of subdivisions involved. The judges responded to each of 
the 19 items according to the following set of instructions: 
The following items are intended to measure the degree to 
which an individual believes he has mastery or control over any 
situation in which he finds himself. The individual at the 
mastery end of the continuum is characterized by his belief 
that he can control ^ at will happen and also be the master of 
the ensuing events. The individual at the fatalism end of the 
continuum is one vtio completely accepts the idea that he has 
no control over the major forces at play which affect his life. 
For each of the following items assume that an individual 
agrees with the item. In which of the 11 categories on the 
mastery-fatalism continuum would you place him? You are not 
to indicate your own feelings about the statement but are to 
indicate your judgment about an individual who would agree 
with the item. 
Please respond on a 1 to 11 continuum as follows: 
Mastery Neutral Fatalism 
11 10. 987654321 
Not all of the following statements are "polar" in that 
they all do not indicate an extreme orientation at one end or 
the other. Most statements will probably fall between the 
extreme positions and the neutral point (6). Some may even 
be judged to be completely neutral. In each case, read over 
the item, think about the individual who would agree with the 
statement and place your interpretation in the form of a 
number to the left of the statement. 
The medians (scale values) and standard deviations were computed for 
each item on the basis of the judges evaluations. The cutting points 
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varied from .73 to 1.20 standard deviations. This procedure resulted 
in the elimination of 6 of the 19 items. 
The pre-test eliminated an additional 8 items leaving 6 items for 
the mastery dimension. An attempt was made during the pre-test to de­
velop the mastery end of the continuum as a separate dimension. This 
attempt was not successful. The 6 items which survived the pre-test, 
therefore, were all related to the fatalism scale. 
Data relevant to the items of the fatalism scale appears in Table 8. 
All of the scale values of the items are near the fatalism end of the 
mastery dimension (Table 8 and Appendix B). The computed minimum r^  ^
is .447. All of the field sample r^ '^s exceed this value. The item 
means and the item standard deviations appear to be relatively indepen­
dent. The item standard deviations range from 4.43 to 5.25. The co­
efficient of reliability is .805. 
Table 8. Data pertaining to the items of the fatalism scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample sample standard 
number deviation value r X deviation 
it 
1 .65 2 .751 4.30 4.69 
2 .62 1 .775 5.41 5.25 
3 .95 2 .770 6.21 4.45 
4 .89 2 .692 6.37 4.43 
5 .93 2 .756 6.67 4.48 
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The distribution of the intercorrelations among the items can be 
found in Appendix B, The range of a majority of the intercorrelations 
is relatively narrow, for 80 percent of the coefficients lie between .38 
and .49. The overall range of the intercorrelation coefficients is from 
.383 to .672. The average intercorrelation coefficient is .451. Thus 
the intercorrelation coefficients are concentrated in a relatively nar­
row range and are of a moderate magnitude. 
The range of the total scores on the fatalism scale is from 0 to 75 
whereas the possible range is from 0 to 80. The mean value is 28.96 and 
the standard deviation is 17.471. Table 9 presents the distribution of 
scores by categories established on the basis of standard deviations. 
As can be seen, a majority of the scores are concentrated at the negative 
end of the scale. 
Table 9. Distribution of sample scores on the fatalism scale 
Score category Number Percent 
11 and below 33 17.7 
12 - 29 69 37.1 
30 - 47 51 27.4 
48 and above 33 17.8 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 28.96 
S = 17.471 
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Scientific orientation scale The scientific orientation scale 
was developed to measure in a relative sense the degree to which a farmer 
believes he should 1) use scientific findings and the scientific method 
as criteria for selection of alternative courses of action in farming 
and 2) apply science to farming. This scale was intended to operation-
alize the concept scientific orientation developed in relation to and 
included in Sub-general Hypotheses IB, ID, 2B, 3A and 33. 
The scientific orientation scale was originally part of the general 
dimension called belief in science. This dimension was developed to 
measure the degree to vrtiich an individual believes 1) that the deter­
mination of all alternatives should be based upon consequences predicted 
by systematic research and 2) scientific findings should be applied to 
our environment and everyday life. The belief in science scale was also 
designed to discriminate those individuals v^ o shared a scientific 
orientation from those who shared a traditional orientation. Thus the 
scientific orientation scale was the positive pole of the belief in 
science scale Wiereas the traditionalism scale (to be discussed below) 
constituted the negative pole of the continuum. 
The belief in science dimension originally had 96 statements. 
These statements can be found in Appendix A of this dissertation. The 
judges were asked to evaluate each of the 95 items according to the fol­
lowing set of instructions: 
The following items are intended to measure the degree 
to which an individual believes in and uses science and 
scientific findings in his everyday life. The opposite pole 
of "belief in science" is "traditionalism". The individual 
at the traditionalism end of the continuum operates primarily 
on the basis of traditional behavior and does not ask #at 
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are the alternatives but asks only •what has been done in the 
past. 
For each of the following items assume that an indi­
vidual agrees with the item. In vfliich of the 11 categories 
on the belief in science-traditionalism continuum would you 
place him? You are not to indicate your own feelings about 
the statement but are to indicate your judgement about an 
individual who would agree with the item. 
Please respond on a 1 to 11 continuum as follows: 
Belief in science Neutral Traditionalism 
1 1  1 0  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  
Not all of the following statements are "polar" in that 
they all do not indicate an extreme orientation at one end or 
the other. Most statements will probably fall between the ex­
treme positions and the neutral point (6). Some may even be 
judged to be completely neutral. In each case, read over the 
item, think about the individual vrtio would agree with the 
statement and place your interpretation in the form of a 
number to the left.of the statement. 
The cutting points of the items were again varied so that the items 
with extreme scale values were subjected to lower cutting points than 
those items with less extreme scale values. The highest cutting point 
was 1.14 standard deviations while the lowest cutting was .88 standard 
deviations. The cutting point procedure eliminated 55 of the items. 
The pre-test eliminated an additional 20 items leaving 21 items for the 
belief in science general dimension. 
The scientific orientation scale contained 15 items in its final 
form. As can be seen from an examination of Table 10 and Appendix A, 
all but items 14 and 15 were on the belief in science end of the con­
tinuum. The compute minimum r._ is .289. All of the items r.'s exceed 
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1 .99 9 .566 6.07 4.26 
2 .72 10 .430 6.74 4.42 
3 .93 10 .692 7.88 4.04 
4 .93 10 .591 8.77 3.80 
5 .93 10 .475 8.81 3.78 
6 1.14 9 .567 9.19 3.78 
7 .72 10 .717 9.24 3.85 
8 .94 9 .428 9.38 3.80 
9 .98 9 .498 9.68 3.84 
10 .94 9 .655 10.11 3.63 
11 .70 9 .609 11.64 3.89 
12 .80 9 .636 11.97 3.34 
13 .97 8 .476 12.25 2.65 
14 .85 3 .580 12.30 3.10 
15 .85 3 .303 12.82 3.14 
this value, although the r of item 15 exceeds the minimum r by a 
it it 
small margin. The item means and standard deviations appear to be 
slightly negatively correlated. The standard deviations range from 
2.65 to 4.42. The reliability coefficient of the scientific orienta­
tion scale is .835. 
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An examination of the distribution of the intercorrelations among 
the items of the scientific orientation scale (Appendix B) reveals that 
a majority of the correlation coefficients are contained in the .10 to 
.39 range. The average intercorrelation is .252 and the range of the 
intercorrelation is .007 to .599. Thus the range of a majority of the 
intercorrelation coefficients is moderately narrow, and the magnitude 
of the coefficients is low. 
The response to the scientific orientation scale ranged from a low 
of 32 to a high of 224, with a mean of 146.84 and a standard deviation 
of 30,546. The possible range on this scale was from 0 to 240. As can 
be seen in Table 11, a majority of the scores are concentrated at the 
positive end of the continuum. 
Table 11. Distribution of sample scores on the scientific orientation 
scale 
Score category Number Percent 
116 and below 27 14.5 
117 - 147 64 34.4 
148 - 178 70 37.6 
179 and above 25 13.5 
TOTAL 
X = 146.84 
S = 30.546 
186 100.0 
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Traditionalism scale The traditionalism scale was developed as 
a relative measure of the degree to vdaich farmers believe decisions 
should be based upon older proven practices and methods rather than upon 
science and Scientific innovations. The scale is intended to operation-
alize the concept traditionalism developed in relation to and included 
in Sub-general Hypotheses lA, IC, IE, 2A, 3A and 3B. 
The traditionalism scale was originally a part of the belief in 
science general dimension, and it constituted the "traditional" end of 
the continuum. Therefore, the procedures for item elimination discussed 
above in this section concerning the scientific orientation scale also 
apply to the traditionalism scale. 
The final traditionalism scale contained 6 items. Data relevant 
to these items appear in Table 12. All of the items in the scale have 
scale values which approach the traditionalism end of the belief in 
science continuum. The computed minimum r^  ^for the traditionalism 
scale is .410, All of the item r^ '^s exceed this value. There appears 
to be some^ Aiat of a positive relationship between the means and stand­
ard deviations of the respective items. The standard deviations of the 
items range from 3.81 to 5.23. The reliability coefficient of the 
traditionalism scale is .740. 
The distribution of the intercorrelations among the items indicate 
that a majority of the intercorrelations are contained in the range .20 
to .39. The range of all the intercorrelations is from .077 to .529. 
The average intercorrelation coefficient is .322. Thus the intercorre­
lations among the items are concentrated in a relatively narrow range. 
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Table 12. Data pertaining to the items of the traditionalism scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample sample standard 
number deviation value i^t X deviation 
1 .88 2 .658 4.31 4.12 
2 1.08 2 .652 4.99 3.81 
3 .80 2 .673 5.34 3.87 
4 .81 2 .701 5.67 3.78 
5 1.15 2 .710 6.93 4.31 
6 .88 3 .551 8.31 5.23 
The magnitude of these coefficients is moderate. 
The responses of the farmers to the traditionalism scale ranged 
from 0 to 96, with a mean of 35.55 and a standard deviation of 16.384. 
The possible range of the scale was also from 0 to 96. Table 13 presents 
the distribution of scores by categories established on the basis of 
standard deviations. The data in Table 13 indicate that most of the 
total scores are concentrated at the negative end of the scale. 
Maximization of income scale The maximization of income scale 
was developed as a relative measure of the degree to which farmers be­
lieve that farming should be viewed primarily as a business and thus a 
means to economic ends. It also embraces the notion that farming should 
be abandoned if monetary opportunities are better in non-farm occupa­
tions. This scale is intended to operationalize the concept maximization 
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Table 13. Distribution of sample scores on the traditionalism scale 
Score category Number Percent 
18 and below 23 12.4 
19 - 35 74 39.8 
36 - 52 63 33.8 
53 and above 26 14.0 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 35.55 
S = 16.384 
of income developed in relation to and included in Sub-general Hypotheses 
IB, ID, 2B, 3A and 3B. 
The maximization of income scale was originally part of the general 
dimension called image of farming. This general dimension was developed 
to measure the farmers* general perception of what the occupation of 
farming ought to be. The scale was designed to discriminate those farm­
ers who perceive farming as a business and a means to obtain economic 
ends from those who view farming primarily in non-economic returns, i.e., 
as a "way of life". Thus one end of the image of farming continuum con­
tained the maximization of income scale ^ ile the other end contained 
essentially the farming as a way of life scale. 
The image of farming scale originally contained 61 statements. A 
complete list of these statements can be found in Appendix A. The judges 
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were asked to evaluate each of the 61 items on the basis of the following 
set of instructions: 
The following items are intended to measure the way in 
vrtiich the individual looks at the occupation of farming. The 
individual at the economic-rationality end of the continuum is 
one who looks unemotionally on farming as a business and as 
an economic pursuit at which he can make money. This type of 
individual understands basic economic concepts such as marginal 
return and the rate of return on investment and also recognizes 
the need for some form of agricultural adjustment. The indivi­
dual at the nonrational-emotional end of the continuum views 
farming as a "way of life" and values non-economic returns to 
a greater extent than he does economic returns. 
For each of the following items assume that an individual 
agrees with the item. In which of the 11 categories on the 
economic-rationality—nonrational-emotional continuum would 
you place him? You are not to indicate your own feelings about 
the statement but are to indicate your judgment about an indi­
vidual who would agree with the item. 
Please respond on a 1 to 11 continuum as follows: 
Economic-rationality Neutral Nonrational-emotional 
1 1  1 0  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  
In each case, read over the item, think about the individual 
who would agree with the statement and place your interpretation 
in the form of a number to the left of the statement. 
The medians (scale values) and standard deviations were computed for 
each item on the basis of the judges evaluation of the item. The cutting 
points varied from a high of 1.33 standard deviations for some of the 
less extreme items to a low of 1.07 standard deviations for some of the 
extreme items. This procedure resulted in the elimination of 37 of the 
61 items. The pre-test eliminated an additional 15 items leaving only 
9 items for the image of farming general dimension. 
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The maximization of income scale contains only 3 items. Data per­
taining to these items can be found in Table 14. An examination of the 
scale values and the content of the items (Appendix B) suggest that the 
items are near the economic-rationality end of the image of farming 
scale. The computed minimum r^  ^is .576 which is exceeded by all 3 
r ^ 's. The item means and standard deviations appear to be independent. 
The reliability coefficient of this scale is .575. 
Table 14. Data pertaining to the items of the maximization of income 
scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample sample standard 
number deviation value r^  ^ X deviation 
1 1.12 9 .662 7.61 4.26 
2 .85 10 .779 8.71 4.40 
3 1.07 10 .763 10.66 4.12 
The distribution of the 3 intercorrelations among the items indicates 
that the range which contains these intercorrelations is relatively nar­
row (.20 - .29) and the correlations are of a low magnitude. The average 
intercorrelation coefficient is .311. 
The range of responses to the maximization of income scale were 
from 0 to 48 which is equal to the possible range on this scale. The 
mean of the total scores is 26.98 with a standard deviation of 9.391. 
The distribution of scores by categories presented in Table 15 reveals 
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that a majority of the farmers* scores are concentrated near the center 
of the continuum. 
Table 15. Distribution of sample scores on the maximization of income 
scale 
Score category Number Percent 
17 and below 27 14.5 
18 
- 27 79 42.5 
28 - 37 54 29.0 
38 and above 26 14.0 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 26.98 
S = 9.391 
Farming as a way of life scale The farming as a way of life 
scale was constructed as a relative measure of the degree to which farmers 
believe that the farm is an ideal place to raise a family and a good 
place to live and these are reasons enough to stay in farming and main­
tain as many families in farming as possible. This scale is intended to 
measure the concept farming as a way of life developed in relation to 
and included in Sub-general Hypotheses lA, IC, 2A, 3A and 3B. 
It should be pointed out that the content of some of the items of 
this scale is not directly related to the theoretical concept. In other 
words, this scale is a rather poor operational definition of the concept 
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fanning as a way of life. The content of 4 of the 6 items is more rele­
vant to the traditionalism and debt avoidance scale. It was decided, 
however, that a 2 item scale would not be very meaningful, so all 6 
items have been included. Thus the findings related to this dimension 
should be interpreted within the context of this situation. 
The farming as a way of life scale was originally part of the image 
of farming general dimension. It constituted the pole defined as 
nonrational-emotional. The process by ^ ich the items on this scale 
were developed has been discussed above in the section on maximization 
of income. 
Six items make up the farming as a way of life scale. As can be 
seen in Table 16 and Appendix A, all of the scale values of these 6 items 
are near the nonrational-emotional end of the range of farming continuum. 
The computed minimum r^ .^ is .410 which is exceeded by all 6 r^ '^s. How­
ever, the r^ '^s of items 1 and 2 do not exceed the minimum r^  ^by very 
much. The item means and standard deviations appear to be relatively 
independent. The range of the standard deviations is from 4.06 to 4.72. 
The reliability coefficient of this scale is .520. 
The distribution of the item intercorrelations (Appendix B) indi­
cates that almost all of the intercorrelations are contained in the 
first 3 categories. The range of all item intercorrelations is from 
.006 to .449. The average intercorrelation coefficient is .153. Thus 
the concentration of the intercorrelation coefficients is within a rela­
tively narrow range but the magnitude of these intercorrelation coeffi­
cients is very low. 
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Table 16. Data pertaining to the items of the farming as a way of life 
scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample sample standard 
number deviation value r^  ^ X deviation 
1 .96 4 .431 6.37 4.72 
2 .98 4 .487 7.74 4.06 
3 .98 4 .582 8.61 4.08 
4 .99 3 .542 8.79 4.58 
5 .96 3 .540 9.84 4.56 
6 .96 3 .670 10.49 4.29 
The distribution of scores by categories established on the basis 
of standard deviations appears in Table 17. The range of the scores on 
the farming as a way of life scale is from a low of 19 to a high of 96. 
Table 17, Distribution of sample scores on the way of life scale 
Score category Number Percent 
37 and below 27 14.5 
38-52 75 40.3 
53 - 67 60 32.3 
68 and above 24 12.9 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 51.85 
S = 14.202 
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The possible range of this scale is from 0 to 96. The mean total score 
is 51.85 and the standard deviation is 14.202. The distribution of the 
scores and the mean indicate that a majority of the scores are concen­
trated near the center of the continuum. 
Risk aversion scale The risk aversion scale was developed as a 
relative measure of the degree to which farmers believe that they should 
diversify their farming operation and save money to reduce risk and un­
certainty in farming. This scale is intended to operationalize the con­
cept risk aversion developed in relation to and included in Sub-general 
Hypotheses lA, IC, IE, 2A, 3A and 3B. 
The risk aversion scale was originally a part of the risk preference 
general dimension. This dimension was developed to measure the degree 
to which farmers believed one should use methods which are perceived as 
involving elements beyond the individual's control for purposes of gain­
ing certain predetermined ends. The risk preference continuum was 
therefore designed to discriminate those who are willing to try things 
or do things which involve elements of risk from those who erfiibit ex­
treme caution in decision-making and select those alternatives which 
minimize risk. The risk orientation scale constituted the risk prefer­
ence end of the general dimension risk preference whereas the risk aver­
sion and debt avoidance scales were grouped together at the risk aversion 
end of the continuum, 
A total of 65 statements were included in the risk preference dimen­
sion in the judges evaluation stage of the scale development. Many of 
the statements were taken from Hobbs (41). A complete list of all these 
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statements can be found in Appendix A of this dissertation. The judges 
were asked to evaluate each statement according to the following set of 
instructions: 
The following items are intended to measure the degree to 
which an individual is oriented towards and willing to take 
risks. The individual at the risk aversion end of the continuum 
exhibits extreme caution in the decisions he makes. He never 
takes chances and always elects "to play it safe". 
For each of the following items assume that an individual 
agrees with the item. In vrftiich of the 11 categories on the 
risk preference-risk aversion continuum would you place him? 
You are not to indicate your own feelings about the statement 
but are to indicate your judgement about an individual who 
would agree with the item. 
Please respond on a 1 to 11 continuum as follows; 
Risk preference Neutral Risk aversion 
1 1  1 0  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  
In each case, read over the item, think about the indivi­
dual lAo would agree with the statement and place your inter­
pretation in the form of a number to the left of the statement. 
The medians (scale values) and the standard deviations were compu­
ted for each item on the basis of the judges evaluation of the item. 
The cutting points varied from 1.15 standard deviations for those items 
with less extreme scale values to .96 standard deviations for those items 
with more extreme scale values. This procedure eliminated 35 of the 69 
items (approximately 50 percent). This pre-test eliminated an additional 
15 items leaving 19 items on the risk preference general dimension. 
The risk aversion scale includes 7 items. Data relevant to these 
items can be found in Table 18. An examination of the scale values and 
L 
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Table 18. Data pertaining to the items of the risk aversion scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample sample standard 
number deviation value fit X deviation 
1 1.02 3 .462 9.11 3.37 
2 .81 3 .681 9.59 4.14 
3 1.08 3 .574 9.69 3.88 
4 .87 3 .558 10.30 3.54 
5 .72 3 .621 10.76 3.20 
6 1.11 4 .570 11.63 3.43 
7 .75 3 .661 12.62 2.90 
the content of the items indicate that the items are near the risk aver­
sion end of the risk preference continuum. None of these scale values 
are extreme values. The minimum acceptable r.^  was computed as .376. 
All of the item r^ '^s exceed this value. The item means and item 
standard deviations appear to be slightly negatively related. The item 
standard deviations range from 2.90 to 4.14. The reliability coefficient 
of the risk aversion scale is .689. 
The distribution of the intercorrelations among the 6 items indi­
cates that a majority of the intercorrelation coefficients are contained 
within the .10 to .29 range. The range of all the intercorrelations is 
from .018 to .527. The average intercorrelation is .241. Thus the 
intercorrelation coefficients appear to be concentrated in a relatively 
116 
narrow range and a majority of the coefficients are of a low magnitude. 
The possible range of total scores on the risk aversion scale is 
from a low of 0 to a high of 112. The actual total scores on this 7 
item scale ranged from 30 to 112, with a mean of 73,70 and a standard 
deviation of 14.425. The distribution of scores by categories established 
on the basis of the standard deviation appears in Table 19. The mean 
and the distribution of the total scores on the risk aversion scale re­
veal that a majority of the farmers* scores are concentrated on the 
positive area of the scale. 
Table 19. Distribution of sample scores on the risk aversion scale 
Score category Number Percent 
59 and below 30 16.1 
60 - 74 71 38.2 
75 - 89 60 32.3 
90 and above 25 13.4 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 73.70 
S = 14.425 
Risk orientation scale The risk orientation scale was construc­
ted as a relative measure of the degree to which farmers are willing to 
take chances and use practices vAich involve unpredictables for social 
and economic gain. This scale was originally a part of the risk 
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preference general dimension and formed the risk preference end of the 
continuum. The scale is intended to operationalize the concept risk 
orientation which was developed in relation to and included in Sub-
general Hypotheses IB, ID, 2B, 3Â and 3B. 
The risk orientation scale contains 6 items. Data pertaining to 
these items are presented in Table 20. The minimum r^  ^was computed as 
.410 and all of the field sample item r.^ 's exceed this value. However, 
Table 20. Data pertaining to the items of the risk orientation scale 
Judges Judges Field ' Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample sample standard 
number deviation value r^  ^ X deviation 
1 .88 10 .474 5.98 4.26 
2 1.19 9 .532 7.86 4,15 
3 .62 9 .425 8.08 3.92 
4 .57 9 .537 9.31 3.46 
5 1.12 ' 9 .560 11.83 3.63 
6 .80 10 .502 12.39 3.06 
items 1 and 3 do not exceed this value by very much. The item standard 
deviations range from 3.06 to 4.26. The item means and the item standard 
deviations appear to be negatively related. The reliability coefficient 
is .423. 
! 
A majority of the intercorrelations among the risk preference items 
are concentrated between .018 and .190 (Appendix B). The range of all 
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of the intercorrelations is from .018 to .523. The average item inter-
correlation was computed as .109. Thus the item intercorrelations are 
concentrated in a relatively narrow range, but are of a very low magni­
tude. 
The possible range of total scores on the risk orientation scale is 
from 0 to 96. The actual scores ranged from a low of 20 to a high of 
87, with a mean of 55.45 and a standard deviation of 11.307. The dis­
tribution of scores by category established on the basis of the scale 
standard deviation can be found in Table 21. The distribution of the 
scores and their mean indicate that a majority of the farmers scored on 
the positive side of the scale, but nearer the center than the extreme. 
Table 21. Distribution of sample scores on the risk orientation scale 
Score category Number Percent 
43 and below 24 12.9 
44 - 55 68 36.6 
56 - 67 70 37.6 
68 and above 24 12.9 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 55 .45 
S = 11 .307 
Debt avoidance scale The debt avoidance scale was developed as 
a relative measure of the degree to which farmers believe that one should 
accumulate rather than borrow capital before purchasing production and 
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consumer goods even though this action may mean some temporary discom­
fort. This scale is intended to operationalize the concept debt avoid­
ance which was developed in relation to and included in Sub-general Hy­
potheses lA, IC, IE, 2A, 3A and 3B. 
The debt avoidance scale was originally part of the risk preference 
general dimension. In the initial stages of the projects, the debt 
avoidance scale and the risk aversion scale were both grouped at the 
risk aversion end of the risk preference general dimension. Subsequent 
conceptual and related statistical analysis suggested that the risk aver­
sion end of the continuum be divided into these two scales. The differ­
ence between these two concepts has been discussed in the theory chapter 
of this dissertation. 
The debt avoidance scale contained 6 items in its final form. Data 
relevant to these items are presented in Table 22. The minimum r was 
it 
computed as .410, and is exceeded by all of the individual item r^ '^s. 
The item means and standard deviations appear to be somewhat positively 
correlated. The items standard deviation range from 3.09 to 4.42. The 
r is equal to .806. 
tt 
The distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of the 
debt avoidance scale are concentrated in the .30 to .49 range. The over­
all range of the intercorrelation coefficients is from a low of .225 to 
a high of .665. The average intercorrelation among the 6 items is .322, 
These data indicate that the intercorrelations are concentrated in a 
relatively narrow range and are of a moderate magnitude. 
The actual range of the total scores on the debt avoidance scale is 
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Table 22. Data pertaining to the items of the debt avoidance scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample s^ ple standard 
number deviation value r^  ^ X deviation 
1 .79 3 .684 3.41 3.77 
2 1.10 3 .649 3.85 3.50 
3 .63 3 .686 3.94 3.09 
4 1.03 2 .751 5.47 4.42 
5 .81 2 .798 6.39 4.37 
6 1.01 3 .694 7.16 4.28 
from 0 to 88 with a mean of 30.02 and a standard deviation of 16.522. 
The possible range on this scale is from 0 to 96. The distribution of 
the scores by categories established on the basis of standard deviations 
is presented in Table 23. As can be seen, the large majority of the . 
farmers scored on the negative end of the scale. 
Table 23. Distribution of sample scores on the debt avoidance scale 
Score category Number Percent 
13 and below 29 15.6 
14 - 30 65 34.9 
31 - 47 65 34.9 
48 and above 27 14.6 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 30.02 
S = 16.522 
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Commutative justice scale The commutative justice scale was de­
veloped to measure the degree to which individuals believe that the 
government should guarantee the farmers a fair return. This scale is 
intended to operationalize the concept commutative justice developed in 
relation to and included in Sub-general Hypotheses IF, IG, IH, IL, IM, 
2C, 3C, 3D and 3E. 
The commutative justice scale was originally a part of the role of 
government general dimension. This dimension was constructed to measure 
the individual's belief concerning how much government intervention 
should be necessary to obtain equality of income, equality of opportunity, 
and a fair return. The dimension was designed to discriminate those \Aio 
believe the role of the government should be passive from those who be­
lieve the role of government should be dominant. 
Unlike the scales discussed above, the two scales developed from 
this general dimension did not emerge from the two poles of this dimen­
sion. The commutative justice scale and the distributive justice scale 
were developed from items which were dispersed over the entire continuum. 
These two scales were differentiated from the general dimension on the 
basis of a content analysis of the items and related statistical analy­
sis. The difference between these two concepts has been discussed in 
the theory chapter. 
A total of 40 items were formulated and presented to the judges. A 
complete list of these statements can be found in Appendix A. The items 
were submitted to the 15 judges for their evaluation. The judges were 
asked to place the items on a psychological continuum established by the 
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following set of instructions: 
ROLE OF GOVERMENT 
The following items are intended to measure vihat the in­
dividual thinks the role of government should be in our country. 
At the "least government" end of the continuum, the individual 
is characterized as one who feels that the best government is the 
one that governs least. The individual at the other end of the 
continuum believes that the government should play a dominant 
role in the economic activities of the country. 
For each of the following items assume that an individual 
agrees with the item. In \Aiich of the 11 categories on the 
"best government governs least-government plays a dominant role" 
continuum would you pliace him? You are not to indicate your 
own feelings about the statement but are to indicate your judg­
ment about an individual MAIO would agree with the item. 
Please respond on a 1 to 11 continuum as follows: 
Best government Government plays 
governs least Neutral a dominant role 
1 1  1 0  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  
In each case, read over the item, think about the indivi­
dual who would agree with the statement and place your inter­
pretation in the form of a number to the left of the statement. 
The medians (scale values) and the standard deviations were compu­
ted for each item on the basis of the judges evaluation of the item. 
The cutting points varied from a high of 1.09 to a low of .71. This 
procedure eliminated 20 items. The pre-test eliminated an additional 
3 items leaving 17 items on the role of government general dimension. 
The commutative justice scale contains 9 items. An examination of 
Table 24 and the content of these items (Appendix B) reveals that 5 of 
the item scale values are near the "best government governs least" end 
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of the continuum. The minimum r, is .332. All of the r 's exceed 
It it 
this value. The item means and item standard deviations appear to be 
relatively independent. The item standard deviations range from 4.26 
to 5.01. The reliability coefficient for this scale is ,870. 


















1 .77 3 .688 5.77 4.64 
2 . 88 2 .611 6.19 4.26 
3 .72 9 .664 6.86 4.35 
4 .81 2 .744 7.80 5.01 
5 .83 3 .635 8.23 4.85 
6 .71 10 .762 8.26 4.44 
7 .59 10 .615 8.87 4.74 
8 1.02 9 .766 9.01 4.83 
9 .85 10 .814 9.74 4.92 
The intercorrelations among the items are concentrated between .30 
and .49. The range of the item intercorrelations is from .264 to .693. 
The average intercorrelation is .423. Thus a majority of the item inter­
correlations are concentrated in a relatively narrow range and are of a 
moderate magnitude. 
The total scores on the commutative justice scale ranged from 0 to 
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144 with a mean of 70.73 and a standard deviation of 29.480. The possi­
ble range of this scale is also frœn 0 to 144. The distribution of scores 
on the commutative justice scale and the total score mean reveal that a 
majority of the scores are concentrated near the center of the scale.. 
Table 25. Distribution of sample scores on the commutative justice scale 
Score category Number Percent 
41 and below 30 16.1 
42 - 71 51 27.4 
72 - 101 81 43.5 
102 and above 24 12.9 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 70.73 
S = 29.480 
Distributive justice scale The distributive justice scale was 
developed as a measure of the degree to which individuals believe it is 
the government's responsibility to equalize opportunity, income, securi­
ty and common welfare (with reference to the imbalance between the agri­
cultural and non-agriculture sector of our economy). The distributive 
justice scale was originally a part of the general dimension role of 
government, and was developed in the same manner as the ccsmnutative 
justice scale discussed directly above. This scale is intended to oper-
ationalize the concept distributive justice developed in relation to and 
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included in Sub-general Hypotheses IF, IG, IH, IL, IM, 2C, 3C, 3D and 
3E. 
The distributive justice scale contains 8 items. All of the items 
except item 8 have scale values which approach the "government plays 
a dominant role" end of the role of government general dimension 
(Table 26 and Appendix A). The computed minimum r.^  is .332, and all 
of the field sample r^ /^s exceed this value. The item range from 4.21 
to 5.01. The item means appear to be relatively independent of the 
item variances. The scale r^  ^is equal to .804. 
A majority of the intercorrelation coefficients are concentrated in 
the .30 to .55 range. The range of all the item intercorrelations is 
from .145 to .547. The average item intercorrelation (r ) is ,340. 
1J 




















1 .68 2 .722 5.48 4.21 
2 .99 2 .617 5.77 4.52 
3 .95 2 .451 6.10 4.28 
4 .96 2 .699 7.10 4.79 
5 .91 3 .663 7.11 4.43 
6 1.06 3 .681 7.33 4.93 
7 1.01 3 .684 7.40 5.01 
8 1.00 10 .678 7.43 4.40 
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Thus a majority of the intercorrelations are concentrated in a moderately 
narrow range, and these intercorrelations are of,.a moderate magnitude. 
The possible range of the total scores on the distributive justice 
scale is from 0 to 128. The actual range is from 0 to 117, with a mean 
of 53.72 and a standard deviation of 23.813. The distribution of scores 
by categories established on the basis of the standard deviation is given 
in Table 27. A majority of these scores are clustered around the center 
of the distributive justice scale. 
Table 27. Distribution of sample scores on the distributive justice 
scale 
Score category Number Percent 
29 and below 31 16.7 
30 - 54 57 30.6 
55 - 79 77 41.4 
80 and above 21 11.3 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 53.72 
S = 23.813 
Government dominance scale The government dominance scale was 
developed to measure the degree to which farmers believe government pro­
grams and the controls associated with these programs are placing res­
trictions upon their efficiency, earning possibilities and freedom to 
manage their farming operations. This scale is intended to operationalize 
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the concept government dominance developed in relation to and included 
in Sub-general Hypotheses II, IJ, IK, IN, 2D, 3C and 3E. 
This scale was originally part of a general dimension called per­
ception of government. This dimension was developed to measure a 
farmer's evaluation of 1) what role he believes the government is playing 
in agriculture today and 2) what effect government intervention is having 
upon agriculture. The perception of government scale was designed to 
discriminate those ^ o believe the government is playing a major role 
in the determination of the economic affairs of this country from those 
who believe the government is playing virtually no role in the affairs 
of this country. The referent for a majority of these items was the 
agricultural sector. 
There were 43 items included in the judges evaluation stage of the 
scale development. A complete listing of these statements can be found 
in Appendix A. The judges were asked to evaluate each of these items 
according to the following instructions: 
PERCEPTION OF GOVEBNMENT 
The following items are intended to measure the degree to 
•which the individual feels the government is presently involved 
in the affairs of our country; especially in the agricultural 
sector. At the "no role" end of the continuum, the individual 
is characterized as one who believes the government is playing 
virtually no role in the affairs of the country at the present 
time. At the "major role" end of the continuum is the individual 
o^ feels the government's role is presently a major factor in 
determining the economic affairs of our country. 
For each of the following items assume that an individual 
agrees with the item. In which of the 11 categories on the 
"government playing virtually no role-government playing a 
major role" continuum would you place him? You are not to 
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indicate your own feelings about the statement but are to indi­
cate your judgement about an individual v^ o would agree with 
the item. 
Please respond on a 1 to 11 continuum as follows: 
Government playing 
virtually no role Neutral 
Government play­
ing a major role 
1 1  1 0  9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1  
In each case, read over the item, think about the individual 
who would agree with the statement and place your interpretation 
in the form of a number to the left of the statement. 
The cutting points for the items varied from a high of 2.07 standard 
deviations to a low of 1.00 standard deviations. This procedure elimina­
ted 26 of the 43 items. The pre-test analysis eliminated an additional 
14 items. The 3 remaining items formed the government restrictiveness 
scale. 
The cutting points for the items on the perception of government 
scale are much more liberal than the cutting points established for the 
scales discussed previously. The attrition rate (93 percent) for items 
is also by far the highest on this general dimension than for any other 
general dimension. These two undesirable situations were a result of 
early difficulties in the construction of the items for the perception 
of government dimension. An analysis of the judges evaluation of the 
43 items revealed that a majority of the items did not fit the psycho­
logical continuum defined in the instructions. Over one-half of the 
item standard deviations were 1.80 and above, indicating a relatively 
large amount of disagreement over the placement of certain items on the 
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perception of government continuum. It was decided that the psychologi­
cal continuum had been poorly defined and that additional analysis was 
necessary to determine the feasibility of using the items of this dimen­
sion. The cutting points therefore, were raised to a point where approx­
imately 40 percent of the items could be included in the pre-test. The 
results of the pre-test indicated that only three of the items were 
scalable. The content of these items was much more specific than the 
original conceptualization of the content of this dimension. 
The data relevant to these three items are presented in Table 28. 
The magnitude of the judges standard deviation should be noted. All of 
the scale values of the items are concentrated at the "government playing 
a major role" end of the perception of government general dimension 
(Table 28 and Appendix A). The computed minimum acceptable r is .576. 
It is exceeded by all of the field sample r^ '^s. The item means and 
item standard deviations appear to be relatively independent, but the 
small number of items make such an evaluation tenuous. The r of this 
tt 
scale is .896. 
Table 28. Data pertaining to the items of the government dominance scale 
Judges Judges Field Field Field sample 
Item standard scale sample sample standard 
number deviation value 
i^t 
X deviation 
1 2.06 3 .861 7.07 5.10 
2 1.62 3 .924 7.12 4.70 
3 2.07 2 .883 8.16 i 5.12 
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The intercorrelations among the three items appear to be concentra­
ted in a relatively narrow range and are of a moderately high magnitude 
(Appendix B). The range of the intercorrelations is from .583 to .769. 
The average intercorrelation is .687. 
The distribution of the scores by categories established on the 
basis of the standard deviation is presented in Table 29. The actual 
range as well as the possible range of total scores on the government 
dominance scale is from a low of 0 to a high of 48. The mean of these 
scores is 22.34 and the standard deviation is 13.254. The distribution 
I 
of the scores and the mean of the scores indicate that a majority of the 
scores are distributed over a wide range of the scale. 
Table 29. Distribution of sample scores on the government dominance 
scale 
Score category Number Percent 
8 and below 23 12.4 
9 - 2 2  75 40.3 
23 - 36 59 31.7 
37 and above 29 15.6 
TOTAL 
X = 22.34 
S = 13.254 
186 100.0 
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Comparison of the 14 scales A careful reading of the discussion 
concerning the 14 value and belief scales indicates that these scales 
vary in the degree to which they possess the properties of additivity, 
unidimensionality and reliability. An attempt will now be made to eval­
uate the degree to which these scales appear to possess these properties 
relative to one another. 
Before discussing the degree of conformity of the scale data to the 
conditions of additivity, a brief evaluation of these scales with res­
pect to some of the criteria which have generally been used in past re­
search is in order. All of the items in each scale exceeded the computed 
minimum acceptable item-total correlation coefficient (r^ )^. Each item 
was evaluated by a panel of judges and was found to be relatively unam­
biguous (with the exception noted in the government dominance scale). 
All items were pre-tested and met the established criteria to belong to 
the various clusters. In addition, many of these items had been used in 
similar scales on similar populations, and had met the standard criteria 
in those studies. 
Table 30 summarizes the data relevant to the arbitrary criteria 
established to evaluate the degree to which each scale conforms to the 
conditions for additivity. The scales are ordered in Table 30 on the 
basis of how well each appears to meet these criteria relative to one 
another. The scales have been placed into three general categories and 
have been ranked primarily on the basis of differences between categories 
and not on the basis of differences within categories. The first four 
scales (government dominance, fatalism, commutative justice, and 
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distributive justice) appear to conform the best to the criteria. The 
reliability coefficients (r^ )^ and the average intercorrelation coef­
ficient (r^ j) are among the highest of the 14 scales. All of the item 
means and item standard deviations were judged to be relatively indepen­
dent. The ranges of the item standard deviations as well as the ranges 
of the concentration of intercorrelations are among the smallest of the 
group. The magnitude of a majority of the item intercorrelations is as 
high as any in the 14 scales. 
The next seven scales (debt avoidance through independent action) 
are relatively equal in their general conformity to the criteria, al­
though the first three scales (debt avoidance, individualism, and tradi­
tionalism) appear to conform somewhat better to these criteria than the 
last four scales. On the whole these seven scales do not conform as well 
to all the criteria as do the first four scales. The r^  ^and r values 
tt ij 
for the scales are, in general, lower than those of the first four scales. 
The means and standard deviations exhibit more relationship and the 
ranges of the standard deviations are somewhat wider for these scales. 
Although most of the ranges of the concentration of intercorrelation of 
these seven scales is as narrow as those of the first scales, the magni­
tude of these intercorrelations is not as high. 
The last three scales (collective action, way of life, and risk 
orientation) appear as a group, to conform the poorest to the criteria 
for additivity. The intercorrelations among the items of the risk orien­
tation scale and the way of life scale are the lowest of the 14 scales. 
The r of these two scales, the concentration of the item intercorrelations 
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and the relative magnitude of these intercorrelation coefficients all 
indicate that the size of the intercorrelations of the items of these 
scales are considerably lower than those of the other scales. An im­
portant consequence of this situation is that the r^ '^s for these scales 
are the lowest of the group. The items of the collective action scale 
are also correlated rather lowly, but not quite to the degree of the 
items of the risk orientation and way of life scale. The most outstand­
ing differences between this scale and the other 13 scales is the very 
large range of the item standard deviations (3.30 to 7.67). This situa­
tion is reflected in the relationship between the item means and item 
standard deviation, for these parameters appear to be positively rela­
ted. 
These comparisons are admittedly arbitrary and the rankings assigned 
to the 14 scales may be open to question. These comparisons, neverthe­
less, provide one with much more information about the scales than such 
standard measures as item-total correlation coefficients and Guttman 
coefficients of reliability. These comparisons may also be important 
in the evaluation and interpretation of the findings, for the presence 
or absence of certain relationships can be evaluated in light of the 
general conformity of these scales to the criteria established. These 
types of evaluations will be conducted to some extent in the discussion 
section of this dissertation. 
It should be pointed out that the number of items in each scale is 
also an important consideration as far as reliability is concerned. Even 
though a scale with few items may cttttform relatively well to the conditions 
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Table 30. Summary of the scale data related to the criteria of additivity 
Number of 
Scale items 
t^t 'ij Relationship of X 
1. Government dominance 3 .896 .687 relatively indepe: 
2. Fatalism 5 .805 .451 relatively indepe; 
3. Commutative justice 9 .870 .423 relatively indepei 
4. Distributive justice 8 .804 .340 relatively indepei 
5. Debt avoidance 6 .806 .322 somewhat positive 
6. Individualism 17 .817 .207 relatively indepei 
7. Traditionalism 6 .740 .322 somewhat positive 
8. Scientific orientation 15 .835 .252 somewhat negative 
9. Maximization of income 3 .575 .311 relatively indeper 
10. Risk aversion 7 .689 .241 somewhat negative 
11. Independent action 7 .653 .212 somewhat negative 
12. Collective action 9 .700 .201 somewhat positive 
13. Way of life 6 .520 .153 relatively indepen 
14. Risk orientation 6 .423 .109 somewhat negative 
)f additivity 
__ Concentration of Relative magnitude 
Relationship of X and s Range of S intercorrelations of intercorrelations 
relatively independent 4,70 to 5.12 .70 to .79 moderately high 
relatively independent 4.43 to 5.25 .40 to .49 moderate 
relatively independent 4.26 to 5.01 .30 to .49 moderate 
relatively independent 4.21 to 5.01 .30 to .55 moderate 
somewhat positive 3.09 to 4.42 .30 to .49 moderate 
relatively independent 3.54 to 5.20 .10 to .29 low 
somewhat positive 3.81 to 5.23 .20 to .39 moderate 
somewhat negative 2.65 to 4.42 .10 to .39 low 
relatively independent 4.12 to 4.40 .20 to .29 low 
somexAiat negative 2.90 to 4.14 .10 to .29 low 
somewhat negative 3.82 to 5.09 .20 to .39 low 
somewhat positive 3.30 to 7.67 .00 to .29 low 
relatively independent 4.06 to 4.72 .00 to .19 very low 
somewhat negative 3.06 to 4.26 .00 to .19 very low 
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for additivity, one should be aware of the fact that measurement error 
is likely to be higher for scales with a small number of items than for 
scales with many items. 
Policy actions 
Policy behavior was divided into two types in the previous chapter 
— policy actions (accustomed behavior) and policy positions (intended 
behavior). Policy actions have been defined as participation in past 
and present policy programs. The type of policy under study in this 
dissertation is government farm programs. The operational definitions 
of policy actions include the number of years of participation in the 
present feed grain program, and the number of years of participation in 
the commodity credit corn program. The number of years of participation 
were used rather than the extent of participation (the number of acres 
or bushels, etc.) to measure policy actions because the latter is a 
function of the size of operation whereas the former is not. Thus the 
number of years of participation were considered to be more unbiased 
and therefore a more valid measure. 
These two programs belong to the general category of voluntary 
type programs. Thus they should be considered in the theoretical frame­
work concerning voluntary programs outlined in the previous chapter. 
Although there have been a number of government farm programs ini­
tiated during the last several decades, these two programs were the only 
136 
ones which were considered to be applicable to nearly all of the sample 
members. The criteria used to determine the applicability of a given 
program included the relevance of the program to the farming operations 
of the sample members and the opportunity of the sample members to par­
ticipate in the program. The feed grain program was applicable to all 
of the farmers interviewed in the study. The program had been in effect 
for three years (1961-1963) at the time the study was conducted. All 
of the farmers except two (1.1 percent) had farmed during these three 
years. The two exceptions had farmed two of the three years the program 
had been in operation. Thus it was decided that the farmers interviewed, 
as a group, had sufficient opportunity to participate in the feed grain 
program. 
Since only 2 percent of the 186 farmers did not grow corn in 1963, 
the commodity credit corn program was considered to be applicable to 
enough of the sample members to be used as a measure of farm program 
participation. The commodity credit corn program, however, was initia­
ted in 1949 so that over 41 percent of the farmers had started farming 
after the program began. Thus certain farmers had had more opportunity 
to participate in this program than others. To adjust for the built-in 
bias of the number of years farming, the number of years in which the 
farmer had participated in the program was divided by the total number 
of years he could have participated in the program. The commodity credit 
corn program had been in effect 15 years when the study was conducted. 
A farmer ^ o farmed during the 1949 to 1963 period potentially could 
have participated in this program for 15 years. Thus his years of 
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participation was divided by 15. A farmer \jho started farming in 1960 
potentially could have participated in this program for four years. Con­
sequently, the number of years he participated in the commodity credit 
corn program was divided by four. By this method, a farmer who farmed 
from 1949 to 1963 and had participated 15 years in the feed grain pro­
gram received the same score (100) as the farmer who farmed from 1960 
to 1963 and had participated in this program for four years. 
The frequency distribution of the number of years the sample members 
had participated in the feed grain program appears in Table 31. The 
mean years of participation is 1.78 years with a standard deviation of 
1.282. 
Table 31. Distribution of years of participation in the feed grain 
program 
Years Number Percent 
0 48 25.8 
1 33 17.7 
2 17 9.2 
3 88 47.3 
X = 1.78 
S = 1.282 
The commodity credit corn program was initiated in 1949 and was in 
operation when the sample was interviewed. The data used for analysis 
were the scores computed on the basis of the ratio discussed above. The 
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distribution of years of participation in this program can be found in 
Table 32. As can be seen the mean number of years is 3.62 with a standard 
deviation of 4.66 years. 
Table 32. Distribution of years of participation in the commodity credit 
corn program 
Years Number Percent 
0 69 37.1 
1 - 2  36 19.4 
3 - 4 25 13.5 
5 - 6 13 7.0 
00 1 11 5.8 
9 - 1 0  9 4.8 
11 and above 23 12.4 
X = 3.62 
S = 4.66 
Policy positions 
There have been many more government farm programs proposed than 
enacted. Since much of the dialogue concerning farm policy is related 
to these proposed programs, it is important to consider these programs . 
as well as those which are in existence. This information should provide 
a representative profile of reaction to the major types of programs de­
signed to deal with the so-called "farm problem". 
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Two sets of measures were developed to measure the policy positions 
of the 186 Iowa farmers. The first set consisted of 19 proposed govern­
ment farm programs. These 19 programs were placed into the six cate­
gories discussed in the previous chapter of this dissertation: the 
voluntary price - supply management programs, compulsory price - supply 
management programs, free market program, auxiliary adjustment programs, 
income transfer programs, and the agricultural restraint programs. These 
programs were designed to be general in nature and, on the whole, repre­
sent alternatives lAiich have not been enacted. In other words, these 
programs were designed to determine the general position or intended be­
havior of each farmer with respect to a number of policy alternatives. 
Each farmer was asked to respond to each of the programs on the 
basis of the following set of instructions; 
Through the years there have been a number of government 
farm programs, and many other farm programs have been proposed. 
We have a list of government farm programs which have been 
proposed at various times. We want you to indicate how you 
would vote on each of the programs if you had to vote today. 
Please respond by answering yes if you would vote for 
the program, and no if you would not vote for the program. 
After you have voted either yes or no, we would like to 
have you indicate how certain you are of this choice. On 
Card ^  you will see numbers from 1 to 5. We wish to have you 
use these numbers to indicate the degree of certainty \rtiich 
you feel about your vote on the issue. Indicate number 1 if 
you are quite uncertain or have strong reservations about your 
choice. Indicate number 5 if you feel quite certain or have 
no reservations about your vote. In some cases, numbers 2, 3, 
or 4 may best describe how certain you are of your vote. 
The responses were scored in the identical way as the value and belief 
scales discussed in the last section. Thus the range of responses on 
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each program was from 0 to 16, 
The 19 programs were grouped into the six categories mentioned 
above. This grouping was done for three reasons. First, the programs 
which are grouped together are all logically related to the category in 
irfiich they have been placed. The programs which are included in the 
voluntary program category differ in content, but are all voluntary 
programs in nature. Second, an examination of the data relevant to 
the scalability of these program sets indicated that some evidence for 
additivity could be found. The data relevant to each program category 
will be presented'directly below. Third, the programs were grouped to­
gether for the sake of parsimony. This grouping reduced the number of 
empirical hypotheses from 160 to 74. 
The data relevant to each program category will be presented below. 
The procedure used for the 14 value and belief scales will also be used 
here. Each program set will be evaluated on the basis of the three 
criteria for additivity. The distribution of the responses to each pro­
gram will also be presented. 
Compulsory price-supply management programs The compulsory 
price-supply management programs were developed to measure the degree 
to which each farmer favors price-supply management programs which re­
quire that all farmers who produce commodities covered by the program 
participate in the program. The programs which constitute this program 
set include the following; 
Program 1 - a compulsory program in which the government would set 
acreage allotments for each farm. 
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Program 2 - a compulsory bushel allotment program in which the 
government would set bushel allotments for each farm in 
an attempt to control surplus and raise farm prices. 
Program 3 - a program in which the government would select farms 
that would be withdrawn from production. (These farms 
would be purchased by the government at a fair price.) 
Data relevant to these three programs appear in Table 33. (The pro­
gram numbers listed in Table 33 correspond to the numbers of the programs 
which appear directly above.) The computed minimum r^  ^is .576. All of 
the field sample r^ '^s exceed this value. The program means and program 
standard deviation appear to be relatively independent, but the few 
number of programs and the low variability of the means and standard 
deviations make such an evaluation tenuous. The range of the program 
standard deviations is from 4.48 to 4.61. The reliability coefficient 
is .577. 
Table 33. Data pertaining to the items of the compulsory program scale 
Program Field sample Field__sample Field sample 
number r X standard deviation 
it 
1 .752 3.46 4.52 
2 .806 3.81 4.61 
3 .650 4.01 4.48 
The intercorrelations among these three programs are .492 (one and 
two)J .167 (one and three), and .277 (two and three). The average 
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intercorrelation is .312. The magnitude of these intercorrelations is 
low and the range of concentration of the coefficients is relatively 
narrow. The small number of items again make these evaluations somewhat 
tenuous. 
The range of the total scores on these three programs is from 0 to 
43 whereas the possible range is from 0 to 48. The mean score is 11.29 
with a standard deviation of 10,021. Table 34 presents the distribution 
of scores by category established on the basis of the standard deviations. 
As can be seen, a majority of the farmers were not in favor of these com­
pulsory programs. 
Table 34. Distribution of sample scores on the compulsory program scale 
Score category Number Percent 
0 43 23.1 
1 - 1 1  6 6  3 5 . 5  
12 - 22 49 26.3 
23 and above 28 15.1 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 11.29 
S = 10.021 
Voluntary price - supply management programs The voluntary price-
supply management programs were developed to measure the degree to which 
each farmer favored farm programs which leave the decision of participa­
tion to the individual. The programs which make up this program set 
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include the following programs: 
Program 1 - a voluntary program in which the government would pay 
farmers to permanently retire part or all of their farm 
land from production. 
Program 2 - a voluntary program in which the government would pay 
farmers for retiring their whole farms from production 
on a year to year basis. 
Program 3 - a voluntary bushel allotment in which the farmers who 
sign up would receive price supports for only those 
bushels within his allotment. 
Program 4 - a voluntary program in which farmers could sell their 
cropland to the government for additions to national 
recreational areas. 
Program 5 - a program in lAich the government would set acreage 
allotments for each farm. Only those v^ o sign up will 
receive price supports. 
Program 6 - a voluntary program in which the farmer agrees to cut 
back the number of his crop acres. 
Table 35 contains data relevant to these six programs. The computed 
minimum r is .410. All of the field sample r 's exceed the value, al-
it It 
though the r^ '^s for programs 3 and 4 do not exceed this value by very 
much. The program means and standard deviations appear to be somev^ at 
negatively related. The range of the program standard deviations is 
from 4.36 to 5.55. The reliability coefficient is .540. 
The intercorrelations among these six items can be found in 
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1 .593 6.11 5.03 
2 .707 7.64 5.57 
3 .440 8.70 4.74 
4 .459 8.92 4.80 
5 .533 10.49 4.83 
6 .565 10.94 4.36 
Appendix B. The range of these intercorrelations is from -.016 to .415 
and the average intercorrelation is .163. The range of the majority of 
the intercorrelations is relatively narrow, since approximately 73 per­
cent of the coefficients are between .10 and .29. These intercorrela­
tion coefficients therefore have a relatively low magnitude. 
The distribution of the total scores by category established on the 
basis of the standard deviations is presented in Table 36. The range of 
total scores on the voluntary programs is from 10 to 91. The possible 
range is from 0 to 96. The mean score is 52.81 with a standard devia­
tion of 16.255. The distribution of total scores and the data related 
to each program indicate that a majority of the farmers favor voluntary 
programs. 
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Table 36. Distribution of sample scores on the voluntary program score 
Score category Number Percent 
36 and below 29 15.6 
37 - 53 60 32.3 
54 - 70 70 37.6 
71 and above 27 14.5 
TOTAL 186 100.0 
X = 52.81 
S = 16.255 
Auxiliary adjustment programs The auxiliary adjustment programs 
were developed to measure the relative degree to which farmers favor 
government farm programs which are designed to aid rural people in the 
process of moving from farm to non-farm occupations. The programs which 
are included in this category of farm programs are : 
Program 1 - a program in which the government would make payments 
to farm families to encourage them to relocate in urban 
jobs. 
Program 2 - a government program to provide education which would 
help farm young people to adjust to urban life. 
Program 3 - a government program to retrain farm people who wish to 
leave agriculture for non-farm employment. 
Program 4 - a government program to improve education opportunities 
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in rural areas. 
Program 5 - a government program which would provide information to 
farm young people about urban job opportunities. 
Data relevant to these programs can be found in Table 37. The mini­
mum acceptable r^  ^for these programs is .447. All of the field sample 
r ^ 's exceed this value. The means and program standard deviation appear 
to be relatively independent. The range of the program standard devia­
tions is from 4.00 to 4.99. The reliability coefficient was computed as 
.764. 










1 .545 3.67 4.00 
2 .841 8.10 4.88 
3 .811 8.41 4.99 
4 .692 10.73 4.72 
5 .711 10.74 4.05 
The distribution of the intercorrelations among these various pro­
grams can be found in Appendix B. The range of these intercorrelations 
is from .149 to .645. A majority of these correlations (60 percent) are 
concentrated in the .30 to .49 range. The average intercorrelation 
coefficient is .400. Thus the intercorrelations are concentrated in a 
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relatively narrow range and are of a moderate magnitude. 
The range of total scores on these auxiliary adjustment programs is 
from 3 to 80 whereas the possible range is from 0 to 80. The mean total 
score is 41.65 and the standard deviation is 16.471. An examination of 
Table 38 and an inspection of the data indicate that a majority of the 
farmers favored these types of programs. 
Table 38. Distribution of sample scores on the auxiliary adjustment 
program scale 
Score category Number Percent 
25 and below 32 17.2 
26 - 42 60 32.3 
43 - 59 69 37.1 
60 and above 25 13.4 
TOTAL - 186 100.0 
X = 41.65 
S = 16.471 
Free market program The free market program was designed to 
measure the relative degree to which farmers favor the elimination of 
all government programs so that price and supply can be determined by 
the market place. Only one program was included in this category. It 
states : 
Program 1 - The government would abolish all farm support programs. 
There would be no production controls and no price 
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support. 
The distribution of the responses to this program are presented in 
Table 39. The mean response is 4.77 with a standard deviation of 5.250. 
The data in Table 39 indicate that a large majority of the farmers were 
not in favor of this type of program. 
Table 39. Distribution of sample scores on the free market scale 
Score category Number Percent 
0 72 38.7 
1 - 5  5 2  2 8 . 0  
6 - 1 1  3 7  1 9 . 9  
12 - 16 25 13.4 
TOTAL __ 186 100.0 
X = 4.77 
S = 5.250 
Income transfer programs The income transfer programs were de­
veloped to determine the degree to which farmers favor direct payments, 
special compensation, etc., to make up the difference between the market 
price a.nd some fair price. There are three programs in this group which 
include : 
Program 1 - a government program in i^ ich there are no price sup­
ports or production controls, but each farmer would 
receive a cash payment to raise farm income. 
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Program 2 - a program in which the government would support prices 
at parity levels with no production controls. 
Program 3 - a government program in which price supports would 
apply only to farmers who operate small farms. 
Table 40 contains data relevant to these three programs. Since the 
number of programs is small, these data must be interpreted as being 
quite tenuous. The minimum computed item-total correlation coefficient 
is .576 which is exceeded by all three of the field sample r^ '^s. The 
program means and standard deviations appear to be positively related. 
The range of the standard deviations is from 3.65 to 5.11. The coeffi­
cient of reliability is .529. 
Table 40. Data pertaining to the items of the income transfer program 
scale 
Item Field sample Field_sample Field sample 
number r^  ^ X standard deviation 
1 .690 3.25 3.65 
2 .695 5.63 4.42 
3 .752 5.89 5.11 
The intercorrelations among the items are .375 (one and two), .209 
(one and three), and .234 (two and three). The average intercorrelation 
coefficient is .273. Thus the concentration of these intercorrelation 
coefficients is relatively narrow and they are of a low magnitude. 
The mean score of these programs is 14.76 with a standard deviation 
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of 9.459. An examination of the individual programs and the distribution 
of scores in Table 41 indicate that a large majority of the farmers did 
not favor these programs. The range of total scores is 0 to 41 vAiereas 
the possible range is 0 to 48. 
Table 41. Distribution of sample scores on the income transfer 
program scale 
Score category Number Percent 
5 and below 39 21.0 
6 - 15 56 30.1 
16 - 25 69 37.1 







Agricultural restraint programs The agricultural restraint pro­
grams were developed to determine the degree to which farmers favor pro­
grams which are designed to slow down the pace of agricultural adjustment. 
There are only two programs in this category. These are: 
Program 1 - A government program to cut back support for Experiment 
Station research and Agricultural Extension in order to 
slow down the rapid development and acceptance of new 
ideas and practices in agriculture. 
Program 2 - A government program to control the production of 
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agricultural products by taxing the use of fertilizer 
and large equipment. 
The correlation coefficient between these two programs is .438. The 
range of responses to these two programs is from 0 to 32 whereas the 
possible range is also from 0 to 32. The mean score is 8.25 with a 
standard deviation of 7.456. The distribution of these scores (Table 42) 
and an examination of the data relevant to each program indicate that a 
vast majority of these farmers are opposed to these programs. 
Table 42. Distribution of sample scores on the agricultural restraint 
program scale 
Score category Number Percent 
0 45 24.2 
1 - 8  6 5  3 4 . 9  
9 - 1 6  5 2  2 8 . 0  
17 and above 24 12.9 
TOTAL _ 186 100.0 
X = 8.25 
S = 7.456 
It can be seen that all of these programs meet their respective 
minimum r^ '^s and appear to conform to certain other criteria of additiv-
ity, even though the small number of programs make such evaluations 
rather tenuous and inconclusive. Thus there appears to be some justifica­
tion for grouping these programs on a statistical basis. The auxiliary 
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adjustment programs appear to conform the best to the criteria for ad-
ditivity and the voluntary and income transfer programs conform the 
poorest of the six categories to these criteria. 
The second set of measures of policy positions consist of four types 
of government farm programs lAiich were presented to the respondents for 
their evaluation. These four programs represented a voluntary program, 
a free market program, a mandatory program and a modified free market 
program. These programs were more specific in content than the pro­
grams discussed above. They were written by Dr. Donald Kaldor, an agri­
cultural economist of the Department of Economics and Sociology at Iowa 
State University. 
The following set of instructions were given to each respondent: 
Card lA contains a list of four government farm programs which 
have been proposed. Would you please indicate 1) which program 
you like most, 2) which program you like next best, and 3) 
which program you like the least. 
The program which the respondent indicated he liked the most was scored 
as "4", the program he liked next best was scored as "3", and the pro- . 
gram he liked the least was scored as "1". The remaining program was 
given a score of "2". 
The four programs which the farmers ranked included the following: 
1. A gradual transition (over a 5-year period) from present price 
support and production control programs to a set of policies 
involving (a) price supports at levels equal to market prices 
during the preceding 5 years, (b) an ever normal granary pro­
gram implemented by commodity loans and purchase agreements. 
2. A set of policies involving (a) price supports as present 
levels, (b) mandatory controls on the amount of farm products 
produced and marketed by individual farmers based on past 
production and marketings, (c) additional restrictions on 
entering farming. 
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3. A set of policies involving (a) price supports at present 
levels, (b) a voluntary land retirement program made attrac­
tive to farmers by government rental payments, (c) continua­
tion of commodity loans and purchase agreements. 
4. A return to free markets for farm products within five years 
and elimination of all production control and price support 
programs thereafter. 
The distribution of the rankings of these four alternative programs 
can be found in Table 43. These data indicate that the present volun­
tary program (Program 3) was ranked the highest, the modified free mar­
ket program (Program 1) the next highest, the free market program (Pro­
gram 4) the third highest, and the mandatory program (Program 2) the 
lowest. This ranking is identical to the rank of the relevant program 
category sets discussed above when they are ordered on the basis of de­
gree of favorableness. 
Table 43. Summary of the ranking of farm program set 2 
Alternative Best Next best Third best Least 
program No. Percent No, Percent No. Percent No, . Percent 
1 22 11.8 91 48.9 60 32.3 13 7.0 
2 15 8.1 26 14.0 53 28.5 92 49.4 
3 106 57.0 50 26.9 27 14.5 3 1.6 
4 43 23.1 19 10.2 46 24.7 78 42.0 
TOTAL 186 100.0 186 100.0 *• 186 100.0 186 100.0 
This second set of measures was also developed to determine the 
validity of the first set of measures. As will be seen in the findings 
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section, the results of the data analysis are similar for the two sets 
of measures with minor variations. 
Method of Data Analysis 
The data discussed in this dissertation were analyzed by standard 
IBM equipment. This work was done at the Iowa State University Statisti­
cal Laboratory. 
The statistical tests which are used in the next chapter to test the 
various empirical hypotheses include zero-order Personian correlation 
coefficients, multiple regression, and multiple correlation. The first 
two general hypotheses will be tested by correlation analysis and the 
last general hypotheses will be tested by multiple regression and multi­
ple correlation. The level of probability which will be considered as 
an acceptable indication of a statistically significant relationship for 
the correlation analysis is at the .05 level of probability. The level 
of probability which will be considered as statistically significant for 
the multiple correlation analysis and the multiple regression is the .025 
level of probability. 
When parametric statistics are used, one must consider the assump­
tions which are associated with such tests. The assumptions \Aiich must 
be made when using the statistical tests mentioned above generally in­
clude normality, homogeneity of variance, independence, randomness, the 
X's are fixed and measured without error, and the errors are uncorrelated 
and normally distributed. The sampling procedures followed in this study 
make it possible to assume independence and randomness. The remaining 
155 
assumptions are more difficult to meet. 
Data which are obtained in behavioral science research does not al­
ways conform well to these types of assumptions. Measurement errors 
often occur and are difficult to estimate. Many phenomena of interest 
to social science researchers are not normally distributed. Units of 
measurement often vary considerably from variable to variable so that 
the variances may also differ greatly. The Chi square test for normali­
ty (.01 level of probability) indicates that many of the variables under 
study in this dissertation are normally distributed. All of the distribu­
tion of the value and belief scales but individualism and commutative 
justice approximate a normal distribution. In the case of policy posi­
tions and policy actions, the voluntary programs, the auxiliary adjust­
ment programs, and the income transfer programs approximate a normal 
distribution. Many of the variances, however, appear to be heterogen­
eous. 
The nature of the measurement used in this research may be responsi­
ble, at least in part, for the presence of non-normality and heterogeneity 
of variance. The ends of the scales can constitute important restrictions 
which may result in non-normality and heterogeneity of variance. Vari­
ables T^ ich have means near one of the ends of the scale may not be 
normally distributed because of the restrictions of the end of the scale. 
The ends may also influence the degree of variance of a variable which 
has a mean near one of the ends of a scale. This effect upon the vari­
ance may result in heterogeneity of variance when variables with more 
extreme means are compared with variables with less extreme means. The 
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number of items in a scale may also lead to heterogeneity of variance, 
for a scale with only three items has much less potential variance than 
a scale with 17 items. 
Although it is recognized that all of the data do not conform to 
the assumptions of the statistical tests used in this study the assump­
tions necessary to apply these tests will be made. This decision is 
justified on the basis of the following reasons: 
1. Many of the variables ejdiibit the characteristics of normality 
and homogeneity of variance. In addition, all observations 
have been drawn at random and are independent of one another. 
2. The law of large numbers, the central limit theorem, and the 
robustness of the statistical tests are all applicable and offer 
evidence for the use of parametric tests. The law of large 
numbers states that no matter what the form of the parent pop­
ulation distribution (provided the variance is finite), the 
distribution of the sample mean becomes more and more concen­
trated about the population mean as the sample size increases. 
The central limit theorem states that the distribution of the 
sample mean approaches a normal distribution as the sample size 
increases, provided the population distribution sampled has a 
finite variance. These laws suggest that even though a vari­
able may have a non-normal parent distribution, as probably 
some of the variables investigated in this study do, the as­
sumption of normality can still be met when large samples are 
- drawn. The robustness of the statistic refers to the 
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sensitivity of the test to deviation from normality and homo-
schedasticity. The F tests in the analysis of variance have been 
found to be relatively insensitive to non-normality and hetero­
geneity of variance. Ostle states: 
"In general, the consequences are not serious when the 
assumptions made in connection with analyses of variance 
are not strictly satisfied. That is, moderate departures 
from the conditions specified by the assumptions need not 
alarm us. For example, minor deviations from normality 
and/or some degree of heteroschedasticity (lack of homo­
geneity of variances) will have little effect on the usual 
tests and the resulting inferences. In summary, the 
analysis of variance technique is quite robust, and thus 
the researcher can rely on its doing a good job under most 
circumstances." (70, o. 339) 
Since the test for multiple regression and multiple correlation is 
the F test in the analysis of variance framework, the comments 
concerning the robustness of F may be applied to these statistics. 
The F test may also be used to test the significance of the cor­
relation coefficient, but it is not within the analysis of variance 
design. 
3. The major objective of this dissertation is to describe what rela­
tionship exists between the concepts of interest. The results of 
these inductive statistical tests will be interpreted more in a 
descriptive or qualitative manner than in a strict analytical or 
quantitative sense. This emphasis in the interpretation of the 
analysis of data is more on locating the general relationship be­
tween the variables of interest than in precise specification and/or 
prediction of these relationships. Thus the results of these 
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statistical tests will be interpreted on the basis of i^ at evidence 
they provide concerning the general relationships between the vari­




In the two preceding chapters, the general and sub-general hypothe­
ses have been derived and measures designed to operationalize the con­
cepts interrelated by these hypotheses have been described. In this 
chapter, the measures of the theoretical concepts will be interrelated 
to form empirical hypotheses which will be tested for statistical sig­
nificance. Inferences concerning the validity of the general and sub-
general hypotheses will be made from these statistical tests. 
The general format which will be followed in this chapter will be 
to 1) restate each general hypothesis and the sub-general hypotheses 
related to it, 2) state the various empirical hypotheses (denoted as 
E. H.) related to the sub-general hypotheses, and 3) report the results 
of the relevant statistical test of the data related to each empirical 
hypothesis. A summary and interpretation of the results of the tests 
of the empirical hypotheses will be given for each of the sub-general 
hypothesis. The general hypotheses will be presented in the same order 
in which they were derived. 
Statements and Tests of General, Sub-general, and Empirical Hypotheses 
General Hypothesis j.: There will be a predictable relationship be­
tween the policy positions and policy actions of individuals and their 
values and beliefs. 
Sub-general Hypothesis lA; There will be a positive relationship 
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between the policy positions of farmers concerning agricultural restraint 
programs and their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the 
traditional value-orientation configuration. 
E. H. 1: There will be a positive relationship between the score on 
the fatalism scale and the agricultural restraint program 
score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: There will 
be no positive relationship between the score on the 
fatalism scale and the agricultural restraing program 
score. The computed correlation coefficient is .265 
which is significant at the .0005 level of probability. 
The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support the 
original proposition. 
E. H. 2: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the traditionalism scale and the agricultural restraint 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the traditionalism scale and the agricultural restraint 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.458 nAiich is significant at the .0005 level of probabili­
ty. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support 
the original proposition. 
E. H. 3: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the farming as a way of life scale and the agricultural 
restraint program score. The hypothesis stated in null 
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form is; There will be no positive relationship between 
the score on the farming as a way of life scale and the 
agricultural restraint program score. The computed cor­
relation coefficient is .389 lAich is significant at the 
.0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is re­
futed. These data support the original proposition. 
E, H. 4: There will be à positive relationship between the score 
on the debt avoidance scale and the agricultural restraint 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the debt avoidance scale and the agricultural restraint 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.325 which is significant at the .0005 level of probabili­
ty. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support 
the original proposition. 
E. H. 5: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the risk aversion scale and the agricultural restraint 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the risk aversion scale and the agricultural restraint 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.161 which is significant at the .025 level of probabili­
ty. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support 
the original proposition. 
E. H. 6; There will be a positive relationship between the score 
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on the individualism scale and the agricultural restraint 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the agricultural restraint 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.132 vrtiich is significant at the .05 level of probability. 
The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support the 
original proposition. 
Sub-general hypothesis lA was tested by 6 empirical hypotheses. All 
of these 6 empirical hypotheses were supported by the data at the designa­
ted significance level. These data are judged to indicate support for 
the hypothesized relationship between the traditional value-orientation 
dimensions and the agricultural restraint programs. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IB; There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning agricultural restraint 
programs and their adherence to each of the values of the contemporary 
value configuration. 
E. H. 7: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the scientific orientation scale and the agricultural 
restraint program score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no negative relationship between 
the score on the scientific orientation scale and the 
agricultural restraint program score. The computed cor­
relation coefficient is ?.337 which is significant at the 
.0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is 
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refuted. These data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 8: There will be a negative relationship between the score on 
the maximization of income scale and the agricultural re-
straing program score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no negatave relationship between 
the score on the maximization of income scale and the 
agricultural restraint program score. The computed cor­
relation coefficient is .060 which is not significant. 
The null hypothesis is not refuted. These data do not 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 9: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the risk orientation scale and the auxiliary adjust­
ment program score. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is: There will be no negative relationship between the 
score on the risk orientation scale and the auxiliary 
adjustment program score. The computed correlation co­
efficient is -.100 which is not significant. The null 
hypothesis is not refuted. These data do not support 
the original proposition. 
Sub-general hypothesis IB was tested by 3 empirical hypotheses. 
Only one of the 3 empirical hypotheses were supported by the data at the 
designated significance level. Based on these data it is concluded that 
these empirical hypotheses, in general, do not support the hypothesized 
relationship between the contemporary value-orientation dimensions and 
the agricultural restraint programs. 
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Sub-general Hypothesis IC; There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning auxiliary adjustment 
programs and their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the 
traditional value-orientation configuration. 
E. H. 10: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the fatalism scale and the auxiliary adjustment pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the fatalism scale and the auxiliary adjustment pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.009 which is not significant. The null hypothesis is 
not refuted. These data do not support the original 
proposition. 
E. H. 11: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the traditionalism scale and the auxiliary adjustment 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the traditionalism scale and the auxiliary adjustment 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.148 which is significant at the .025 level of probabili­
ty. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support 
the original proposition. 
E, H. 12: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the farming as a way of life scale and the auxiliary 
adjustment program score. The hypothesis stated in null 
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form is; There will be no negative relationship between 
the score on the farming as a way of life scale and the 
auxiliary adjustment program score. The computed corre­
lation coefficient is -.064 which is not significant. 
The null hypothesis is not refuted. These data do not 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 13: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the debt avoidance scale and the auxiliary adjustment 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the debt avoidance scale and the auxiliary adjustment 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.026 which is not significant. The null hypothesis is 
not refuted. These data do not support the original 
proposition. 
E.^ . 14: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the risk aversion scale and the auxiliary adjustment 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the risk aversion scale and the auxiliary adjustment 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.124 which is significant at the .05 level of probability 
(however, the sign of the correlation coefficient is the 
opposite of what was predicted). The null hypothesis is 
not refuted. These data do not support the original 
proposition. 
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E, H. 15: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the auxiliary adjustment 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the auxiliary adjustment 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.038 x^ ich is not significant. The null hypothesis is 
not refuted. These data do not support the original 
proposition. 
Sub-general hypothesis IC was tested by 6 empirical hypotheses. 
Only one of these empirical hypotheses were supported by the data at the 
selected significance level. These data, therefore, are judged not to 
support the hypothesized relationship between the traditional value-
orientation dimensions and the auxiliary adjustment programs. 
Sub-general Hypothesis ID: There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning auxiliary adjustment 
programs and their adherence to each of the values of the contemporary 
value configuration. 
E. H, 16: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the scientific orientation scale and the auxiliary 
adjustment program score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no positive relationship between 
the score on the scientific orientation scale and the 
auxiliary adjustment program score. The computed cor­
relation coefficient is .324 which is significant at the 
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.0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is re­
futed. These data support the original proposition. 
E, H. 17: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the maximization of income scale and the auxiliary ad­
justment program score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no positive relationship between 
the score on the maximization of income scale and the 
auxiliary adjustment program score. The computed cor­
relation coefficient is .212 which is significant at the 
.005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is re­
futed. These data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 18: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the risk orientation scale and the auxiliary adjust­
ment program score. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is: There will be no positive relationship between the 
score on the risk orientation scale and the auxiliary 
adjustment program score. The computed correlation co­
efficient is .206 which is significant at the .005 level 
of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. These 
data support the original proposition. 
All 3 of the empirical hypotheses used to test sub-general hypothe­
sis ID were supported at the designated significance level by the data. 
It is concluded that these data support the hypothesized relationship 
between the contemporary value-orientation dimensions and the auxiliary 
adjustment programs. 
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Sub-general Hypothesis IE; There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning income transfer pro­
grams and their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the tradi­
tional value-orientation configuration, 
E. H, 19; There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the fatalism scale and the income transfer program 
score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; There 
will be no positive relationship between the score on 
the fatalism scale and the income transfer program score. 
The computed correlation coefficient is .273 which is 
significant at the .0005 level of probability. The null 
hypothesis is refuted. These data support the original 
proposition. 
E. H, 20: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the traditionalism scale and the income transfer 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the traditionalism scale and the income transfer pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is .266 
which is significant at the .0005 level of probability. 
The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support the 
original proposition. 
E. H. 21; There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the farming as a way of life scale and the income 
transfer program score. The hypothesis stated in null 
170 
form is; There will be no positive relsitionship between 
the score on the farming as a way of life scale and the 
income transfer program score. The computed correlation 
coefficient is .219 which is significant at the .005 
level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 22: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the debt avoidance scale and the income transfer pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the debt avoidance scale and the income transfer pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is .329 
which is significant at the .0005 level of probability. 
The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support the 
original proposition. 
E. H. 23: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the risk aversion scale and the income transfer pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the risk aversion scale and the income transfer pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.001 which is not significant. The null hypothesis is 
not refuted. These data do not support the original 
proposition. 
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E. H. 24: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the income transfer pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the income transfer pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is .146 
which is significant at the .025 level of probability. 
The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support the 
original proposition. 
Sub-general hypothesis IE was tested by 6 empirical hypotheses. 
Five of these 6 empirical hypotheses were supported by the data at the 
designated significance level. It is concluded that Sub-general Hypothe­
sis IE is supported by these data. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IF: There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning compulsory price-
supply management and control programs and their adherence to each of 
the values of ,the collective action value configuration. 
E. H. 25: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the compulsory program 
score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: There 
will be no positive relationship between the score on the 
collective action scale and the compulsory program score. 
The canputed correlation coefficient is .229 which is 
significant at the .005 level of probability. The null 
hypothesis is refuted. These data support the original 
proposition. 
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E. H. 26: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the rank of the manda­
tory control program. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is: There will be no positive relationship between the 
score on the collective action scale and the rank of the 
mandatory control program. The computed correlation co­
efficient is .218 \^ ich is significant at the .005 level 
of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. These 
data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 27: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the compulsory pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the compulsory pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.414 which is significant at the .0005 level of probabili­
ty. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support 
the original proposition. 
E. H. 28: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the rank of the 
mandatory control program. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no positive relationship between 
the score on the commutative justice scale and the rank 
of the mandatory control program. The computed correla­
tion coefficient is .389 which is significant at the 
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.0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is re­
futed. These data support the original proposition. 
E, H, 29: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the compulsory 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the compulsory pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is .410 
which is significant at the .0005 level of probability. 
The null hypotheses is refuted. These data support the 
original proposition. 
E. H. 30: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the rank of the 
mandatory control program. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no positive relationship between 
the score on the distributive justice scale and the rank 
of the mandatory control program. The computed correla­
tion coefficient is .246 \diich is significant at the 
.0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is re­
futed. These data support the original proposition. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IF was tested by 6 empirical hypotheses. All 
6 of these hypotheses were supported by the data at the selected signifi­
cance level. These data are judged to support the sub-general hypothesis. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 16: There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning voluntary price-supply 
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management and control programs and their adherence to each of the values 
of the collective action value configuration. 
E. H. 31: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the voluntary program 
score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: There 
will be no positive relationship between the score on the 
collective action scale and the voluntary program score. 
The computed correlation coefficient is .190 which is 
significant at the .005 level of probability. The null 
hypothesis is refuted. These data support the original 
proposition. 
E, H. 32; There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the rank of the volun­
tary control program. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is: There will be no positive relationship between the 
score on the collective action scale and the rank of the 
voluntary control program. The computed correlation co­
efficient is .236 vhich is significant at the .005 level 
of probability. Thenull hypothesis is refuted. These 
data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 33: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the voluntary pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the voluntary 
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program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.285 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 34: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the rank of the 
voluntary control program. The hypothesis stated in 
null form is: There will be no positive relationship 
between the score on the commutative justice scale and 
the rank of the voluntary control program. The computed 
correlation coefficient is .293 which is significant at 
the .0005 level of probability. The;null hypothesis is 
refuted. These data support the original proposition. 
E. H, 35: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the voluntary pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the voluntary pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.246 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 36: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the rank of the 
voluntary control program. The hypothesis stated in 
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null form is: There will be no positive relationship be­
tween the score on the distributive justice scale and the 
rank of the voluntary control program. The computed cor­
relation coefficient is .168 xdtiich is significant at the 
.025 level of probability. The null hypothesis is re­
futed. These data support the original proposition. 
All of the 6 empirical hypotheses used to test the relationship be­
tween collective action, commutative justice and distributive justice 
were supported by the data at the designated significance level. It is 
concluded that these data support Sub-general Hypothesis IG. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IH; There will be a positive relationship 
between the participation by farmers in past and present farm programs 
and their adherence to each of the values of the collective action value 
configuration. 
E. H. 37 : There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the feed grain partici­
pation score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the feed grain par­
ticipation score. The computed correlation coefficient 
is .180 ^ ich is significant at the .025 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 38: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the feed grain 
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participation score. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is; There will be no positive relationship between the 
score on the commutative justice scale and the feed grain 
participation score. The computed correlation coeffi­
cient is .240 wtiich is significant at the .005 level of 
probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. These 
data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 39: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the feed grain 
participation score. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is; There will be no positive relationship between the 
score on the distributive justice scale and the feed 
grain participation score. The computed correlation co­
efficient is .197 which is significant at the .005 level 
of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. These 
data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 40; There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the commodity credit 
corn participation score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is ; There will be no positive relationship between 
the score on the collective action scale and the commodity 
credit corn participation score. The computed correla­
tion coefficient is .243 \diich is significant at the 
.0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is re­
futed. These data support the original proposition. 
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E, H. 41: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the commodity credit 
corn participation score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is : There will be no positive relationship between 
the score on the commutative justice scale and the com-
s 
modity credit corn participation score. The computed 
correlation coefficient is .148 which is significant at 
the .025 level of probability. The null hypothesis is 
refuted. These data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 42: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the commodity 
credit corn participation score. The hypothesis stated 
in null form is: There will be no positive relationship 
between the score on the distributive justice scale and 
the commodity credit corn participation score. The 
computed correlation coefficient is .101 which is not 
significant. The null hypothesis is not refuted. These 
data do not support the original proposition. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IH was tested by 6 empirical hypotheses. 
These tests indicated that 5 of these 6 empirical hypotheses were sup­
ported at the designated significance level by the data. These data are 
judged, therefore, to support the hypothesized relationship between col­
lective action, commutative justice, and distributive justice and partici­
pation in government farm programs. 
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Sub-general Hypothesis II; There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning compulsory price-
supply management and control programs and their adherence to each of 
the values and beliefs of the independent action value-orientation con­
figuration. 
E. H. 43: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the compulsory pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the compulsory pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.434 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 44: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the compulsory program 
score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; There 
will be no negative relationship between the score on 
the individualism scale and the compulsory program score. 
The computed correlation coefficient is -.187 which is 
significant at the .025 level of probability. The null 
hypothesis is refuted. These data support the original 
proposition. 
E, H. 45: There will be a negative relationship between the scor& 
on the government dominance scale and the compulsory 
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program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the government dominance scale and the compulsory pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.323 lAiich is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E, H. 46: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the rank of the manda­
tory control program. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is: There will be no negative relationship between the 
score on the independent action scale and the rank of the 
mandatory control program. The computed correlation co­
efficient is -.302.vtiich is significant at the .0005 
level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 47: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the rank of the mandatory 
control program. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the rank of the mandatory 
control program. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.059 which is not significant. The null hypothesis is 
not refuted. These data do not support the original 
proposition. 
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E. H. 48: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the government dominance scale and the rank of the 
mandatory control program. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no negative relationship between 
the score on the government dominance scale and the rank 
of the mandatory control program. The computed correla­
tion coefficient is -.300 which is significant at the 
.0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is re­
futed. These data support the original proposition. 
The hypothesized relationship between independent action, individual­
ism, and government restrictiveness and preference for compulsory pro­
grams was tested by 6 empirical hypotheses. All but one of the 6 hypothe­
ses were supported by the data at the designated significance level. It 
is concluded that these data support Sub-general Hypothesis II. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IJ: There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning voluntary price-
supply management and control programs and their adherence to each of 
the values and beliefs of the independent action value-orientation con­
figuration. 
E. H. 49: There will be a negatave relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the voluntary program 
score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: There 
will be no negative relationship between the score on 
the independent action scale and the voluntary program 
score. The computed correlation coefficient is -.095 
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which is not significant. The null hypothesis is not 
refuted. These data do not support the original proposi­
tion. 
E. H. 50: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the voluntary program 
score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; There 
will be no negative relationship between the score on 
the individualism scale and the voluntary program score. 
The computed correlation coefficient is .103 which is 
not significant. The null hypothesis is not refuted. 
These data do not support the original proposition. 
E. H. 51; There will be a negative relationship between the scpre 
on the government dominance scale and the voluntary pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the government dominance scale and the voluntary pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.269 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 52: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the rank of the 
voluntary control program. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is : There will be no negative relationship between 
the score on the independent action scale and the rank of 
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the voluntary control program. The computed correlation 
coefficient is -.165 which is significant at the .025 
level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 53: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the rank of the voluntary 
control program. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the rank of the voluntary 
control program. The computed correlation coefficient 
is .089 which is not significant. The null hypothesis 
is not refuted. These data do not support the original 
proposition. 
E. H. 54: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the government dominance scale and the rank of the 
voluntary control program. The hypothesis stated in 
null form is: There will be no negative relationship 
between the score on the government dominance scale and 
the rank of the voluntary control program. The computed 
correlation coefficient is -.260 which is significant at 
the .0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is 
refuted. These data support the original proposition. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IJ was tested by 6 empirical hypotheses. 
Three of these 6 hypotheses were supported by the data at the selected 
significant level. Of the 3 empirical hypotheses which were not 
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supported, one of the relationships was in the hypothesized direction. 
These data are judged to tentatively support Sub-general Hypothesis 3, 
but it is suggested that more investigation is necessary before more con­
clusive judgment can be made concerning this hypothesis. This hypothesis 
will be evaluated more in detail in the discussion section of this dis­
sertation. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IK; There will be a negative relationship 
between participation by farmers in past and present farm programs and 
their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the independent ac­
tion value-orientation configuration. 
E. H. 55: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the feed grain par­
ticipation score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the feed grain par­
ticipation score. The computed correlation coefficient 
is -.228 which is significant at the .005 level of 
probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. These 
data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 56; There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the feed grain participa­
tion score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the feed grain participa­
tion score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
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-.125 which is significant at the .05 level of probabili­
ty. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support 
the original proposition. 
E. H. 57: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the government dominance scale and the feed grain 
participation score. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is: There will be no negative relationship between the 
score on the government dominance scale and the feed 
grain participation score. The computed correlation co­
efficient is -.297 which is significant at the .005 level 
of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. These 
data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 58: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the commodity credit 
corn participation score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no negative relationship between 
the score on the independent action scale and the commodi­
ty credit corn participation score. The computed correla­
tion coefficient is -.134 which is significant at the 
.05 level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 59: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the commodity credit corn 
participation score. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is: There will be no negative relationship between the 
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score on the individualism scale and the commodity credit 
corn participation score. The computed correlation co­
efficient is -.087 which is not significant. The null 
hypothesis is not refuted. These data do not support the 
original proposition. 
E. H. 60: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the government dominance scale and the commodity credit 
corn participation score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no negative relationship between 
the score on the government dominance scale and the com­
modity credit corn participation score. The computed 
correlation coefficient is -.186 vdiich is significant 
at the .01 level of probability. The null hypothesis is 
refuted. These data support the original proposition. 
Five of the 6 empirical hypotheses used to test Sub-general Hypothe­
sis IK were supported by the data at the designated level of significance. 
These data, therefore, are judged to support the hypothesized relation­
ship between past and present participation in government farm programs 
and independent action, rugged individualism, and government restrictive-
ness. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IL: There will be a positive relationship be­
tween the policy positions of farmers concerning the auxiliary adjustment 
programs and their adherence to each of the values of the collective ac­
tion value configuration. 
E, H. 61: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
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on the collective action scale and the auxiliary adjust­
ment program score. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is: There will be no positive relationship between the 
score on the collective action scale and the auxiliary 
adjustment program score. The computed correlation co­
efficient is .274 /tAiich is significant at the .0005 
level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 62: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the auxiliary ad­
justment program score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no positive relationship between 
the score on the commutative justice scale and the aux­
iliary adjustment program score. The computed correla­
tion coefficient is .348 v^ ich is significant at the 
.0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is re­
futed. These data support the original proposition. 
E. H. 63: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the auxiliary ad­
justment program score. The hypothesis stated in null 
form is: There will be no positive relationship between 
the score on the distributive justice scale and the 
auxiliary adjustment program score. The ccmputed cor­
relation coefficient is .413 which is significant at the 
.0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is 
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refuted. These data support the original proposition. 
The 3 empirical hypotheses used to test Sub-general Hypothesis IL 
were all supported by the data at the selected significance level. It 
is concluded that these data support Sub-general Hypothesis IL. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IM; There will be a negative relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning the free market pro­
gram and their adherence to each of the values of the collective action 
value configuration. 
E. H. 64: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the free market pro­
gram score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the free market pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.305 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 65; There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the rank of the free 
market program. The hypothesis stated in null form is; 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the collective action scale and the rank of the free 
market program. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.336 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
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support the original proposition. 
E. H. 66: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the free market 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the free market 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
-.591 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 67: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the rank of the free 
market program. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the commutative justice scale and the rank of the 
free market program. The computed correlation coeffi­
cient is -.578 which is significant at the .0005 level 
of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. These 
data support the original proposition. 
E, H, 68: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the free market 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; 
There will be no negative relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the free market 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
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-.365 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data sup­
port the original proposition. 
E. H. 69: There will be a negative relationship between the score 
on the distributive justice scale and the rank of the 
free market program. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is: There will be no negative relationship between the 
score on the distributive justice scale and the rank of 
the free market program. The computed correlation co­
efficient is -.347 which is significant at the .0005 
level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IM was tested by 6 empirical hypotheses. All 
6 of these empirical hypotheses were supported by the data at the designa­
ted statistical level. These data are judged to support the hypothesized 
relationship between collective action, commutative justice and distribu­
tive justice and preference for the free market program. 
Sub-general Hypothesis IN: There will be a positive relationship 
between the policy positions of farmers concerning the free market pro­
gram and their adherence to each of the values and beliefs of the inde­
pendent action value-orientation configuration. 
E. H. 70: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the free market 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
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on the independent action scale and the free market pro­
gram score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.240 which is significant at the .005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 71: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the rank of the free 
market program. The hypothesis stated in null form is; 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the independent action scale and the rank of the free 
market program. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.307 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
E. H. 72: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the free market program 
score. The hypothesis stated in null form is: There 
will be no positive relationship between the score on the 
individualism scale and the free market program score. 
The computed correlation coefficient is .058 which is 
not significant. The null hypothesis is not refuted. 
These data do not support the original proposition. 
E. H. 73: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the rank of the free 
market program. The hypothesis stated in null form is: 
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There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the individualism scale and the rank of the free 
market program. The computed correlation coefficient 
is .096 which is not significant. The null hypothesis 
is not refuted. These data do not support the original 
proposition. 
E. H. 74: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the government dominance scale and the free market 
program score. The hypothesis stated in null form is; 
There will be no positive relationship between the score 
on the government dominance scale and the free market 
program score. The computed correlation coefficient is 
.497 which is significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data sup­
port the original proposition. 
E. H, 75: There will be a positive relationship between the score 
on the government dominance scale and the rank of the 
free market program. The hypothesis stated in null form 
is : There will be no positive relationship between the 
score on the government dominance scale and the rank of 
the free market program. The computed correlation co­
efficient is .458 which is significant at the .0005 
level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
Of the 6 empirical hypotheses used to test Sub-general Hypothesis IN, 
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4 were supported by the data at the predetermined significance level. 
The value individualism was involved in both of the hypotheses which 
were not supported. It is concluded that these data support tentatively 
the sub-general hypothesis. 
In all, 14 sub-general hypotheses were used to test General Hypothe­
sis 1. Ten of these sub-general hypotheses were supported, 2 were tenta­
tively supported, and 2 were not supported. It is concluded, therefore, 
that the data support the proposition that predictable relationships 
exist between value-orientations of individuals and their policy posi­
tions and policy actions. 
General Hypothesis 2 :  Certain values and beliefs will form value 
configurations or value orientation-configurations. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 2A; Fatalism, traditionalism, farming as a 
way of life, debt avoidance, risk aversion, and individualism will form 
a value-orientation configuration. 
E. H. 76: There will be positive relationship between the scores 
on the fatalism scale, the traditionalism scale, the 
debt avoidance scale, the risk aversion scale, and the 
individualism scale. The hypothesis stated in the null 
form is; There will be no positive relationships between 
the scores on the fatalism scale, the traditionalism 
scale, the debt avoidance scale, the risk aversion scale, 
and the individualism scale. The intercorrelations be­
tween the scores on these 6 scales are reported in 
Table 44. All interrelationships are statistically at 
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the .005 level or greater. The null hypothesis is re? 
futed. It is concluded that these data support the 
original proposition. 
Table 44. Intercorrelation coefficients between the traditional value 
and belief scale scores 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Fatalism ---- .422® .240^  .338* .203^  .250* 
2. Traditionalism ---- .526* .424* .265* .278* 
3. Way of life ---- .543* .370* .394* 
4. Debt avoidance ---- .246* .291* 
5. Conservatism .246* 
6. Individualism ----
S^ignificant at .005 level of probability. 
'^ Significant at .0005 level of probability. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 2B; Scientific orientation, maximization 
of income, and risk orientation will form a value configuration. 
E. H. 77: There will be positive relationships between the scores 
on the scientific orientation scale, the maximization of 
income scale, and the risk orientation scale. The hy­
pothesis stated in the null form is : There will be no 
positive relationships between the scores on the scien­
tific orientation scale, the maximization of income 
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scale, and the risk orientation scale. The intercorrela-
tion between the scores on these 3 scales are reported 
in Table 45. Two of the intercorrelations are signifi­
cant at the .005 level or greater. The relationship be­
tween scientific orientation and maximization of income 
is in the hypothesized direction, but is not statistical­
ly significant. The null hypothesis is not refuted. 
These data do not support the original proposition. 
Table 45. Intercorrelation'coefficients between the contemporary value 
and belief scale scores 
12 3 
a b 
1. Scientific orientation .070 .210 
c 
2. Maximization of income .252 
3. Risk orientation ' 
S^ignificant at .18 level of probability. 
S^ignificant at .005 level of probability. 
'^ Significant at .0005 level of probability. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 2C; Collective action, commutative justice, 
and distributive justice will form a value configuration. 
E. H. 78: There will be a positive relationship between the scores 
on the collective action scale, the commutative justice 
scale, and the distributive justice scale. The hypothe­
sis in the null form is: There will be no positive 
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relationships between the scores on the collective ac­
tion scale, the commutative justice scale, and the dis­
tributive justice scale. The intercorrelations between 
the scores on these scales are reported in Table 46. All 
of these intercorrelations are significant at the .0005 
level. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data sup­
port the original proposition. 
Table 46. Intercorrelation coefficients between the collective action 
value and belief scale scores 
12 3 
1. Collective action .362* .321* 
2. Commutative justice ---- .733* 
3. Distributive justice ----
S^ignificant at .0005 level of probability. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 2D; Independent action, individualism, and 
government dominance will form a value-orientation configuration. 
E. H. 79: There will be a positive relationship between the scores 
on the independent action scale, the individualism scale, 
and the government dominance scale. The hypothesis in 
the null form is: There will be no positive relation­
ships between the scores on the independent action scale, 
the individualism scale, and the government dominance 
scale. The intercorrelations between the scores on 
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these 3 scales are reported in Table 47. All of these 
intercorrelations are significant at the .0005 level. 
The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support the 
original proposition. 
Table 47. Intercorrelation coefficients between the independent action 
value and belief scale scores 
12 3 
1. Independent action .591^  .565^  
2. Individualism .369^  
3. Government restrictiveness 
S^ignificant at .0005 level of probability. 
Sub-general Hypotheses 2A, 2B, 2C and 2D were each tested by an 
empirical hypothesis. Three of these empirical hypotheses were sup­
ported at the designated statistical level. It is concluded that these 
data support Sub-general Hypotheses 2A, 2C and 2D, but do not support 
Sub-general Hypothesis 2B. Since 3 of the 4 sub-general hypotheses 




Having examined the zero-order relationships between the 14 value 
and belief dimensions and the policy positions and actions, the discus­
sion will now be focused upon the analysis of the multiple relationships. 
This analysis is related to General Hypothesis 3. It may be recalled 
that this hypothesis stated that there will be a relationship between 
policy actions and policy positions and a weighted combination of certain 
value configurations and value-orientation configurations. 
The statistical techniques of multiple regression and multiple cor­
relation will be used to determine the combined effect of certain values 
and beliefs upon a given policy position or policy action. These methods 
will also be used to determine whether or not the combined effect of 
these variables provides a useable prediction of a specified policy 
position or action. 
An equation for the determination of the coefficient of the multiple 
correlation (R) has been defined by Walker and Lev (99, p, 326) as: 
R = /r b* + r b* + .., + r b* 
y.l2...n T yl yl.23...n y2 y2.13...n yn n.l2...n 
In this equation, r^ ,^ represents the correlation between the first 
independent variable and the dependent or criterion variable. The 
symbol b*^  represents the partial regression coefficient which 
defines the amount of change in Y that can be associated with a given 
change in first independent variables with the remaining independent 
variables held fixed. In other words, it is the weight given to in 
the regression equation. The beta weights which are used in the above 
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equation are in standard form, i.e., they are computed by multiplying 
the regular beta coefficient by the ratio of the standard deviation of 
the criterion variable to the standard deviation of the independent 
y/ 
variable b /. The product of the standard beta weight (b* ) 
,/s yn.l2...n 
and its respective correlation coefficient (r^ ) provide an estimate 
of the relative amount of "explained" variance each variable contributes 
(88, p. 416). 
The computed R can be tested for statistical significance y • J.Z • • • n 
by the following F test given by Walker and Lev (99, p. 324). 
R^  N-K-1 
F = . 
1-R^  K 
where K = number of predictor variables 
This test is derived directly from the analysis of variance tests for 
significance of multiple correlation (99, pp. 323-324). 
Traditional and contemporary value-orientations 
Data pertaining to Sub-general Hypotheses 3A and 3B are reported in 
Tables 48, 49, and 50. Each of these sub-general hypotheses and their 
related empirical hypotheses will be stated below. A brief discussion 
of the findings of the tests of these hypotheses will also be given. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3A; There will be a relationship between 
the policy positions of farmers concerning agricultural restraint pro­
grams and auxiliary adjustment programs and the weighted combination of 
their adherence to the traditional value-orientation configuration and 
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the contemporary value configuration. 
E. H. 80: There will be a correlation between the agricultural re­
straint program score and a weighted combination of the 
9 traditional and contemporary value and belief scales. 
This hypothesis stated in the null form is: There is 
no correlation between the agricultural restraint pro­
gram score and a weighted combination of the 9 tradi­
tional and contemporary value and belief scales. The 
computed F value is 12.98 with 9 and 176 degrees of 
freedom which is statistically significant at the .0005 
level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
The data relevant to this empirical hypothesis can be found in 
Table 48. The value of R is .5485 which is somewhat larger than the 
highest zero-order correlation (.458) which is between the traditionalism 
scale and the auxiliary adjustment score. Interpreting these data in 
2 
relation to the amount of variance explained by regression, R represents 
the amount of variation of the criterion variable accounted for by these 
2 9 scales whereas 1-R represents the amount of residual or unexplained 
variation. When taken in combination, these 9 scales account for 30.08 
percent of the variance. 
Walker and Lev (99) have suggested two interpretations ^ ich may be 
made with respect to the F test just described. The first interpretation 
concerns the null hypothesis just tested, i.e., there is a significant 
correlation between these 9 scales and the agricultural restraint program 
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Table 48. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficient of multiple correlation^ 
Independent variable b* r (b*)0r ) 
Individualism scale -.0535 .132 -.0071 
Fatalism scale .1032 .265 .0273 
Traditionalism scale .2387 .458 .1093 
Scientific orientation scale -.1476 -.337 .0497 
Farming as a way of life scale .1708 .388 .0663 







Risk aversion scale .0999 .161 .0161 
Risk orientation scale -.0723 -.098 .0071 
Debt avoidance scale .0826 .325 .0268 
TOTAL .3008 
= .3008 
R = .5485 
D^ependent variable is the agricultural restraint program score. 
score. On the basis of the other interpretation, it can be inferred 
that these value and belief scales provide a useable prediction of 
the positions farmers take with respect to agricultural restraint 
programs. In other words, knowledge of a farmer's traditional and 
contemporary values and beliefs can enable one to make a meaningful 
prediction of the position the farmer will take concerning 
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agricultural adjustment programs. 
It can be seen in Table 48 that the traditionalism scale contributes 
approximately one-third of the "explained" variance. Next in order of 
contribution are the farming as a way of life scale and the scientific 
orientation scale. An examination of the relative contributions of all 
the scales reveals that the traditional orientation values and beliefs 
contribute most of the "explained" variance. 
E, H. 81: There will be a correlation between the auxiliary adjust­
ment program score and a weighted combination of the nine 
traditional and contemporary value and belief scales. 
This hypothesis stated in the null form is; There is no 
correlation between the auxiliary adjustment program 
score and a weighted combination of the nine traditional 
and contemporary value and belief scales. The computed 
F value is 3.767 with 9 and 176 degrees of freedom which 
is significant at the .0005 level of probability. The 
null hypothesis is refuted. These data support the 
original proposition. 
The data relevant to Empirical Hypothesis 81 can be found in Table 
49. The value of R is .4018. This value is somewhat larger than the 
highest zero-order correlation (.314). When taken in combination, these 
nine scales account for 16.13 percent of the variance. The F value sug­
gests that these nine value and belief scales provide a useable predic­




It can be seen in Table 49 that the scientific orientation scale 
contributes almost half of the "explained" variance of the criterion 
variable. Next in order of contribution are the maximization of income 
scale and the risk orientation scale. The contemporary values as a group 
contribute most of the "explained" variance of the criterion variable. 
Table 49. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation^  
Independent variables b* r^  (b*)(r;) 
Individualism scale -.0613 
00 CO o
 .0023 
Fatalism scale -.0233 .009 -.0002 
Traditionalism scale -.0658 -.142 .0093 
Scientific orientation scale .2424 .314 .0761 
Farming as a way of life scale -.0067 
VO o
 t .0004 
Maximization of income .1526 .211 .0322 
Risk aversion scale il229 .124 .0152 
Risk orientation scale .1284 .206 .0265 
Debt avoidance scale .0199 -.025 -.0005 
TOTAL .1613 
= .1613 
R = .4018 
D^ependent variable is the auxiliary adjustment program score. 
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Sub-general Hypothesis 3A was tested by 2 empirical hypotheses. 
Both of these empirical hypotheses were supported by the data at the 
selected significance level. It is concluded that these data support 
the sub-general hypothesis. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3B; There will be a relationship between the 
policy positions of farmers concerning income transfer programs and a 
weighted combination of their adherence to the values and beliefs of the 
traditional value-orientation configuration. 
E. H, 82: There will be a correlation between the income transfer 
program score and a weighted combination of the six tradi­
tional values and beliefs. This hypothesis stated in the 
null form is : There is no correlation between the income 
transfer program score and a weighted combination of the 
six traditional values and beliefs. The computed F value 
is 5.763 with 6 and 179 degrees of freedom which is sig­
nificant and the .0005 level of probability. The null 
hypothesis is refuted. These data support the original 
proposition. 
The data relevant to Empirical Hypothesis 82 can be found in Table 
50. The computed value of R is .4025, a value some^ Aiat larger than the 
highest zero-order correlation (.329). When taken in combination, these 
six scales account for 16.21 percent of the variance. The F test sug­
gests that these six value and belief scales provide a useable predic­
tion of the positions farmers take with respect to income transfer pro­
grams. 
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Table 50. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation^ 
Independent variables b* r (b*)(r ) 
y y 
Individualism scale .0268 .146 .0039 
Fatalism scale .1599 .273 .0437 
Traditionalism scale .1098 .266 .0292 
Farming as a way of life .0363 .219 .0079 
Risk aversion scale -.1394 -.001 .0001 
Debt avoidance scale .2349 .329 .0773 
TOTAL .1621 
= .1621 
R = .4025 
D^ependent variable is the income transfer program score. 
It can be seen in Table 50 that the debt avoidance scale contributes 
almost half of the "explained" variances of the criterion variable. 
Next in order of contribution are the fatalism scale and the tradi­
tionalism scale. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3B was tested by one empirical hypothesis. 
This empirical hypothesis was supported by the data. On the basis of 
these data the sub-general hypothesis is judged to be supported. 
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Independent action and collective action value-orientation 
Data pertaining to Sub-general Hypotheses 3C, 3D, and 3E are repor­
ted in Tables 51 through 59. Each of these sub-general hypotheses and 
their related empirical hypotheses will be stated below. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 30; There will be a relationship between the 
policy positions of farmers concerning compulsory price-supply management 
and control programs, voluntary price-supply management and control pro­
grams, and the free market program and a weighted combination of their 
adherence to the collective action value configuration and the independent 
action value-orientation configuration. 
E. H. 83; There will be a correlation between the compulsory price-
supply management and control program score and a weigh­
ted combination of the six independent action and col­
lective action values and beliefs. This hypothesis 
stated in the null form is: There is no correlation 
between the compulsory price-supply management and con­
trol program score and a weighted combination of the six 
independent action and collective action values and be­
liefs. The computed F value is 10.787 with 6 and 179 
degrees of freedom which is significant at the .0005 
level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
The data related to Empirical Hypothesis 83 is presented in Table 
51. The computed value of R is .5132. These six scales, when taken in 
combination, account for 26.34 percent of the variance. The significance 
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Table 51. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation^ 
Independent variables b* r^  (b*)(r^ ) 
Collective action scale .0249 .229 .0057 
Independent action scale -.2887 -.434 .1253 
Individualism scale .0184 
00 T—1 1 
-.0034 
Commutative justice scale .1101 .414 .0456 
Distributive justice scale .1961 .410 .0804 
Government dominance scale -.0302 -.323 .0098 
TOTAL .2634 
= .2634 
R = .5132 
D^ependent variable is the compulsory price-supply management 
and control program score. 
test for the multiple correlation suggests that the six value and belief 
scales provide a useable prediction of the positions farmers take with 
respect to compulsory price-supply management and control programs. 
The independent action scale, the commutative justice scale, and 
the distributive justice scale contribute almost all of the "explained" 
variance (Table 51). 
E. H. 84: There will be a correlation between the rank of the 
compulsory program alternative and a weighted combina­
tion of the six independent action and collective action 
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value and belief scales. This hypothesis stated in the 
null form is: There is no correlation between the rank 
of the compulsory program alternative and a weighted 
combination of the six independent action and collective 
action value and belief scales. The computed F value 
is 7.457 with 9 and 176 degrees of freedom which is 
statistically significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
Table 52 contains the data related to Empirical Hypothesis 84. The 
value of R is .1982. Thus the multiple correlation between the rank of 
the compulsory program alternative and these six value and belief scales 
(program set 2) is not as large as the multiple correlation coefficient 
obtained between these scales and the compulsory program score (program 
set 1). The value of R is somewhat larger than the highest zero-order 
correlation (.389). The F test suggests that these six value and belief 
scales provide a useable prediction of the positions farmers take with 
respect to the compulsory program alternative. 
As can be seen in Table 52, the independent action scale and the 
commutative justice scale contribute most of the "explained" variance. 
E. H, 85: There will be a correlation between the voluntary price-
supply management and control score and a weighted com­
bination of the six independent action and collective 
action value and belief scales. This hypothesis stated 
in the null form is: There is no correlation between the 
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Table 52. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation^ 
Independent variables b* r (b*)(r ) 
y y 
Collective action scale .0927 .218 .0202 
Independent action scale -.2170 -.302 .0655 
Individualism scale .0142 -.059 -.0008 
Commutative justice scale .3152 .389 .1226 
Distributive justice scale -.1204 .246 -.0296 
Government dominance scale -.0676 
o
 1 .0203 
TOTAL .1982 
= .1982 
R = .4455 
D^ependent variable is rank of compulsory program alternative. 
voluntary price-supply management and control score and 
a weighted combination of the six independent action and 
collective action value and belief scales. The computed 
F value is 5.810 with 3 and 179 degrees of freedom Wiich 
is statistically significant at the .0005 level of proba­
bility. The null hypothesis is refuted. These data 
support the original proposition. 
The data relevant to Empirical Hypothesis 85 can be found in Table 
53. The computed value of R is .4020 while the highest zero-order 
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Table 53. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation 
Independent variables b* r (b*)(r ) 
y y 
Collective action scale .1663 .189 .0314 
Independent action scale .0350 -.095 -.0033 
Individualism scale .2450 .103 .0252 
Commutative justice scale .0105 .285 .0030 
Distributive justice scale .1049 .246 .0258 
Government dominance scale -.2952 -.269 .0794 
TOTAL .1615 
= .1615 
R = .4020 
D^ependent variable is voluntary price-supply management and 
control program score. 
correlation (between the commutative justice scale and the criterion 
variable) is .285. These six scales when taken in combination, "explain" 
16.15 percent of the variance associated with the criterion variable. 
The test of significance of the multiple correlation coefficient sug­
gests that these scales provide a useable prediction of the positions 
farmers take with respect to voluntary price-supply management and con­
trol programs. 
It can be seen in Table 53 that the government dominance scale 
contributes almost half of the "explained" variance. Next in order of 
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contribution are the collective action scale, the distributive justice 
scale, and the individualism scale. 
E. H. 86: There will be a correlation between the rank of the volun­
tary program alternative and a weighted combination of 
the six independent action and collective action value 
and belief scales. This hypothesis stated in the null 
form is: There is no correlation between the rank of 
the voluntary program alternative and a weighted combina­
tion of the six independent action and collective action 
value and belief scales. The computed F value is 4.227 
with 6 and 179 degrees of freedom vrtiich is statistically 
significant at the .001 level of probability. The null 
hypothesis is refuted. Tliese data support the original 
proposition. 
Table 54 contains data relevant to Empirical Hypothesis 86. The 
value of R is .3525 which is somewhat larger than the largest zero-order 
correlation coefficient (.293). Thus the R obtained from the correlation 
between these six scales and the rank of the voluntary program alterna­
tive (program set 2) is slightly smaller than the R obtained from these 
scales and the voluntary price-supply management and control program 
2 
score (program set 1). The value of R is .1241, i.e., these six scales, 
taken in combination, "explain" 12.41 percent of the variance. The F 
test suggests that these six value and belief scales furnish a useable 
prediction of the positions taken by farmers with respect to the volun­
tary program alternative. 
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As can be seen in Table 54, the commutative justice scale con­
tributes nearly two-thirds of the "explained" variance. Next in order 
of contribution are the collective action scale and the government dom­
inance scale. 
Table 54. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation^  
Independent variables b* r^  (b*)(r ) 
Collective action scale .1638 .236 .0387 
Independent action scale .0494 -.165 -.0082 
Individualism scale .0813 -.088 -.0072 
Commutative justice scale .2685 .293 .0786 
Distributive justice scale -.0890 .168 -.0150 
Government dominance scale -.1431 -.260 .0372 
TOTAL .1241 
= .1241 
R = .3525 
D^ependent variable is rank of the voluntary program alternative. 
E. H. 87: There will be a correlation between the free market 
program score and a weighted combination of the six 
independent action and collective action value and be­
lief scales. This hypothesis stated in the null form 
is; There is no correlation between the free market 
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program score and a weighted combination of the six in­
dependent action and collective action value and belief 
scales. The computed F value is 21.879 with 6 and 179 
degrees of freedom which is statistically significant at 
the .0005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is 
refuted. These data support the original proposition. 
Data relevant to this hypothesis can be found in Table 55. The 
computed value of the multiple correlation coefficient is .6504 which 
is somewhat larger than the highest zero-order correlation (-.591), 
2 The value of R is .4229. Using the second interpretation of the test of 
significance of the multiple correlation coefficient suggested by Walker 
and Lev (99), these six value and belief scales provide a useable pre­
diction of the positions taken by farmers with respect to the free 
market program. 
It can be seen in Table 55 that a majority of the'Explained" vari­
ance is contributed by the commutative justice scale. Nearly all of 
the "explained" variance is contributed by the commutative justice scale 
and the government dominance scale. 
E, H. 88: There will be a correlation between the rank of the free 
market program alternative and a weighted combination of 
the six independent action and collective action value 
and belief scales. This hypothesis stated in the null 
form is: There is no correlation between the rank of 
the free market program alternative and a weighted com­
bination of the six independent action and collective 
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Table 55. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation 
Independent variables b* r^  (b*)(r^ ) 
Collective action scale -.1531 -.305 .0467 
Independent action scale -.1579 .240 -.0379 
Individualism scale -.0458 .058 -.0027 
Commutative justice scale -.5023 -.591 .2969 
Distributive justice scale .0940 -.365 -.0343 
Government dominance scale .3103 .497 .1542 
TOTAL .4229 
= .4229 
R = .6504 
D^ependent variable is the free market program score. 
action value and belief scales. The computed F value is 
18.852 with 6 and 179 degrees of freedom which is statis­
tically significant at the .0005 level of probability. 
The null hypothesis is refuted. These data support the 
original proposition. 
Table 56 contains the data which are relevant to this empirical 
2 hypothesis. The computed value of R is .6223 and the value of R is 
.3872. Thus, the multiple correlation coefficient between the six value 
and belief scales and the rank of the free market program alternative 
(program set 2) is smaller in magnitude than the R between these scales 
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Table 56. Regression weights and correlations of variables us|d in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation 
Independent variables b* r^  (b*)(r^ ) 
Collective action scale -.1719 -.336 .0578 
Independent action scale -.0122 .307 -.0037 
Individualism scale -.0552 .096 -.0053 
Commutative justice scale -.5279 -.578 .3051 
Distributive justice scale .1536 -.347 -.0533 
Government dominance scale .1904 .455 .0866 
TOTAL .3872 
= .3872 
R = .6223 
D^ependgot variable is rank of the free market program alternative. 
and the free market program score (program set 1). The multiple R of 
.6223 is somewhat larger than the highest zero-order correlation co­
efficient (-.578). The significance test of the multiple correlation 
coefficient suggests that these six value and belief scales furnish 
a useable prediction of the positions farmers take with respect to the 
free market program alternative. 
An examination of Table 56 reveals that the commutative justice 
scale contributes most of the "explained" variance. Next in order of 
contribution are the government dominance scale and the collective 
action scale. 
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Sub-general Hypothesis 3C was tested by 6 empirical hypotheses. All 
of these empirical hypotheses were supported by the data at the selected 
statistical level of significance. Therefore, these data are judged to 
indicate support for Sub-general Hypothesis 3C. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3D; There will be a relationship between the 
policy positions of farmers concerning auxiliary adjustment programs and 
a weighted combination of the values of the collective action value con­
figuration. 
E. H. 89: There will be a correlation between the auxiliary adjust­
ment program score and a weighted combination of the 
collective action value scales. This hypothesis stated 
in the null form is: There is no correlation between 
the auxiliary adjustment program score and a weighted 
combination of the collective action value scales. The 
computed F value is 14,643 with 3 and 182 degrees of 
freedom which is statistically significant at the .0005 
level of probability. The null hypothesis is refuted. 
These data support the original proposition. 
The data related to Empirical Hypothesis 89 are presented in Table 
2 57. The computed value of R is .4409 and the value of R" is .1944. The 
multiple correlation coefficient is slightly larger than the largest 
zero-order correlation coefficient (.413). The F test suggests that 
these three value and belief scales provide a useable prediction of the 
positions farmers will take regarding auxiliary adjustment programs. 
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Table 57. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation^ 
Independent variables b* fy (b*) (r ) 
Collective action scale .1496 .274 .0410 
Commutative justice scale .0555 .348 .0193 
Distributive justice scale .3246 .413 .1341 
TOTAL .1944 
= .1944 
R = .4409 
D^ependent variable is auxiliary adjustment program score. 
It can be seen in Table 57 that the distributive justice scale con­
tributes most of the "explained" variance. Next in order are the collec­
tive action scale and the commutative justice scale. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3D was tested by one empirical hypothesis. 
The data supported this hypothesis at the predetermined significance 
level. These data, therefore, are judged to support Sub-general Hypothe­
sis 3D. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3E; There will be a relationship between the 
participation of farmers in past and present farm programs and a weighted 
combination of their adherence to the collective action value configura­
tion and the independent action value-orientation configuration. 
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E. H. 90: There will be a correlation between the feed grain parti­
cipation score and a weighted combination of the six in­
dependent action and collective action value and belief 
scales. This hypothesis stated in the null form is: 
There is no correlation between the feed grain participa­
tion score and a weighted combination of the six inde­
pendent action and collective action value and belief 
scales. The computed F value is 3.747 with 6 and 179 
degrees of freedom which is statistically significant at 
the .005 level of probability. The null hypothesis is 
refuted. These data support the original proposition. 
Table 58 presents data relevant to Empirical Hypothesis 90. The 
computed value of R is .3329 which is slightly larger than the highest 
zero-order correlation (-.297 which is between government dominance and 
the criterion variable). The value of R is .1105. The F test suggests 
that these six values and beliefs furnish a useable prediction of farmers* 
participation in the feed grain program. 
The government dominance scale contributes over half of the "explained" 
variance. The collective action scale, the distributive justice scale, 
and the independent action scale are next in order of contribution. 
E. H. 91: There will be a correlation between the commodity credit 
corn program score and a weighted combination of the six 
independent action and collective action value and belief 
scales. This hypothesis stated in the null form is: 
There is no correlation between the commodity credit 
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Table 58. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation^ 
Independent variables b* r^  (b*)(r^ ) 
Collective action scale .0969 .180 .0174 
Independent action scale -.0472 -.229 .0108 
Individualism scale .0019 -.125 -.0002 
Commutative justice scale -.0028 .240 -.0007 
Distributive justice scale .0692 .197 .0136 
Government dominance scale -.2345 -.297 .0696 
TOTAL .1105 
= .1105 
R = .3329 
D^ependent variable is feed grain participation score. 
com program score and a weighted combination of the six 
independent action and collective action value and belief 
scales. The computed F value is 2.7120 with 6 and 179 
degrees of freedom which is statistically significant at 
the .025 level of probability. The null hypothesis is 
refuted. These data support the original proposition. 
Data relevant to this empirical hypothesis are presented in Table 59. 
The value of R is .2875 and the value of R^  is ,0825. The value of R is 
slightly higher than the largest zero-order correlation coefficient (.243). 
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Table 59. Regression weights and correlations of variables used in 
computation of coefficients of multiple correlation* 
Independent variables b* r (b*)(r ) 
Collective action scale .2316 .243 .0563 
Independent action scaleq .0352 -.126 -.0044 
Individualism scale .0299 -.088 -.0026 
Commutative justice scale -.0340 .148 -.0050 
Distributive justice scale -.0413 .101 -.0042 
Government dominance scale -.2069 -.205 .0424 
TOTAL .0825 
= .0825 
R " .2875 
D^ependent variable is commodity credit corn participation score. 
The significance test of R suggests these six value and belief scales 
furnish a useable prediction of the farmers* participation in the com­
modity credit corn program. 
As can be seen in Table 59, the collective action scale and the 
government dominance scale contribute all of the "explained" variance. 
The contribution of the remaining scales is negative and negligible. 
Sub-general Hypothesis 3E was tested by two empirical,hypotheses. 
Both of these hypotheses were supported by the data at the designated 
level of probability. Sub-general Hypothesis 3E, therefore, is judged 
to be supported by these data. 
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In all, 5 sub-general hypotheses were used to test General Hypothe­
sis 3. All of these sub-general hypotheses were supported. It is con­
cluded that the data supported the proposition that a relationship exists 
between value-orientation configurations and value configurations and 
policy positions and policy actions. 
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ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Introduction 
To complete this research endeavor, a general discussion and summary 
of the study will be given and certain implications for future research 
will be pointed out. Selected data which were not included in the pre­
ceding chapter will also be presented. 
Effect of Situational Variables 
It was proposed in the theory chapter of this dissertation that 
certain situational variables may influence the relationship between 
value-orientations and behavior. Some selected situational variables 
will now be examined to determine if they have any impact upon the re­
lationship between certain of the value-orientation configurations and 
policy positions or actions analyzed in the preceding chapter. 
The study upon which this dissertation is based was not directly 
concerned with situational variables. Therefore, the data available for 
analysis do not include precise measures of situational variables. There 
are, however, some variables available which may be considered as situa­
tional variables. In light of the fact that the literature suggests 
that situational variables should be considered when studying the re­
lationships between value-orientations and behavior, it was decided that 
a special section of this dissertation be devoted to reporting the 
analysis of these "secondary" situational variables. 
In a broad context, the situation is a social psychological concept 
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which includes most of those external forces which impinge upon the 
actors decision or behavior at a particular point in time. The impor­
tance of the situation was early recognized by W. I. Thomas (93). 
Thomas viewed the social situation as consisting of three interrelated 
elements: the objective conditions, which include the socially enforced 
rules of behavior; the pre-existing attitudes and values of the individual 
and the group; and the definition of the situation by the actors them­
selves (influenced by the group). Thomas believed that behavior could 
only be understood when it was studied within its entire context -- the 
situation inclusive of these three elements. 
The elements in Thomas* definition of the situation are the objec­
tive conditions which may place restraints upon the behavior of an indi­
vidual during the course of social action. The other two elements can, 
for the most part, be subsumed under the concepts of values and beliefs 
(95). Although Thomas placed these objective conditions in an institu­
tional and normative setting, they can be treated in a more micro fashion. 
Newcomb (57) and Jacob and Flink (45) have broadened the definition of 
these objective conditions to environmental and non-social external re­
straints . 
There is little doubt that different individuals face different 
social and physical constraints when they enter into social action. One 
man may have many more "degrees of freedom" to behave as he wishes or as 
his value-orientations suggest than another. These constraints would be 
expected to influence the magnitude of the relationship between value-
orientations and behavior. If these constraints were identified and 
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controlled, the relationship between values, beliefs, and behavior should 
be more explicit. The interaction between the situation and values and 
beliefs, if specified, should achieve what Thomas expected — a more com­
plete understanding of behavior. 
The author is not aware of any research studies which have examined 
the impact of situational variables upon the relationship between value-
orientations and behavior. There are, however, several studies extant 
which have examined the influence of situational variables upon the re­
lationship between attitudes and overt behavior (24, 25). DeFriese and 
Ford (25), for example, have demonstrated that when measures of the in­
fluence of mechanisms of social constraint are used in conjunction with 
conventional measures of attitude, a greater reduction in the errors in 
the prediction of overt behavior occurs than when either attitude or 
social constraint are considered alone. They contend, therefore, that 
the accuracy with which overt behavior can be predicted from measures 
of verbal attitudes can be increased by the addition of a systematic 
categorization of the influence of certain mechanisms of social con­
straint. Most of the other studies which have been concerned with sit­
uational variables have considered certain reference groups to be the 
social constraint mechanism which intervene and mediate the relation 
between attitude and overt behavior (24, 25). 
All of the hypothesized relationships between value-orientation and 
policy behavior discussed in the last two chapters were examined with 
respect to a limited number of variables which were considered as pos­
sible constraints which might "disturb" the hypothesized relationship 
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between these specific value-orientations and policy behavior. Since it 
was difficult to predict the exact nature of the influence of these 
selected variables upon the hypothesized relationships, the analysis 
was done on a "nondirectional" and exploratory basis. It may be pointed 
out that even with adequate data, it is often difficult to predict 
a priori exactly how a given situational variable will influence the re­
lationship between value-orientations and behavior. Those studies (24, 
25) which have been concerned with situational variables or "social con­
straints" have determined the]iature of the influence of these variables 
from mainly an empirical standpoint. The researchers stated a general 
proposition concerning the expected effect of situational variables and 
then proceeded to determine the exact nature of this influence through 
empirical examination. 
The analysis of these variables indicated that only a few of the 
variables appeared to have a significant influence upon certain of the 
hypothesized relationships. Of the several statistical techniques used 
to analyze the data, the one yiich provided the most meaningful results 
was a correlational technique. The sample was divided into two equal 
random groups. One part of the sample (93 observations) was used to 
determine the general nature of the relationship between these situa­
tional variables and the hypothesized relationships. This was accom­
plished by plotting each situational variable against the absolute value 
of the deviations from regression (Y - Y) of the specific policy position 
or action on the value-orientation configurations of interest. Each of 
these scatter diagrams were examined to determine the general pattern of 
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relationships between these two variables. This inspection revealed 
that only a few of the situational variables were related to certain of 
the deviations from regression, and these relationships appeared to be 
relatively linear. These remaining variables were then subjected to 
correlational analysis to determine if these situational variables and 
deviations from regression were statistically related. The remaining 
93 observations were used in this analysis. 
A significant correlation between a situational variable and the 
magnitude of the deviations from regression of a policy position or 
action on the value-orientation configurations is considered to indicate 
that the situational variable has an effect on the hypothesized relation­
ship. A more precise explanation of the interpretation of this correla­
tion will be given below when the specific variables are discussed. 
A discussion of the relationships vdiich were found to be signifi­
cant are presented below. For each test of significance of the correla­
tion coefficient (r), a null hypothesis is formulated. The significance 
tests used are two-sided, and the .05 level of probability is taken as 
an acceptable indication of a statistically significant relationship. 
Null Hypothesis: There is no correlation between the number of 
crop acres farmed and the magnitude of the devia­
tions from regression of the commodity credit 
corn participation score on the independent ac­
tion and collective action value and belief scales. 
The computed correlation coefficient (r) was found to be .305 with 
91 degrees of freedom. Since a correlation coefficient of .266 is 
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required for significance at the .01 level of probability, the null hy­
pothesis is refuted. 
The regression equation referred to in the above null hypothesis 
was discussed in the last section of the preceding chapter. Data per­
tinent to this regression equation can also be found in the preceding 
chapter (Table 59). The results of the test of this null hypothesis in­
dicate that the regression equation predicts the degree of participation 
of farmers in the commodity credit corn program from their independent 
and collective action value-orientation configurations better for those 
farmers who farm a small number of crop acres, i.e., relative to the 
sample average, than for those farmers who farm a large number of crop 
acres. In other words, the fewer crop acres a farmer operates, the more 
likely his participation in the commodity credit corn program will be 
consistent with his independent and collective action value-orientation 
configurations. 
Further examination of the data indicates that the largest devia­
tion from regressions are, for the most part, positive, i.e., the actual 
commodity credit corn program participation scores considerably exceed 
the predicted participation scores. A majority of the observations as­
sociated with these higher errors of prediction are the large farmers. 
These data suggest that many of the larger farmers appear to be partici­
pating extensively in the commodity credit program even if they adhere 
to the independent action values and beliefs. These crop intensive 
farmers may consider that this farm program provides them with higher 
returns for their outputs than they can receive elsewhere. More data 
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is needed, however, before more exact reasons lidiy crop acres influence 
the relationship between participation in the commodity credit corn pro­
gram and these values and beliefs can be determined. 
Null Hypothesis : There is no correlation between the number of acres 
planted in soybeans and the magnitude of the devia­
tions from regression of the commodity credit corn 
program participation score or the independent 
and collective action value and belief scales. 
The computed correlation coefficient (r) was found to be .370 with 
91 degrees of freedom. Since a correlation coefficient of .336 is re­
quired for significance at the .001 level of probability, the null 
hypothesis is refuted. 
The discussion and data relevant to this regression equation can be 
found in the preceding chapter and in Table 59 of the preceding chapter. 
The results of the test of this null hypothesis indicate that the re­
gression equation more accurately predicts the degree of participation 
of farmers in the commodity credit corn program from their independent 
and collective action value-orientation configurations for those farmers 
ïAo plant a small number of acres in soybeans (relative to the sample 
average) than for those farmers who plant a large number of acres in 
soybeans. In other words, the larger the number of acres a farmer plants 
in soybeans, the more likely his participation in the commodity credit 
corn program will be inconsistent with his independent and collective 
action value-orientation configurations. 
Additional data analysis indicates that those farmers who exhibit 
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the largest deviation from their predicted participation scores are, in 
general, participating in the commodity credit corn program considerably 
more than expected on the basis of their values and beliefs. A majority 
of these farmers also planted 25 acres or more of soybeans in 1963. 
These data suggest that many of the large (relative to the sample average) 
soybean farmers are participating extensively in the commodity credit 
corn program even if they adhere to the independent action value-orienta­
tion configuration. The number qf acres planted in soybeans can be con­
sidered as an index of the degree to which a farming operation is crop 
intensive. Certain income considerations on the part of many of these 
large crop intensive farmers, therefore, may be responsible for this 
deviance from expected behavior. Considering the fact that there is a 
relatively high correlation (.711) between crop acres and soybean acres, 
this pattern of behavior and the reasons for this pattern may be quite 
similar to that discussed above concerning the first null hypothesis. 
As in the first case, more data is needed before this relationship 
between 1) soybean acres and 2) the participation in the commodity 
credit corn program and values and beliefs can be fully understood. 
Null Hypothesis: There is no correlation between the age of the 
farmer and the magnitude of the deviations from 
regression of the free market program score on 
the independent and collective action value and 
belief scales. 
The computed correlation coefficient (r) was found to be .215 with 
91 degrees of freedom. Since a correlation coefficient of .204 is 
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required for significance at the .05 level of probability, the null 
hypothesis is refuted. 
The discussion and data related to the regression equation referred 
to in the above null hypothesis can be found in the findings chapter and 
in Table 55 in the findings chapter. The results of the test of this 
null hypothesis suggest that the regression equation more accurately 
describes the positions of younger farmers with respect to the free 
market program from their independent and collective action value-
orientation configurations than the positions of older farmers with 
respect to these variables. The younger a farmer is, the more likely he 
is to hold a position concerning the free market consistent with his in­
dependent and collective action value-orientations. 
A possible explanation for these findings is that many of the older 
farmers who are strongly individualistic and independent may oppose the 
free market system. The older the farm operators become, the more likely 
it is that they will rely upon those means which will give them the 
highest probability of remaining liquid for their retirement period 
(41). They may believe, therefore, that a free market system would 
create uncertainty for them with respect to prices and income at a time 
in which they wish to have assurance of both. Examination of the data 
indicates that this tendency appears to exist. More data is again needed, 
however, before more meaningful statements concerning this situational 
variable can be made. 
Null Hypothesis: There is no correlation between the age of the 
farmer and the magnitude of the deviations f rom 
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regression of the compulsory price-supply manage­
ment and control program score on the independent 
and collective action value and belief scales. 
The computed correlation coefficient (r) was found to be .242 with 
91 degrees of freedom. Since a correlation coefficient of .204 is re­
quired for significance at the .05 level of probability, the null hy­
pothesis is refuted. 
Data and discussion relevant to the regression equation referred to 
in this null hypothesis appear in Table 51 and in the findings chapter 
of this dissertation. The results of the test of this hypothesis sug­
gest that this regression equation predicts the positions taken by 
younger farmers with respect to compulsory programs from their indepen­
dent and collective action values and beliefs better than the positions 
taken by older farmers with respect to these same variables. 
The same reasoning given above concerning age and the relationship 
between the free market program and the independent and collective ac­
tion values and beliefs can be applied here. The compulsory program 
stabilizes prices and provides certain assurances concerning future 
income. Although the older farmer may adhere to the independent action 
value-orientation configuration, he may believe it in his best interest 
from the standpoint of security to support the compulsory program. An 
examination of the data indicate that there is some evidence that this 
proposition is correct, but the evidence is not convincing. More in­
formation is again needed before the reasons for impact of this situa­
tional variable can be fully understood. 
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This data analysis has been exploratory and ex post facto. Only a 
few situational variables have been found, and the reasons for their in­
fluence upon certain of the hypothesized value-orientation and behavior 
relationships are not entirely clear. This discussion has been presented 
to demonstrate that situational variables do exist and knowledge of these 
variables can lead to more meaningful data interpretation. It is hoped 
this rather inadequate demonstration will encourage more precise work 
on the part of those lAio study value-orientations and behavior in the 
future. 
Discussion and Summary 
This dissertation has examined the relationship between rural value-
orientations and farm policy positions and actions. More specifically, 
this study has attempted to determine vAiat role values and beliefs play 
in the present farm policy conflict. 
Two forms of policy behavior were delineated; policy positions and 
policy actions. Policy positions were defined as intended or hypotheti­
cal policy behavior and policy actions were defined as actual participa­
tion in past and present policy. Six categories of government farm pro­
grams were defined. These include the voluntary price-supply management 
and control programs, the compulsory price-supply management and control 
programs, the free market programs, the auxiliary adjustment programs, 
the agricultural restraint programs, and the income transfer programs. 
Various definitions of the terms value and belief were reviewed. 
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It was proposed that values are abstract normative propositions or stan­
dards \^ ich represents an individual's concept of what should or ought 
to be whereas beliefs are existential propositions concerning an indi­
vidual's perception of reality. It was suggested that values may inter­
act with beliefs and form value-orientations. The general notion that 
value-orientations are related to behavior was adopted, but this notion 
was considered to be a proposition and not an integral part of the de­
finition of either values and beliefs. 
Three general hypotheses were derived concerning the relationships 
between value-orientation and policy behavior. These hypotheses are: 
General Hypothesis There will be a predictable relationship be­
tween the policy positions and policy actions of individuals and their 
values or beliefs. 
General Hypothesis 2 :  Certain values and beliefs will form value 
configurations or value-orientation configurations. 
General Hypothesis There will be a relationship between policy 
actions and policy positions and a weighted combination of certain value 
configurations and value-orientation configurations. 
The literature relevant to rural value-orientations and policy be­
havior was reviewed, and 14 value and belief dimensions were developed. 
These were related to policy behavior through a number of sub-general 
hypotheses. The 14 value and belief dimensions were operationalized by 
14 scales. Certain important modifications and additions to conventional 
scaling techniques were used in an attempt to obtain more accurate 
measurement of the values and beliefs under investigation. 
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A number of empirical hypotheses were derived from these sub-general 
hypotheses. Each of the general hypotheses were tested by inference from 
the results of the tests of these empirical hypotheses which related the 
empirical measures of the various values, beliefs, and policy positions 
and actions. Based on the analysis of data reported in this disserta­
tion the following conclusions are made: 
1. Values and beliefs are significantly related to policy behavior 
(General Hypothesis 1). The linear model appears to be the most 
appropriate model to describe the relationship between the value-
orientations and policy behavior investigated here. An inspec­
tion of the scatter diagrams did not reveal the presence of any 
other type of meaningful function. 
2. The values and beliefs examined in this dissertation form 
meaningful value-orientations and value configurations (General 
Hypothesis 2). Three complete configurations and one partial 
configuration were identified. These include the traditional 
value-orientation configuration (consisting of fatalism, 
traditionalism, farming as a way of life, debt avoidance, risk 
aversion and individualism), the independent action value-
orientation configuration (consisting of independent action, 
individualism, and government dominance), the collective action 
value configuration (consisting of collective action, distribu­
tive justice, and commutative justice), and a partial cluster 
called the contemporary value configuration (consisting of 
scientific orientation and maximization of income). Risk 
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orientation, although hypothesized to be part of the contemporary 
value configuration, did not statistically relate to both of the 
values of this configuration. 
Value-orientation configurations are significantly related to 
policy behavior (General Hypothesis 3). Value-orientations can 
also furnish useable predictions of policy positions and actions. 
Although highly statistically significant, the multiple relation­
ships are of a moderate magnitude. For the most part, the propor­
tion of variance "explained" by value-orientations is relatively 
small. It is concluded that the values and beliefs studied in 
this dissertation are important variables to consider lAen at­
tempting to predict policy positions or actions, but by them­
selves explain only a small portion of the variance of the 
criterion variable. 
Value and belief conflicts are evident in rural society and are 
related to conflicting policy alternatives, the independent 
action values and beliefs are related negatively to preferences 
for the compulsory programs and the voluntary programs whereas 
the collective action values are positively related to pref­
erences for these two types of programs. The collective action 
values are positively related to participation in government 
farm programs, but the independent action values and beliefs 
are negatively related to participation in government farm pro­
grams. The independent action values and beliefs are positively 
related to the free market policy alternative, whereas the 
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collective action values are negatively related to preference 
for this program. The evidence for contrary patterns of policy 
positions and actions is not as convincing for the traditional 
yalue-orientation configuration and the contemporary value 
configuration. The traditional values and beliefs, on the 
whole, are positively related to the agricultural restraint 
programs but are not related to the auxiliary adjustment pro­
grams. The contemporary values, on the whole, are positively 
related to the auxiliary adjustment programs but are unrelated 
to the agricultural restraint programs. 
5. There is evidence that certain situational variables influence 
some of the relationships between certain value-orientation 
configurations and policy positions or actions. The available 
measures of situational variables, however, are not adequate 
enough to determine the precise impact of relevant situational 
variables upon the relationship between value-orientations and 
policy positions and actions. It is concluded that future 
studies should consider situational variables more directly 
so that the relationships between value-orientations and be­
havior can be more fully understood. 
Evaluation and suggestions for future research 
' Y 
Some general comments and evaluations regarding these conclusions 
will now be presented. Certain suggestions for future research will also 
be given. These suggestions are made primarily on the basis of the prin­
cipal weaknesses of the present research study as judged by the author. 
I 
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In general, the data strongly support the general hypotheses and 
sub-general hypotheses. It may be noted that the value-orientations are 
generally more significantly related to policy positions than to policy 
actions. This pattern of relationships has also been found in other 
studies (14, 23, 81, 82). The lower correlations between policy actions 
and value-orientations may, as many have suggested, be a function of the 
difference in actual and hypothetical behavior, i.e., people don't al­
ways behave like they say they will behave. 
Situational variables or social constraints are probably not quite 
as important in hypothetical behavior as in actual behavior, for these 
constraints are more salient in actual behavior than in hypothetical 
behavior. It is suggested, therefore, that future studies closely ex­
amine possible situational variables which may influence the relation­
ship between value-orientations and policy actions. It was found in this 
study that crop acres and soybean acres both act as situational variables 
with respect to the relationship between independent and collective ac­
tion value-orientation and participation in the commodity credit corn 
program. Other situational variables which might be investigated are the 
influence of group norms, constraints which encourage participation such 
as financial necessity, etc., and the farmer's "calculation" of his 
chances of surviving the adjustments that would result if prices declined. 
This approach may clarify the relationship between policy actions and 
value-orientations, or at least provide more information about this rela­
tionship. 
Only three sub-general hypotheses (IB, IC, and 2B) were not supported 
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by the data. In the case of IB and 2B, poor measurement of the value 
risk orientation may be an important reason why the data failed to sup­
port these hypotheses. It may be recalled that the risk orientation 
scale was one of the three scales v^ ich conformed the poorest to the 
conditions for additivity. With respect to Sub-general Hypothesis IC, 
it is suggested that the theoretical basis for this hypothesis be re-
valuated before this hypothesis is included in any future work. The 
indirect nature of the auxiliary adjustment programs and the heavy em­
phasis upon retraining, information, and education may make these pro­
grams less objectionable to at least some of those ^ o adhere to tradi­
tional values and beliefs than was expected. 
In passing, it may be pointed out that the value individualism does 
not appear to fit well in either the traditional or independent action 
cluster. In all of the empirical tests involving the independent action 
value-orientation configuration, this value consistently was related the 
weakest to the behavior in question. Individualism is also among those 
variables which are related the weakest to policy positions relevant to 
the traditional value-orientation configuration. Perhaps the identifi­
cation with each of these value-orientation configurations may be res­
ponsible for these poor results obtained with this value dimension. 
Future research studies should strive to obtain a more precise concep­
tual and operational definition of this concept so that it can be placed 
in one configuration or the other. 
It has been found that values and beliefs form value-orientation 
configurations which are related to policy positions and actions. From 
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a prediction standpoint however, multiple relationships involving values 
and beliefs do not differ a great deal from the zero-order relationships. 
An examination of the regression analysis presented in the findings of 
the thesis reveals that the magnitude of a given multiple correlation co­
efficient and the magnitude of the highest zero-order correlation coeffi­
cient involved in the computation of that multiple correlation coeffi­
cient do not differ substantially. This situation is most likely a re­
sult of the moderate to high interrelation among the values and beliefs 
which constitute the independent variables. Put another way, if two 
variables are highly interrelated, the second will be explaining essen­
tially the same variance as the first since there will be considerable 
overlap. Thus, not a great deal is gained when moderately or highly 
related values and beliefs are cast in a multiple correlation framework. 
Future research studies may wish to include the notion of commit­
ment when examining value-orientations (85). The intensity of commit­
ment to a given value or belief may vary directly with the degree of con­
sistency between values and behavior. The individual vtio is strongly 
committed to a value is emotionally involved with that value and most 
likely will behave more according to his values than one vtio is lowly 
committed to the same value. 
The results of the study suggest that the scaling technique used to 
measure values, beliefs, and policy positions provides a relatively good 
operational measure of these concepts. There are several refinements, 
however, that could be carried out to increase both the reliability and 
validity of the measurement device. More items should be developed for 
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each concept being studied. An attempt should also be made to obtain 
more additive scales. There is some evidence that poor results con­
cerning one value (risk orientation) may be a function of the relatively 
poor conformity of the operational measure to the conditions for additiv-
ity. 
The use of verbal statements as a means to measure values and be­
liefs appears to have been a relatively successful technique in this 
study. This technique can be improved in several ways. A larger 
variety of statements should be developed to sample a wider range of 
the values and beliefs under examination. These statements should be 
constructed so that the structure of everyday life experience and con­
duct is reflected in them. The construction of more and better state­
ments may be achieved by participant observation and informal sampling 
of farmer sentiments concerning the dimension of interest. 
The results of this study can probably only be generalized to 
full-time Iowa farmers. As Schuler and Taylor (80) and Gillin (30) 
have pointed out, values, attitudes, beliefs, and opinions vary from 
region to region. Thus the pattern found in Iowa may differ greatly 
from that extant in other parts of the country. More research is needed 
to determine the pattern of relationship between values and farm policy 
in other areas so that these differences, if any, can be identified. 
It may be that value conflicts not only have an important influence on 
farm policy choices interregionally, but intraregionally as well. 
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In summary, it is the opinion of the author that the research re­
ported in this dissertation has demonstrated that values and beliefs are 
meaningfully related to conflicting policy positions and actions. It is 
concluded, however, that these relationships can not be fully understood 
until the influence of situational variables has been adequately examined 
and research concerning value-orientations and policy behavior is conduc­
ted in other regions of the country. 
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FREEDOM-INDEPENDENCE ITEMS 
Independent Action Items 
Farmers should remain independent even if it means a loss of income 
to them. 
People in our society have become so concerned with conforming to 
the actions of others that they have lost a part of the independent 
thinking that made this country great. 
A farmer can no longer afford to make his decisions independently. 
One of the worst things about some of the government programs is 
that they tend to destroy the freedom to make your own decisions. 
Every person should find a way to help himself and not expect help 
from others. 
I don't like to feel obligated to other people. 
A man in business for himself should be free to make his own deci­
sions without any outside interference. 
Collective Action Items 
An individual farmer can usually make better farm management deci­
sions than a group of farmers or some agency. 
The solution of the agricultural problem is going to depend on each 
farmer giving up a part of his independence. 
Farming would be extremely difficult without the advice and help of 
neighbors. 
Farmers must stick together in order to get things done even if they 
have to give up some of their individual freedom. 
A basic cause of the agricultural problem today is that too many 
farmers want to go their separate and individual ways without regard 
for other farmers. 
The performance of most groups is usually above the level of that 
vdiich many of the group members could accomplish on their own. 
,) 
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7. Groups usually produce good solutions when confronted with a problem. 
8. Farmers are too independent; if they are going to solve the farm prob­
lem, they are going to have to work together. 
9. Unless farmers stick together the price situation in agriculture is 
going to get worse. 
Individuali sm Items 
1. A person should always be master of his own fate. 
2. A man can be more successful by striking out boldly on his own than 
he can by following the advice of others. 
3. Adults should always be expected to look after themselves unless they 
are sick. 
4. Actually you can rely on very few people. 
5. What someone else will think of a person's actions should never in­
fluence his behavior. 
6. One of the best ways to get ahead financially is to be independent. 
7. The most important function of education is to teach a person to be 
independent. 
8. The independent spirit -- spurning all aid, needing no one, self-
reliant and free — this is man at his best. 
9. If a man wants a thing done right, he must do it himself. 
10. I'm not concerned about what my neighbors think of the way I farm. 
11. The best way to avoid trouble is to be as independent as possible. 
12. Farmers should be allowed to decide all things for themselves. 
13. The most important quality of a real man is independence. 
14. For the most part an individual should "go it alone" and make his 
own decisions. 
15. In making decisions it is more important to follow one's own judgment 
rather than to do what other farmers are doing. 
16. One of the best single indicators of ^ diether or not a man will make 
a good farmer is his ability to make his own decisions. 
17. The man vitio stands alone is the man who is admired. 
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Additional Items 
1. The most important asset a farmer can have is the ability to make 
his own decisions and stand by them. 
2. The trouble in this country today is that people depend too much on 
others. 
*3. I admire the person who stands alone, 
4. An individual's freedom is restricted by group activities. 
5. An individual has a great opportunity for individual expression 
within our system of democracy. 
6. I would much rather participate in group activities than go it alone. 
* 7 .  I would prefer to make my own decisions regarding my farm operations 
than abide by decisions made by the majority. 
8. The farmer lAio is independent and self-sufficient Is better off than 
the one \Aio relies on others and their decisions. 
9. I would prefer that my son choose an occupation where he could be 
his own boss rather than one where he works for someone else. 
10. It is very important that the farmer be completely free to make his 
own management decisions. 
11. A group is only as strong as its weakest member. 
12. To be superior a man must stand alone. 
13. The greatest lesson children can be taught is to be independent and 
self-sufficient. 
14. What this country needs, more than laws and political programs, is 
more people who can think for themselves and make their own deci­
sions. 
15. Groups are the backbone of a democracy -- they allow for talking 
things over and making a decision on what should be done. 
16. One thing I like about farming is that I can make my own decisions 
without any outside interference. 
The following symbol is used throughout the Appendix: 
* Items Included in the pre-test questionnaire. 
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17. An individual should solve his own problems. 
*18. Good group members should accept the criticisms of their points of 
view without arguments in order to preserve a harmonious group. 
19. A man should make his own decisions without concern for the opinions 
of others. 
20. Sooner or later farmers must come to recognize that they are in com­
petition with each other. 
*21. In making management decisions one of the important factors to be 
taken into consideration is what your neighbors will think about 
you for doing it that way. 
22. Farmers are going to have to depend more and more on government pro­
grams. 
23. Farmers really don't have to think a great deal about what they are 
going to do on their farms since this is largely decided for them by 
their land and by the kind of practices followed in the neighborhood. 
*24. A man must be willing to make his own decisions, uninfluenced by the 
opinions of others. 
25. The best way to avoid difficulty is to be as completely self-suffi­
cient as possible. 
*26. One of the major reasons for trying to get ahead financially is to 
be independent. 
27. Perhaps the greatest advantages in farming is the opportunity to be 
your own boss. 
28. The basic motivation behind all human behavior is self-preservation. 
29. One of the greatest lessons a young man can learn is to make his 
own decisions. 
30. In getting ahead in this world it's more important who you know 
, than \^ at you know. 
31. One of the most important advantages of rural life is that a person 
has neighbors he can depend on in time of need. 
*32. A man who works his own way through college comes out with a better 
education than one who doesn't pay his own way. 
33. Knowing the dealer personally is a most important factor in deciding 
where to buy farm supplies. 
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34. Perhaps the greatest advantage in farming is the opportunity to make 
your own decisions. 
35. The mark of a successful farmer is the one ^ rtio has the respect of 
other farmers. 
36. Many young farmers get started off on the wrong foot by trying to 
follow all the practices their neighbors are following. 
37. All men are created equal. 
38. Our free enterprise system is the backbone of democracy. 
39. Probably the most distasteful thing about communism is that the in­
dividual has no opportunity to make decisions for himself. 
40. Those farmers who have made the greatest financial success have been 
willing to deviate from what the rest of their neighbors considered 
right. 
41. One of parent's greatest obligations is to teach their children to 
make decisions on their own uninfluenced by what others may say or 
do. 
42. A young farmer would do well to find out the opinions of more ex­
perienced farmers before making decisions. 
43. It is very important to have friends to %^ on one can go for opinions 
before making a decision. 
44. If I were really truthful with myself, it is very important to me 
that my neighbors approve of the way I farm. 
45. Farmers are not concerned enough about preserving the right to make 
their own decisions. 
*46. One of the things that city people miss out on is the close ties 
with other members of the community that you find in the country 
and small towns. 
47. I really respect an individual vdio makes his own decisions and is 
willing to stand behind them. 
48. In the final analysis even after I have collected a lot of informa­
tion, I generally make my decisions after having talked to some 
people v^ ose opinions I respect, 
49. Before trying any new practice or idea it is pretty wise to wait 
and see how it is working out for some of the neighbors. 
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50, If it boiled down to two choices I would rather have the respect of 
my neighbors than to get ahead financially. 
*51. To be able to share ideas and advice with other farmers is one of 
the greatest advantages of farming. 
52. Even though I've collected a lot of information on my own, I usually 
don't make my decisions until I've talked to some other people whose 
opinions I respect. 
53. One of the most undesirable things about working for a big company 
is that all of your decisions are made for you by someone higher 
up the ladder. 
54. To be accepted by one's fellow man is one of the most important goals 
in life, 
55. I would much rather give up a part of my freedom to make decisions 
than to be forced out of farming. 
*56. One of the real adv^ fitages of vertical integration in farming is 
that someone else shares a part of the responsibility for the deci­
sions that are made. 
*57. In the long run it's generally better to go along with the thinking 
of the majority than to push for the acceptance of one's own ideas. 
58. One of the disadvantages of being independent and making one's own 
decisions is that you have nowhere to turn •s^ en you get in trouble. 
*59. In any group it is more important to keep a friendly atmosphere 
than to be efficient. 
60. Young people today would be a lot better off if they would follow 
more closely the advice of their parents, teachers and other people 
with more experience. 
61. In making decisions it's a good idea to get the advice from a number 
of people but then go ahead and make your own decision. 
62. In a democracy like ours the way of the majority is usually the 
right way. 
*63. A farmer should decide what's right for his own farm and go ahead 
regardless of Wiat his neighbors may think of him for doing it that 
way. 
64. One of the desirable things about the government programs in agri­
culture is that they make the farmer's decisions easier. 
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65. A real problem in this country today is that too many people are re­
lying too much on government programs to get them by. 
66. Humans are rational beings x^ ose actions are determined by self-
interest. 
*67. It is more important to me to be known as a person who gets along 
well with others and has a lot of friends rather than a person vAio 
likes to make decisions for himself. 
68. When a man chooses to live in groups he must give up certain 
individual rights and submit to the decisions of the group. 
*69. In this day and age a person can no longer afford to be independent 
and to rely on his own judgment in making decisions. 
70. Farming has become so complex it is impossible to rely on one's own 
judgment in making decisions. 
71. Above all other things children should be taught to respect the 
opinions of their elders. 
72. Having the freedom to make up my own mind is, to me, one of the 
major advantages in farming. 
73. In this day and age it is important that each person maintain his 
individuality. 
*74. At the present time there is too much emphasis on groups and group 
activity in our country. 
*75. Individual needs and desires should be subordinate to group needs 
and desires. 
76. In any group there is a real danger in having members who always 
want to do things differently than the majority. 
77. About the only way the agriculture problem is going to get solved 
is by individual farmers joining together to put up a united front. 
*78. It is actually more satisfying to be a part of a group that has ac­
complished something of significance than to accomplish something 
on your own. 
79. Generally speaking most group accomplishments result from a few 
individuals taking the initiative and leading the rest of the group 
members. 
80. In farming the most successful man is the one who has earned the 
respect of his neighbors. 
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*81. Farmers' problems will probably never be solved by collective action. 
82. Decisions made by a majority vote usually restrict the better farmer. 
83. Farmers have more freedom to make individual decisions than most 
other occupational groups. 
*84. The limitations which government farm programs place upon farmers' 
freedom are not severe. 
85. Farm programs greatly impair a farmer's freedom to manage his farming 
operation. 
86. One must avoid dependence upon others. 
87. No matter what the circumstances, one should never tell other people 
what they should do. 
88. Each individual should take care of himself and not have to depend 
on help even when some personal disaster occurs. 
89. Too many people expect others to take care of them in time of trouble. 
90. Each individual should be able to solve his own problems. 
91. A person should be able to handle any situation in which he finds 
himself. 
92. Individuals should solve their own problems regardless of the dif­
ficulties and sacrifices involved. 
93. More children should be taught to be independent and self-sufficient. 
94. The man who stands alone is the man who is respected. 
95. A farmer must be free to seek out information and make his own de­
cisions rather than be forced to accept the decisions of others. 
96. Even though I make some mistakes, it is very important to me that 
I have the freedom to make my own decisions. 
97. Many people who want complete independence are not willing to accept 
the consequences of their acts. 
98. Actually I really don't care too much what my neighbors think of the 




1. Fate seems to decide some people will be successful -- others 
failures. 
2. The future is in the hands of fate and we might as well accept it. 
3. For the most part, man is a victim of circumstances beyond his con­
trol. 
4. Man is the victim of circumstances beyond his control. 
5. We should view whatever happens to us as planned by forces beyond 
our control. 
Additional Items 
*1. There are so many unpredictables in farming, such as weather and 
prices, that a farmer really can't control how successful he is going 
to be. 
*2. Farmers who blame weather, disease, prices, insects, etc., for their 
success or failure really don't recognize how much control they have 
over their situation. 
3. A farmer really can control his own destiny if he tries. 
4. A lot of success in farming depends on luck rather than planned 
decisions and actions. 
*5. There are many things that happen in farming that just have to be 
accepted -- you can't do anything about them, 
6. I believe there is a superior power that determines who will and who 
will not be successful and the individual's control is real insignifi­
cant. 
7. Some people are born to be successful while others seem to be failures 
regardless of what they do or how hard they work. 
*8. The most important element in success is how well man masters the 
environment in which he lives. 
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*9. The future depends on circumstances and there's not much we can do 
about it. 
*10. In order to make progress, it is a good thing to fight a little 
against fate. 
*11. Even for those farmers who carry out sound practices, weather is a 
major factor in determining their success or failure. 
12. Farmers who are willing to take trouble to study the information 
available can practically eliminate weather as a factor in determin­
ing their success or failure. 
13. The will of God determines who will be successful and vdio will be 
failures. 
*14. Good management can eliminate most of the risks involved in any 
business. 
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BELIEF IN SCIENCE ITEMS 
Scientific Orientation Items 
1. A college education in agriculture is almost a necessity to begin 
farming these days. 
2. The best way to compete in agriculture is to apply the latest 
scientific research. 
3. The best thing a young farmer can do is to learn as much as he 
possibly can about new developments in agriculture. 
4. Man's future depends primarily upon the technical advances made 
by scientific research. 
5. The only way a farmer can maximize income is to use all the latest 
available research information. 
6. Time spent in learning about new farming innovations is time well 
spent. 
7. A farmer has to keep trying out new scientific practices in order to 
stay in farming these days. 
8. A farmer must keep up with and apply the new methods in farming if 
he is to compete and stay in farming. 
9. To be successful a farmer has to make more than average use of 
technical agricultural knowledge. 
10. A farmer must keep up and apply new methods in farming to be able 
to compete. 
11. Research information is a necessity to a farmer in making decisions. 
12. Man's future depends primarily upon the technical advances made in 
scientific knowledge. 
13. A farmer needs more than a high school education these days. 
14. Many farmers waste too much time keeping up on new scientific 
developments. 
15. Scientific advancements in agriculture have gone about as far as 
they can go. 
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Traditionalism Items 
1. About the only thing that science has accomplished for the farmer 
is to make life more complicated. 
2. I think traditional ways are the best ways of doing things. 
3. It is more important for farmers to make decisions on the basis 
of past experience and rules of thumb than to try to find new 
ways of doing things. 
4. The farmer who gets ahead fastest is the one who sticks to the old 
proven ways of doing things. 
5. A farmer is better off to continue traditional farming practices 
since many of the new fangled ideas are not suited to his farm 
operation. 
6. There is really no reason for man to explore outer space. 
Additional Items 
1. All of the workings of the human brain will eventually be explained 
by the laws of science. 
*2. There is too much emphasis on science today and not enough emphasis 
on morals. 
3. The principle hope for peace in the world is the advancement of man's 
knowledge. 
4. Science is actually in conflict with Christianity. 
*5. Many farmers have become so scientific they have forgotten the im­
portance of good practical judgment. 
6. There is really little prospect in the future for any major increases 
in yields per acre. 
7. Education is valuable but it willnever be as valuable as experience 
for success in farming. 
*8. Good management is the application of scientifically developed 
principles. 
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9. New ideas in farming are alright but the farmer who works hardest 
is generally the most successful, 
10. The person who is a good manager, regardless of the kind of business 
he is in, would probably be a successful farmer, 
11. There is no substitute for practical experience in farming. 
12. Farming is becoming more scientific and requires a high degree of 
technical training on the part of the farmer. 
*13. Farming today is more a science than an art. 
14. The successful elevator or feed store manager would probably be a 
successful farmer. 
*15, Probably the best guide in making decisions is what has worked in 
the past. 
*16. It is important for a farmer to be able to predict lAat's going to 
happen before it happens. 
17. Time spent by the farmer in finding out about new ideas and practices 
in farming is time well spent. 
18. The truly successful farmer is the one who weighs the profit to be 
gained from a new farm, practice against other alternatives. 
19. Everything considered, all of the scientific developments in this 
country have done about as much harm as good. 
20. A farmer really can't afford to experiment with different ideas 
on his own farm, 
21. In the long run practical experience and knowledge gained through 
experience are a farmer's most important assets. 
*22. Many good ideas on raising children come from research on child 
care, 
23. It is important to take time to consider the alternative ways of 
doing a job before deciding which one is best. 
24. Good managers take the time to seek out information and use this 
information in making decisions, 
25. The basic principles of farming really haven't changed much in the 
last 30 years. 
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26. Results of scientific experiments need to be tempered with the 
wisdom of experience. 
*27. In general the farmer with the most education is the most success­
ful. 
28, The ability to make right decisions is something a person is born 
with. 
29. The best guide for making decisions is a prediction of That's going 
to happen in the future. 
*30. The future of agriculture depends largely on additional research. 
*31. The principles of management of other fields can't be applied to 
farming. 
*32. Our schools today don't place enough emphasis on science. 
*33, People who do agricultural research really don't have an apprecia­
tion of the farmer's problems. 
34. Most of the research information in agriculture is good but a farmer 
should try it on a limited basis on the farm before accepting it 
completely. 
35. A lot of farmers use field-days and short-courses as an excuse to 
get away from the farm for a day. 
36. Our high schools need to offer more science courses. 
37. In the foreseeable future men will be able to control the weather. 
*38. In the long run people who know how to do a job are worth more to 
society than the geniuses who invent new things. 
39. The main reason for our schools is to teach young people how to get 
along with each other. 
40. Getting ahead in the world depends more on gaining knowledge than 
on gaining friends. 
*41, Knowing a dealer personally is probably the most important considera­
tion in deciding \^ ere to buy farm supplies. 
42. A farmer is generally ahead to buy farm supplies from a dealer who 
can also provide the latest research information about their uses. 
43. A farmer can generally get more useful and practical information 
from other farmers than from the county extension director. 
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44. Advances made by science are primarily responsible for the farm 
problem today. 
45. It's impossible to "farm by the book". 
46. In general, farmers who keep good records and use the records in 
, making decisions are the most successful, 
47. In the final analysis most of a farmer's decisions are based on 
guesswork. 
48. In judging neighbors the most important thing to consider is how 
practical his ideas are. 
49. On the whole a farmer can get better information from specialists 
and farm magazines than he can from his neighbors and relatives. 
50. I feel that research information put out by agricultural colleges 
is just as good to go on as if I had tried it on my own farm. 
51. Many farmers spend too much time and effort trying to keep them­
selves up-to-date on new farming ideas, 
*52. Since the future is so uncertain in farming a farmer has to depend 
to a great extent on what has worked in the past. 
53. A farmer must continuously evaluate his operation and adjust his 
future plans on the basis of these evaluations. 
54. Even with all the changes and new developments in farming, common 
sense is still the most important factor for success. 
55. There are certain basic principles in farming that can only be 
learned from experience. 
*56. Although there is new machinery, new fertilizers, new feeds, etc., 
the basic principles of farming really haven't changed too much in 
the last 30 years. 
57. In the long run a farmer is better off to establish a pattern and 
stick with it than to continually change his farming operations. 
*58. A farmer should try research recommendations on his farm on a limited 
basis before accepting them completely. 
59. Common sense is still the most important factor in farm decision­
making. 
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60. Farmers really don't have to think a great deal about what they are 
going to do on their farms since this is largely decided for them by 
their land and by the kind of practices followed in the neighborhood. 
61. People were better off 50 years ago before scientific advancements 
complicated life so much. 
62. Science is the hope of the future. 
*63, Eventually, science will eliminate all the uncertainty in raising 
crops. 
*64. Someday a farmer will be able to control all aspects of farming by 
applying scientific techniques. 
65. Science will never eliminate all risk in farming. 
*66. The day is coming when science will make farming no more risky than 
any other business. 
67. The farmer will always be somev^ at helpless in facing the many 
uncertainties in farming. 
68. There are no limits to what science may eventually discover. 
69. Every event in the Universe is determined by some natural cause 
which will eventually be discovered by science. 
70. Science has its place, but there are things that can never possibly 
be understood by the human mind. 
71. One of the greatest aids to the farmer is the research work carried 
on by agricultural scientists. 
*72. More farmers should attend Extension Service meetings, field days, 
and farm tours. 
73. In these days a college education in agriculture is essential in 
order to do an adequate job of farming. 
*74, Technical agricultural knowledge is much more important to success 
in farming these days than knowledge gained from the personal ex­
perience of other farmers. 
*75. Most farmers spend too much time and effort keeping themselves up-to-
date on new farming practices. 
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Most of the discoveries made by agricultural scientists are im­
practical for the average farmer. 
A high school education is essential for a farmer to make the greatest 
use of agricultural research findings. 
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IMAGE OF FARMING ITEMS 
Maximization of Income Items 
1. If a farmer could make more money in another occupation, he should 
leave farming. 
2. Making money is the most important consideration in farming. 
3. Making as much money as possible is a very important consideration 
in farming. 
Way of Life Items 
1. In getting ahead in this world it's more important who you know 
than what you know. 
2. Much of the research information farmers receive is too impractical 
to be of value. 
3. Older, more experienced farmers in the community are probably the 
best source of information on farming ideas and practices. 
4. Most farm families would do well to hold off buying modern equipment 
and conveniences for their homes until they can pay cash for them. 
5. The farm is a good place to raise a family; this is reason enough 
to maintain as many families in farming as possible. 
6. The farm is a good place to raise a family; this is reason enough to 
stay in farming. 
Additional Items 
1. It is realistic to say that about one-third of today's farmers will 
have to leave the farm in the next ten of fifteen years. 
2. The family-type farm should be maintained at all costs since it has 
been so fundamental in agriculture in the past. 
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*3. Farming to me is more a way of life than a way to make money. 
*4, A farmer must keep up with and apply the new methods in farming if 
he is to compete and stay in farming. 
5. A great deal of technical knowledge is required to be a successful 
farmer. 
*6, Many adjustments including reducing the number of farmers and in­
creasing the average farm size are needed to bring agriculture into 
balance with other sectors of the economy. 
7. Many farmers waste too much time keeping up on new farming practices. 
*8. Farming involves the use of scientific principles and is thus more 
of a science than an art. 
*9. Many agricultural adjustments are needed in the next few years. 
10. There are too many farmers. 
11. There is no longer room in agriculture for the farmer whose only 
asset is that he has been in farming a long time. 
12. Farming is still a family enterprise. 
13. It is best to follow the practices that have been used for a number 
of years rather than seek new ones. 
14. The small farm operators are the ones who won't be able to compete 
in the future and will probably have to leave farming. 
15. Keeping a good set of records is a very important aspect of farming. 
16. A farmer should use all the sources available to learn about new 
ideas in farming. 
*17. Farming is an end in itself rather than a means to other ends. 
18. A farm is the best place to raise a family. 
19. Many farmers spend too much time trying to avoid hard work. 
20. I would put more faith in my father's management decisions than an 
agriculture expert from the State University. 
*21. I would rather clear $3,000 a year on the farm than clear $5,000 a 
year in a town job. 
*22. I like to wait to see what results neighbors get before trying out 
a new farm practice or seed variety. 
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*23. I think a farmer has to keep learning and trying new things to stay 
on top. 
*24. It is very important for a farmer to attend field days and farm 
meetings. 
25. I have tried out several new farm practices in the last few years. 
26. Maximum profit is more important to me than improving the land. 
27. People engaged in farming are the backbone of the country. 
28. The economy of the country won't improve until the economic problems 
of agriculture are solved. 
29. Farming was the first activity of mankind that led to civilization. 
30. Agriculture is the most fundamental aspect of our economy. 
31. Farming is a profit maximizing business more than a way of life. 
32. As agriculture goes, so goes the nation. 
33. Agriculture is no more important to our nation than any other sector 
of our economy. 
34. The only advantage we have over many countries is the productivity 
of our agriculture, so it should be maintained at all costs. 
35. Physical work is more important to success in farming than mental 
work. 
*36. Hard work means muscular work. 
37. The farmer is in a situation similar to the small businessman in 
that his individual actions have virtually no effect on the overall 
market situation. 
38. If the returns to capital and labor are to be at the same level in 
agriculture as in other sectors of the economy the number of farms 
will have to be reduced by one-third in the next ten or fifteen years. 
39. The family-type farm should be maintained at all costs since it has 
been such a fundamental part in maintaining democracy in America. 
40. There is no longer room in agriculture for the farmer whose only 
asset is the willingness to work hard. 
41. The advantages of living in the country outweigh the disadvantages 
of a lower average farm income. 
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42. Owning a farm debt-free should be the most important goal of every 
farm family. 
43. If I had a son, I would rather have him stay home and farm than go 
to college. 
44. It is just as important for a farmer to belong to farm organizations 
and keep up on the latest techniques in farming as it is for the 
doctor to belong to his associations and keep up on the new medical 
techniques. 
*45. Book learning and going to college to study agriculture are not very 
important to success in farming. 
46. It is important for the future of agriculture to attract intelligent 
young people to farming. 
47. Stewardship of the soil is one of the farmer's most important obliga­
tions . 
*48. One of the most important things about farming is that you are 
guaranteed certain minimum essentials of living. 
49, One of the problems of agriculture is that farmers are too indepen­
dent and don't work together on their common problems. 
*50, Farming is more important to me as a way to make the most money 
possible than because it is a way of life. 
51. Most of the benefits of scientific advancement accrue to the above 
average farmer. 
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RISK PREFERENCE ITEMS 
Risk Orientation Items 
1. Farmers who are willing to take chances usually do better financi­
ally. 
2. I regard myself as the kind of person who is willing to take a few 
more risks than the average farmer. 
3. I would rather take a chance on making a big profit than to be con­
tent with a smaller but more sure profit. 
4. Those farmers who specialize generally have a higher income than 
those who don't. 
5. A farmer must be willing to take a great number of risks to stay in 
farming. 
6. A farmer must be willing to take a great number of risks to get 
ahead. 
Risk Aversion Items 
1. It is better to make a smaller profit each year than to attempt 
something v^ ere there is a chance of losing. 
2. In farming a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush. 
3. A farmer ought to save as much as possible to guard against the 
risks that are always present in farming. 
4. A farmer should diversify his farming operation to hedge against 
the greater risks in specialization. 
5. A farmer needs to remain diversified to protect himself against a 
bad year. 
6. A farmer should always have some money laid aside in case of emer­
gency. 
7. A farmer should try to reduce the risk or uncertainty in farming by 
keeping his operation diversified, even though it may mean the loss 
of some future income. 
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Debt Avoidance Items 
1. Farm families would do well to wait until they have accumulated 
their own money rather than borrow for farm production purposes. 
2. In being a successful farmer it is most important to do the best 
you can with what you have without going into debt. 
3. Farmers should wait until they can accumulate their own capital 
rather than to borrow for farm production purposes. 
4. A farmer should never borrow money for operating capital. 
5. Rather than going in debt a farmer should make do with what he has. 
6. The major goal of young farm families should be to stay out of debt. 
Additional Items 
1. A farmer must take a greater number of risks than the average self-
employed businessman. 
*2. A farmer should be conservative in making his management decisions 
due to the many uncertainties that are involved in farming. 
3. Farming is an "all or nothing" proposition. 
4. I would prefer to do things the way they have always been done than 
take the risk of trying some new method. 
5. With the agriculture situation as it is today, it is especially im­
portant for the farmer to avoid all unnecessary risks. 
6. A farmer is just increasing his risk \Aen he uses new practices on 
his farm. 
*7. A farmer ought to keep a relatively large reserve of cash to guard 
against the risks that are present in farming. 
8. Farmers need to take more risks. 
9. The conservative farmer who "plays it safe" is respected in this 
community. 
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*10, A reliable criticism of many farmers these days is that they have 
forgotten how to "play it safe". 
*11. One of the most undesirable things about farming is the great number 
of risks that a person must take. 
12. There is a large amount of risk or uncertainty that goes along with 
the use of any new farming technique. 
13. A great deal of the risks involved in farming are eliminated by the 
good farmer. 
14. Saving is even more important than wise spending. 
15. Saving is the most important thing for future well-being. 
16. In farming the successful man is one who stays out of debt. 
17. Most farmers who enlarge their operations by borrowing make more 
profit than farmers who have small operations free of debt. 
*18. A farmer should borrow enough money to have as much equipment and 
livestock as he needs, regardless of how much he is in debt. 
19. A farm operator who is short of capital generally would profit by 
borrowing more money before paying off the debts he already has. 
20. It is easy for a farmer to borrow more money in normal years than 
he can pay back. 
21. In deciding v^ ether to try a new farming practice it is most important 
to be among the first to change if it is a good practice. 
22. In seeking to solve the present problems of American farmers the 
government should direct its attention to setting up more security 
measures to help the farmer during bad years. 
23. It is important to select a good crop rotation and stick with it 
despite changing price conditions. 
24. A farmer can borrow $500 to purchase a new piece of farm machinery 
that can make him an above average profit within the year. He 
should borrow the money. 
*25, It is generally better to stick with practices that have proven to 
be productive rather than experimenting with new ideas. 
*26. The farmers who are going broke these days are the ones who are 
scared to take a few chances. 
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*27. I regard myself as the kind of person who is willing to take a few 
more risks than the average farmer. 
*28, Everyone should have some money laid aside for a "rainy day". 
*29. One of the most undesirable things about fairming is the amount of 
risk the farmer must bear. 
30. The best advice to the young farmer is to be cautious. 
*31. In making decisions it is better to think in terms of minimizing 
losses rather than maximizing profits. 
32. A farmer can't afford to be without crop insurance. 
*33. One of the most undesirable things about farming is the number and 
kind of decisions that have to be made, 
*34. Before adopting a new farming practice it is a good idea to see what 
luck other farmers are having with it. 
35. It is generally too risky to be among the first to try a new farming 
idea or practice. 
36. I would rather invest money in a savings account in a bank than in 
speculative stock. 
*37. Most people wait too long to make a decision. 
38. Farmers who are willing to take occasional risks never seem to get 
ahead. 
39. Farming probably involves a greater amount of risk than most other 
kinds of business. 
40. A farmer can't afford to be without insurance on his buildings. 
41. I like to put things off as long as I can in hopes that a better 
solution may turn up, 
42. Even though it occasionally costs money it is better to wait to try 
some new ideas or practices rather than take the chance of losing, 
43. Those farmers vho wait to see how new ideas and practices are going 
to work seldom do well financially. 
44. I enjoy making decisions. 
45. The price of being a manager is accepting the risks that go with it. 
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*46. In selecting enterprises for a farm it is better to stay with those 
that guarantee a small profit than to get into enterprises that 
have a higher return but also greater risk. 
47. There is probably more money to be made from taking chances but the 
worry isn't worth it. 
48. Young people today are too willing to take chances because they 
have forgotten how tough times can be. 
49. If a person buys a farm he should put all the money he can into it 
until he gets it paid off. 
*50. It's better to do something wrong than not have tried. 
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ROLE OF GOVERMENT ITEMS 
Commutative Justice Items 
1. The government should subsidize agriculture and keep the agricul­
tural sector of the economy healthy. 
2. The government should have a farm program that assures the farmer 
an adequate income. 
3. The government should stay out of many facets of our economy since 
it only complicates matters. 
4. We need strong governmental controls to improve our country. 
5. The government should establish long-range price supports to help 
farmers make long-range plans about their farming operations. 
6. The government should not assume the responsibility of guaranteeing 
the income level of any group of people in our country. 
7. Farmers should have the responsibility of solving the farm problem 
and the government should stay out of the picture. 
8. The government should not be involved in regulating agricultural 
production or setting guaranteed price levels. 
9. The government has no responsibility to guarantee the farmer a fair 
return for his products. 
Distributive Justice Items 
1. The government should establish price and production controls in 
any industry in which the return to investment is lower than the 
average of the economy as a whole. 
2. It is up to the government to see that everyone has a secure job 
and a good standard of living. 
3. Any facility that provides for the common welfare should be govern­
ment controlled. 
4. The government should provide education and job retraining for those 
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The government should establish compulsory education programs in 
all rural high schools to provide training for non-farm jobs for 
those young people who may be leaving the farm. 
The government should place price controls on farm inputs such as 
machinery, fertilizer, and seed to assure fair prices. 
The government should assume the responsibility of equalizing op­
portunities of those starting out in an occupation. 
The government has the responsibility of equalizing opportunity and 
income. 
Additional Items 
The farmer would be better off if the government would get completely 
out of agriculture. 
The government should have a program to move unemployed people from 
places where work is scarce to areas where there is work. 
I 
I think that the government is in agriculture to stay but its im­
portance in the overall picture should be decreased. 
The government is responsible for the mess the farmer is in today 
and therefore should help improve his economic position. 
The government should assume the responsibility of equalizing op­
portunity for young farmers just starting out in farming by paying 
them a guaranteed income for the first few years. 
The government has as much responsibility to the small businessman 
as the farmer. 
One way by \Aiich the government could help agriculture is to provide 
low-interest credit to any young man starting out in farming. 
Protective legislation such as grading regulations and the Pure Food 
and Drug Act is the only way in which government should enter the 
agricultural scene. 
The government should enforce legislation that would assure a secure 
job to every person who desirps one. 
The government sMould assume the responsibility of assuring a high 














The government should use agricultural products in foreign aid pro­
grams to a greater extent to solve the surplus problem. 
The government should assume the responsibility of assuring a mini­
mum income to everyone in our society who is gainfully employed. 
The government should not be expected to establish high tariffs to 
protect the American farmer against foreign products. 
The government should be fair to all sectors of the economy by not 
giving greater subsidies to one sector than to others. 
The government should help the farmer ease his large cost burden by 
reducing tariffs on foreign made farm machinery. 
The government should provide low cost crop insurance because the 
farmer is exposed to so many uncertainties such as weather. 
The government shouldn't have farm programs to control production 
because sometimes people with a lot of capital make a killing. 
Since the government is subsidizing so many other sectors of the 
economy, there is no reason why there shouldn't be farm programs 
to improve the farmer's income. 
The government has the responsibility to make sure our best farm 
land is not diverted to non-farm use. 
The government should help private agricultural businesses establish 
foreign markets for our agricultural surpluses. 
The government should have no agricultural control programs in which 
the farmer does not have the final say as to whether or not the 
controls go into effect. 
A farmer referendum shouldn't be the deciding factor in whether a 
farm program goes into effect. 
The government should provide a program of land purchase credit 
which makes money available to farmers up to 100% of the cost of 
the land. 
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PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT ITEMS 
Government Dominance Items 
1. Production controls place too many restrictions on the efficient 
farmer. 
2. Government farm programs tend to be too restrictive in that these 
programs limit farmers' operations and income earning possibilities. 
3. The present government farm programs place a severe limitation on a 
farmer's freedom to manage his own farming operation. 
Additional Items 
*1. Despite what you hear, the government is actually playing a minor 
role in most of the affairs of the country. 
*2. If the government would get completely out of agriculture, ma,ny 
farmers would be forced to leave farming for some other occupation. 
*3. Prices are higher today than they would be if the government didn't 
have an agricultural program. 
*4. Many inefficient and small farmers would not be able to stay in 
farming if it were not for support programs. 
*5. Government farm programs do not limit a farmer's freedom to make 
decisions regarding the management of his farm, 
6. We need to keep the governmental regulations that we now have. 
7. Government farm programs are primarily responsible for the great 
number of farmers who have had to leave their farms. 
*8. Prices would drop drastically if the government discontinued its 
agricultural programs. 
9, Most of the present government farm programs are necessary to keep 
agriculture healthy. 
10. If the government got out of agriculture, prices would eventually 
rise to higher levels after a period of time t»ince supply and demand 
would be operating freely. 
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11. The migration out of agriculture is due primarily to the fact that 
the government's farm programs have not been designed to help those 
who need it most. 
12. The farmer was better off before the government entered the picture 
with agricultural programs. 
*13. Government farm programs have had little effect on farm prices 
during the past ten years. 
14. The government is out to reduce the number of farmers. 
15. The government is really not playing any greater role in agriculture 
than it is in many other sectors of the economy. 
16. The government's actual involvement in agriculture has been greatly 
over-emphasized, 
*17. Government farm programs have generally been favorable to all farmers 
by raising their incomes over xdiat they would have been in the ab­
sence of farm programs. 
18. Despite the wide publicity given to farm programs, they really 
haven't had much effect on the individual farmer, 
*19, The government is definitely playing a major role in controlling 
the production of agricultural products. 
*20, The government farm program is the most important factor in deter­
mining how well the farmer does in comparison to the rest of the 
economy. 
21. The farmer would make a better living if the government wouldn't 
try to control the supply and the price of agricultural products. 
*22. For all practical purposes, the government controls the individual 
farmer through production control and price support programs. 
23 .  Government farm programs are designed to give the farmer a helping 
hand until he can get back on his feet. 
24. Government farm programs h^  farmers by keeping the prices of farm 
inputs such as machinery, fertilizer, and seed in line with the 
prices they receive for farm products. 
25. The present government farm programs are designed so they help 
those farmers who have the least need for help. 
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26. It is hard to figure where the money supposedly spent on farm pro­
grams goes because the programs put so little money in the farmer's 
pocket. 
27. The present government farm programs are designed so they help those 
farmers who have the most need for help. 
28. The government is spending more to support agriculture than any 
other sector of the economy except the military. 
29. The government is playing as great a role in many other segments of 
the economy as it is in agriculture, 
30. The government is playing a more dominant role in some other sectors 
of the economy than in agriculture. 
31. The government is neglecting farmers because it allows manufacturers 
of farm inputs such as machinery, fertilizer, and seed to set their 
own prices ^ ich are out of line with what the farmers receive for 
their products. 
*32. The government's farm program is the most important factor in de­
termining the price of farm products. 
33. Government farm programs have really only helped the big farmers 
who don't need the help. 
34. Actually, farm programs have more effect on the consumer than they 
do on the farmer. 
35. If any benefits have accrued from farm programs, they have benefitted 
consumers more than they have farmers. 
36. The government is not doing a good job of informing the people of 
the country about the farm situation and consequently the farmer 
gets blamed for a lot of things over which he has no control. 
*37. The government is helping the farmer a great deal by stimulating 
the demand for farm products both in the United States and in other 
countries. 
38. There is bound to be some graft and corruption anytime the govern­
ment gets involved to the extent vrtiich it is in agriculture. 
*39. The government has an active program to promote the use of agri­
cultural products, 
40. Government farm programs designed to regulate production and prices 




Intercorrelations of Scale Items and Programs 
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Table 60. Distribution of the intercorrelation among the items of the 
independent action scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.09 and below 4 19.1 
.10 - ,19 5 23.8 
.20 - .29 7 33.3 
,30 and above 5 23.8 
TOTAL 21' 100.0 
Range = -.010 to +.367 
r .  . = .212 
1] 
Table 61. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of the 
collective action scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.09 and below 7 19.5 
.10 - .19 12 33.3 
.20 - .29 8 22.2 
.30 - .39 6 16.7 
.40 and above 3 8.3 
TOTAL 36 100.0 
Range = .027 to .482 
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Table 62. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items on the 
individualism scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.09 and below 20 14.7 
.10 - .19 39 28.7 
.20 - .29 52 38.2 
.30 - .39 21 15.5 
.40 - .49 3 2.2 
.50 and above 1 0.7 
TOTAL 136 100.0 
Range = .005 to .509 
'ij 
Table 63. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of the 
fatalism scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.29 and below 0 0.0 
.30 - .39 2 20.0 
.40 - .49 6 60.0 
.50 and above 2 20.0 
TOTAL 10 100.0 
Range = .383 to .672 
'ij " 
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Table 64. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of the 
scientific orientation scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.09 and below 16 15.2 
.10 - .19 17 16.2 
.20 - .29 32 30.5 
.30 - .39 23 21.9 
.40 - .49 12 11.4 
.50 and above 5 4.8 
TOTAL 105 100.0 
Range = .007 to .549 
r^ j = .252 
Table 65. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of the 
traditionalism scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.19 and below 2 13.3 
.20 - .29 4 26.7 
.30 - .39 5 33.3 
.40 - .49 3 20.0 
.50 and above 1 6.7 
TOTAL 15 100.0 
Range = .077 to .529 
"ij = .322 
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Table 66. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of the 
maximization of income scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.19 and below 0 0.0 
.20 - .29 2 66.7 
.30 - .39 0 0.0 
.40 and above 1 33.3 
TOTAL 3 100.0 
Range = .231 to .471 
r .  .  = .311 
ij 
Table 67. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of 
the farming as a way of life scale 






and below 6 40.0 
.10 - .19 5 33.3 
.20 - .29 3 20.0 
.30 and above 1 6.7 
TOTAL 15 100,0 
Range = .006 to .449 
'ij - .153 
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Table 68. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of 
the risk aversion scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
,09 and below 2 9.5 
.10 - .19 5 23.8 
,20 - .29 8 38.2 
.30 - .39 4 19.0 
.40 and above 2 9.5 
TOTAL 21 100.0 
Range = .018 to .527 
?.. = .241 
Table 69. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of 
the risk orientation scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.09 and below 7 46.7 
.10 - .19 5 33.3 
.20 - .29 2 13.3 
.30 and above 1 7.7 
TOTAL 15 100.0 
Range = .018 to .523 
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Table 70. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of 
the debt avoidance scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.19 and below 0 0.0 
.20 - .29 2 13.3 
.30 - ,39 ~ 6 40.0 
.40 - .49 4 26.7 
.50 - ,59 2 13.3 
,60 and above 1 7,7 
TOTAL 15 100.0 
Range = ,225 to .665 
'ij - -322 
Table 71. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the 
the commutative justice scale 
items of 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.19 and below 0 0.0 
.20 - ,29 3 8.3 
.30 - .39 14 38.9 
.40 - .49 11 30.6 
.50 - .59 6 16,7 
.60 and above 2 5.5 
TOTAL 36 100.0 
Range = ,264 to ,693 
r^ j = ,423 
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Table 72. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of 
the distributive justice scale 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
,09 and below 0 0.0 
.10 - .19 6 21.4 
.20 - .29 3 10.7 
.30 - .39 11 39.3 
.40 - .49 5 17.9 
.50 and above 3 10.7 
TOTAL 28 100.0 
Range = .145 to .547 
r . = .340 
ij 
Table 73. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the items of 
the government dominance scale 
Intercorrelations category Number Percent 
.49 and below 0 0.0 
.50 - .59 1 33.3 
.60 - .69 0 0.0 
.70 - .79 2 66.7 
.80 and above 0 0.0 
TOTAL 3 100.0 
Range = .583 to .769 
r^ j = .687 
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Table 74. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the six 
voluntary programs 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
,09 and below 3 20.0 
.10 - .19 8 53.3 
.20 - .29 3 20.0 
.30 and above 1 6.7 
TOTAL 15 100.0 
Range = -.016 to +.415 
7. . = .163 
ij 
Table 75. Distribution of the intercorrelations among the five 
auxiliary adjustment programs 
Intercorrelation category Number Percent 
.29 and below 2 20.0 
.30 - .39 2 20.0 
.40 - .49 4 40.0 
.50 and above 2 20.0 
TOTAL 10 100.0 
Range = .149 to .647 
7. . = .399 
3-J 
